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INDEPENDENT PANEL FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CGIAR SYSTEM 
 
 
November 3, 2008 
 
Ms. Katherine Sierra    
Chair, CGIAR 
The World Bank 
Washington DC 
 
Independent Review of the CGIAR System 
 
Dear Kathy: 
On behalf of the Independent Panel for the Review of the CGIAR System, I am 
pleased to transmit to you the Synthesis Report of the Independent Review. The Panel 
and I wish to thank you and your colleagues for the trust and confidence that you have 
placed in us. We are very pleased to complete this Review and to deliver 
recommendations, which we believe may enable important reforms and position the 
CGIAR and its affiliated Centers as a leader in meeting the challenges of agriculture and 
natural resource management for the poor of the world.  
In conducting the Review and preparing our Report, we consulted widely and 
benefited greatly from the expertise, insights, and support of many people and 
institutions both within and outside the CGIAR. Members, staff, and stakeholders were 
generous with their time and candid in their contributions. We have benefited from the 
exchange of ideas with participants in the Change Management Process. We are grateful 
to all who contributed to our work. 
Today, there has been a unique confluence of a global food price crisis, an energy 
crisis, climate change challenges and environmental degradation, and a collapse of the 
international financial system. This is creating unprecedented demands on the 
international development community. Institutions will need to reform rapidly to cope 
with these developments. 
 While the CGIAR can capitalize on its 37 years of global partnership, it must 
shed some systems and behaviors that no longer contribute to its effectiveness. It must 
produce a compelling results‐oriented strategy and work plan and create the trust that 
will lead to substantial and predictable funding for research in the future. Although in 
recent years other organizations have gained strength in agricultural research, there is 
no question that the world needs the CGIAR global network of research Centers and its 
committed funders. It is unique in its history and long‐standing in its credibility. It can 
make a vital contribution to the multiple tasks of scientific and social science research 
and technology innovation, resource mobilization, and constituency building.  
The Panel members and I are pleased that many of our recommendations have 
already been assimilated into the reform proposals that will be presented at the CGIAR 
2008 Annual General Meeting. The Panel is optimistic that the final Synthesis Report and 
the Technical Report will continue to guide the CGIAR System in its efforts. In our view 
it is a key part of the international institutional architecture and its contribution to 
development results at the global, regional, national, and local levels is essential. 
Our recommendations call for swift decisions and urgent action focused on 
governance, results‐oriented management, funding, partnerships, and gender 
integration.  
In closing, thank you for your support to the Panel’s work, and for your 
unstinting support of the independence of the Panel and for our recommendations.  
Yours sincerely, 
      
Elizabeth McAllister 
Chair 
Independent Panel for the Review of the CGIAR System 
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Centers contribute value, 
but the CGIAR System 
is not achieving its full 
potential. Governance 
transformation is needed 
for leadership in a 
rebalanced partnership 
to articulate a shared, 
convincing strategy with 
a results orientation, 
clear authorities, and 
effective decisionmaking
The importance of reviewing the Consulta-
tive Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) became starkly apparent 
to the Independent Reviw Panel in 2008 as 
food prices soared. World leaders called for 
rapid action to stem the effects of food price 
inflation as 100 million people were pushed 
into poverty and the ranks of the 800 mil-
lion already suffering hunger began to swell. 
As trade barriers on rice and other food com-
modities were resurrected and food price pro-
tests hit many developing countries, the world 
community was reminded of the importance 
of food security to economic and political sta-
bility. The questions posed to the Panel by the 
CGIAR membership became compelling. 
In our visits to the Centers and atten-
dance at various forums over the year, the 
Panel was struck by the energy and dedication 
that Center leadership and scientists have for 
their work. We participated in several retreats 
with CGIAR members and stakeholders who 
worked hard for almost a year in an intensive 
change exercise to renew the CGIAR as a 
forum for bringing together the best of sci-
ence and the best of development. 
The CGIAR, however, suffers signs of age 
as it turns 37. It is in urgent need of structural 
change if it is to respond with its full potential 
to new challenges of food and environmental 
security. A renewed and rebalanced partner-
ship is essential for the CGIAR System to im-
prove its game. 
In support of this renewal, the Panel of-
fers its answers to the questions posed by the 
CGIAR Members in the form of key findings 
and recommendations, supported by a sum-
mary of its findings and a model for moving 
forward, detailed in this Synthesis Report. The 
Panel’s full analysis is in its Technical Report.
The Panel’s key conclusion is that the 
Centers contribute value, but the CGIAR 
System is not achieving its full potential. Gov-
ernance transformation is needed for leader-
ship in a rebalanced partnership to articulate 
a shared, convincing strategy with a results 
orientation, clear authorities, and effective 
decisionmaking.
The independent CGIAR network of re-
search Centers matters—for achieving food 
security, for dealing with climate change, and 
for supporting achievement of the Millen-
nium Development Goals. The new global ar-
chitecture for agriculture will need to respond 
rapidly to emergencies, such as crop, animal, 
and zoonotic diseases of global significance. It 
will also need to make sustained investments 
over the coming decades to address such com-
plex challenges as mitigation and adaptation 
to climate change and biotechnology for the 
poor. 
Despite working in a complex environ-
ment with significant management challenges, 
CGIAR-supported research has seen high re-
turns. Global and regional meta-evaluations 
suggest that CGIAR investments have paid 
for themselves by a wide margin, even consid-
ering just a few well documented successes. Its 
multidisciplinary research activities and its 
range of collaborations position the CGIAR 
network of Centers as one for the world’s most 
innovative development  partnerships—and as 
a 21st century organization.
But this is a serious moment in the CGIAR 
System’s history. Notwithstanding its contri-
butions and potential, the CGIAR system 
has major shortcomings and is hitting below 
its weight. It has been largely absent from the 
key global debates on the food crisis and cli-
mate change, it lacks a coherent strategy, it has 
Overview: summary of 
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A new compact—one 
based on separate 
governance and 
management and 
predictable funding—is 
needed to rebuild the 
cooperative spirit between 
Members and Centers 
and bring the best of 
science together with the 
best of development
experienced financial and administrative up-
heavals in recent years, and the trust between 
its constituent Centers and the donors that 
support them has deteriorated. 
Center performance is uneven, financing 
arrangements have not kept pace with needs, 
system governance has become cumbersome 
and ineffective, and management practices re-
quire improvement. Financing in real terms 
has stagnated since the 1990s. The share of 
unrestricted funds has declined steadily since 
1998 and with it capital investment. The Cen-
ters are experiencing difficulty attracting and 
retaining top scientists. As a consequence, the 
CGIAR Centers’ influence and impact are 
less than they could be.
The CGIAR System has been attempt-
ing reform since 1994. Incremental, these at-
tempts have largely failed to meet their ambi-
tious aims. Needed now is extensive reform, 
particularly to address a dysfunctional gover-
nance structure that is at the root of the Sys-
tem’s inability to change.
A new compact—one based on separate 
governance and management and predictable 
funding—is needed to rebuild the coopera-
tive spirit between Members and Centers and 
bring the best of science together with the 
best of development.1 Effective structural re-
form as the vital first step should allow new 
leadership to emerge. The rebalanced CGIAR 
partnership, with the mutual accountability 
recommended in this report, should facilitate 
the formulation of a bold collective strategy. 
These challenges offer an opportunity for 
renewing and strengthening the international 
agricultural architecture as well as the CGIAR 
System. With a 3,300-person scientific staff 
dedicated to poverty reduction and one of the 
world’s largest and most important germplasm 
collections, the System can reaffirm its value 
to humanity. It generates and delivers inter-
national public goods—scientific and techno-
logical knowledge, agricultural research prod-
ucts and services, and research capacities to 
respond to and anticipate demand—that are 
essential to improve agricultural productivity 
and environmental sustainability in the poor 
regions of the world. 
Findings
Finding 1: The CGIAR-supported 
Centers contribute substantially 
to agricultural productivity and 
natural resource management
Overall, recent impact assessments of CGIAR 
research reveal very high returns on invest-
ment. A recent meta-analysis of all ex post 
impact assessments over the System’s lifetime 
found benefits suggesting that total invest-
ments in the CGIAR have paid for themselves 
by a wide margin—benefits ranged from 
$12 billion to $120 billion. Regional impact 
studies in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
point to substantial benefits of crop genetic 
improvement research in Asia and of crop 
genetic improvement and biological control 
research in Africa. But they also illustrate that 
research impacts in Africa have been limited 
geographically, with lower positive returns on 
investment than in other regions—despite 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s receiving the largest 
regional share of CGIAR investment (41 per-
cent over the CGIAR’s lifetime).
Crop genetic improvement research has 
received the most assessment and has gener-
ated evidence of profound positive impacts 
from the broad diffusion of improved variet-
ies and subsequent spillover effects. Yield-en-
hancing and yield-stabilizing modern variet-
ies produced by the Centers and their national 
partners have produced benefits of more than 
$10 billion annually, due largely to improved 
wheat, rice, and maize. Recent research on a 
range of crops and traits (drought resistance 
and nutritional content) are generating out-
puts and outcomes assessed as very promising 
for potential impact. 
Recent studies on the impact of natural 
resource management research, including 
pest management, show substantial benefits 
and positive internal rates of return on in-
vestment. Some benefits have occurred at a 
considerable scale and are of international 
significance. Notable examples are the work 
of the rice-wheat consortium in South Asia, 
biological control programs in Africa, and the 
Alternatives to Slash and Burn Program. But 
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much of the research impact for natural re-
source management is still on a much smaller 
geographic scale than that for crop genetic im-
provement, often because adoption depends 
on local collective action, extension services, 
or assignment of property rights. That means 
that the spillovers can be very limited, and the 
overall impacts constrained. 
The number of studies on the impact of 
policy-oriented research has risen considerably 
in recent years. Policy-oriented research offers 
strong potential for generating broad impacts 
affecting many people in many countries. Esti-
mating benefit-cost ratios is more difficult for 
policy-oriented research than for most other 
types of research. Even where the evidence is 
clear that policy advice was applied, the advice 
is usually only one of many influences.
Finding 2: The CGIAR and Centers 
need to take a more strategic 
approach to partnership 
The word partnership is greatly overused in 
the discourse of international development. 
Yet the CGIAR System cannot function 
effectively as a component of an international 
public goods delivery system without robust 
partnerships that ensure the distribution and 
use of CGIAR outputs. Although Centers 
have forged many high-value partnerships, 
most are short term and ad hoc. The resources, 
incentives, and strategic arrangements needed 
for an effective international public goods 
delivery system are not in place. The challenge 
for the CGIAR donors and Centers is to be 
part of such a system and to exercise vision 
and leadership in bringing it about. The green 
revolution of the 1970s in Asia was driven by 
a strategic vision that included the scientific 
discoveries of the CGIAR contributing to 
a delivery system that catalyzed large-scale 
agriculture and infrastructure investment. 
This resulted in an international public goods 
delivery system through strong partnerships 
between the CGIAR and the national agricul-
tural research systems (NARS) and advanced 
research institutes.
New partnerships are needed to meet 
today’s challenges—of food insecurity, 
nutritional inadequacy, and climate change—
especially in Africa. To be successful, these 
partnerships will need to apply the lessons 
of the first green revolution in Asia, with its 
clear long-term strategy for delivery system 
requirements, including financing for capac-
ity and institution building. Without this, the 
current attention of world leaders on issues of 
food production and food security for the 
poor and vulnerable will come to very little. 
Key characteristics of successful partner-
ships include:
Written and mutually endorsed un-•	
derstanding of the “coincidence of 
objectives.”
Stipulation and agreement on mutual •	
expectations and the mechanisms for 
dispute resolution.
Specification of “end points,” mile-•	
stones, and a framework for ongoing 
evaluation.
Inclusion of exit strategies and the •	
conditions for their enactment.
Where finances are part of the part-•	
nership, advance understanding on 
resource allocations, accountability, 
and management standards.
Finding 3: The Centers have 
made progress in addressing 
intellectual property protection, 
but more needs to be done 
The CGIAR and its Centers’ capacity to han-
dle issues of intellectual property and gover-
nance of genetic resources affects the status of 
the collections in genebanks, the exchange of 
germplasm, the ability of the Centers to col-
laborate with NARS and farmer organiza-
tions, and the kinds of partnerships they can 
establish with the private sector and advanced 
research institutes. The CGIAR cannot 
ignore or casually handle issues of intellec-
tual property protection. While some Centers 
have relatively developed regimes, high levels 
of awareness, and staff dedicated to dealing 
with intellectual property issues, the major-
ity of the Centers do not have in-house staff 
responsible for intellectual property issues 
and tend to deal with these issues on an ad hoc 
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basis, often reacting to crisis. The general view 
among people consulted by the Independent 
Review Panel is that Centers need to do more 
to effectively deal with issues of intellectual 
property protection. 
Finding 4: Gender is not adequately 
integrated into Centers’ research 
mandates and outreach 
The Panel’s analysis indicates that the CGIAR 
System appreciates gender integration as being 
important or very important to its research 
mandate and understands that the CGIAR 
and the Centers have not been fully effec-
tive in integrating gender into their research 
and outreach. But there is scant evidence to 
indicate that the contributions of women to 
agriculture and their special knowledge and 
needs are addressed at a level commensurate 
with their importance to agriculture, as recog-
nized by the CGIAR and Center leadership. 
Institutionally, the CGIAR System has not 
built on best practice institutional account-
ability approaches to mainstream gender and 
to devise special measures, where necessary, 
to address the specific needs of women and 
girls. There is misplaced reliance by CGIAR 
leadership on staff advocacy functions below 
the executive level in convening Centers and 
in individual Centers, diverting responsibility 
from operations. Even so, there is a readiness 
to develop a systemwide policy, strategy, and 
results framework. 
Finding 5: The Centers are in 
a quiet financial crisis
Funding for the Centers has not grown in 
real terms for more than a decade (figure 1). 
In contrast, several international development 
institutions have received record replenish-
ments of their concessionary and grant funds, 
suggesting that the problem has not been the 
unavailability of resources but a failure of the 
CGIAR and Centers to set up institutions 
that mobilize funds well.
Funding has been increasingly piecemeal 
rather than strategic. Every review of the 
CGIAR in the past decade has recommended 
stronger central coordination of funding and 
a tighter link between priorities, performance, 
and fund allocation. Yet funding has become 
increasingly “restricted,” with a proliferation 
of smaller, targeted grants. While this has ben-
efits for some donors, it means larger admin-
istrative costs for Centers, greater financial 
risk, and less flexibility to follow promising 
lines of research. It has also resulted in falling 
capital investments by the Centers at the risk 
of falling behind scientifically. All growth in 
funding from nonmembers is restricted. And 
while so far supporting CGIAR objectives, 
nonmember funding can also lead to further 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base.
2007 US$ millions
Restricted funding
Unrestricted funding
Total funding
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2007200620052004200320022001200019991998199719961995
Figure 1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR
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Centers need more 
resources, larger reserves, 
and especially more 
unrestricted funds, but 
donors are unlikely to 
provide them without 
greater assurance of 
strategic effectiveness and 
performance. Needed: 
a new institutional and 
financial structure with 
new tools for resource 
mobilization as part of a 
general reform package
fragmentation of CGIAR and Center core 
objectives. 
The CGIAR Centers have been placed in 
an invidious position by the lack of clear, ade-
quate, and consistent incentives. The discourse 
of the donor agencies has been rooted in the 
Paris Declaration principles of alignment, 
harmonization, devolved ownership, and mu-
tual accountability. The incentives provided to 
the CGIAR by donors, however, have pushed 
competition and individual donor ownership, 
resulting in fragmentation. Many Centers cur-
rently manage 200–300 separate, relatively 
small projects, many with different terms, 
conditions, requirements, fiscal year reporting 
schedules, and overhead rates. 
There are deficiencies in financial manage-
ment at some Centers and limited tools for 
managing financial risk across the partner-
ship. The cross-cutting multipartner Chal-
lenge Programs have increased the complex-
ity of the research network and partnership 
and the difficulty of financial management 
and control. The ad hoc arrangements for dif-
ferent Challenge Programs do not provide a 
strong foundation of financial systems to cope 
with the rising numbers of such programs.
In good times, these would be significant 
problems. During the current food price cri-
sis, new ideas and approaches are needed even 
more urgently. Because the problems are in-
terrelated, the Panel believes that the finan-
cial challenges can probably be resolved only 
as part of an overall change in the institu-
tional structure of the partnership. Centers 
need more resources, larger reserves, and es-
pecially more unrestricted funds, but donors 
are unlikely to provide them without greater 
assurance of strategic effectiveness and per-
formance. Needed: a new institutional and 
financial structure with new tools for re-
source mobilization as part of a general re-
form package. 
Finding 6: Dysfunctional 
governance and management 
constrain the System’s potential
The CGIAR Charter enshrines what may 
be called “dispersed governance,” with no 
effective locus for systemwide decisions on 
important governance matters. Because 
there is no empowered “entry point” into 
the CGIAR and no accepted leader who can 
act with authority for the Centers, decision-
making is shifted down to individual Center 
boards or up to the Consultative Group. The 
expression of collective will of the members 
is at the Annual General Meeting (particu-
larly its Business Meeting), a large body that 
can take decisions only by consensus. Spe-
cific decisions on vision, partnerships, orga-
nizational structure, research activities, and 
resource allocation are made by the individ-
ual boards and managements of the Centers. 
Between the Centers and the Annual General 
Meeting of the Consultative Group are bodies 
fulfilling only advisory or nonbinding over-
sight and monitoring functions.
The lack of a focal point for Centerwide 
decisionmaking has several pernicious out-
comes. First are high transaction costs, iden-
tified by new and existing donors and the 
sister institutions in the international system 
as a serious disincentive to working with the 
CGIAR. Second is the inability of the net-
work of Centers to mobilize quickly to re-
spond to opportunities or to position their 
collective competence to create opportunities 
in the rapidly changing context of research for 
development. 
There is no use of modern results-based 
strategy and management approaches that 
would help CGIAR entities decide where ac-
countability and responsibility for final results 
fall between production of the core components 
and complementary delivery components of the 
international public goods delivery system. 
The CGIAR has attempted reform several 
times since the mid-1990s, with the twin aims 
of ensuring strategic relevance and securing 
adequate, stable, and predictable financing. 
All efforts proved largely unsuccessful. The 
CGIAR is once again attempting change 
through a highly ambitious change manage-
ment initiative. The Panel considers that a 
successful outcome will require taking careful 
account of the lessons of prior efforts: a struc-
tural transformation in CGIAR governance 
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is the key precondition for the success of all 
other reforms. 
Recommendations
Recommendation 1. Rebalance the 
Center-donor partnership to sustain 
the CGIAR’s unique contributions 
A central finding of the Panel is that the 37-year 
partnership between Members/donors and 
the research Centers is a robust comparative 
advantage of the CGIAR. No other interna-
tional arrangement rivals this common-cause 
partnership of development agencies and agri-
cultural science with its nearly four decades 
of accumulated knowledge and social capital. 
This partnership should be preserved. But it 
needs rebalancing (box 1). 
The separate responsibilities and au-•	
thorities of Members/donors and of 
the Centers need to be clarified and 
rationalized in a dual structure of a 
Consortium (a legal entity owned 
jointly by the Centers) and a CGIAR 
Fund (formed and managed by do-
nors), with some bridging institutions 
(figure 2). 
Some common institutions of the •	
partnership need to be maintained.
Donors need to strike a new balance be-
tween providing unrestricted resources to the 
Centers, achieving greater programmatic co-
herence in funding, and strategically target-
ing grants. In addition, resource allocation 
needs to be influenced more by Center perfor-
mance. In return, the Centers need to work 
closely together to bring greater coherence 
to the network, to be more programmatic in 
their outlook, to make firm strategic and orga-
nizational decisions and to demonstrate cost-
efficiency. Finally, the Centers cannot be held 
accountable for the final delivery of their prod-
ucts to the poor, but they do need to be part of 
a larger strategy and set of arrangements with 
The Panel recommends a new systemwide governance model 
based on nine criteria:
A single entry point is required to position the CGIAR in inter-1. 
national forums and to reduce the transaction costs identified 
by potential funders and international institutional partners. 
The functions of governance and management need to be 2. 
differentiated and clearly separated to avoid conflicts of in-
terest. Donors should not be involved in managing the Cen-
ters. Management and responsibility for operations should 
be separated from oversight. 
Decisionmaking bodies should be empowered to take bind-3. 
ing decisions and have commensurate authority to ensure 
implementation, at least in clearly circumscribed areas es-
sential for CGIAR System functioning.
Governance arrangements require formal foundations— 4. 
legal in the case of the Consortium—to increase legitimacy 
and improve effectiveness. This requires establishing rules-
based membership conditions that include enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Adequate and predictable financing, particularly for inter-5. 
national public goods, is required to allow the Centers to 
retain a cadre of high-caliber scientists to tackle mid- and 
long-term scientific challenges. Predictable and adequate 
financing must be earned. Financing arrangements must 
take full account of the need for donors to demonstrate 
results and value for money.
Paris Declaration principles—alignment of developing 6. 
country strategic priorities and CGIAR strategy and pro-
grams, harmonization of programmatic funding levels and 
reporting requirements, devolved ownership, and mutual 
accountability—should be applied to the CGIAR.
A fully independent evaluation and assessment function 7. 
needs to be set up. The Science Council’s role as evaluator 
is incompatible with its role as advisor and honest broker on 
scientific excellence. The two roles need to be separated. 
The CGIAR must maintain high standards of excellence in 8. 
research, while ensuring that key partners use the CGIAR 
outputs to achieve development impact. The apparent 
contradiction between focusing on scientific excellence 
and research achievements and giving priority to achiev-
ing development outcomes and results needs to be recon-
ceptualized using advanced models of international public 
goods and results management.
The political viability of implementing the new governance 9. 
arrangements for the CGIAR should be acceptable to the 
key players in the CGIAR community. A time-targeted plan 
to implement the proposed governance reforms should be 
agreed to and supported financially. 
Box 1 Criteria for getting on with rebalancing the Center-donor partnership
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donors and other partners to achieve specific 
development-based outcomes. 
After careful consideration, the Panel has 
concluded that four actions are vital:
The CGIAR System should separate 1. 
governance and management func-
tions. The roles of donors and man-
agement should be separated to avoid 
conflicts of interest. The management 
responsibility for operations should 
be separated from oversight. 
The donors should establish a CGIAR 2. 
Fund for Agricultural Research as a 
new channel for predictable, unre-
stricted funding to Centers and re-
stricted funding to programs. Money 
should be allocated from the Fund to 
Centers and to programs in a rules-
based manner, partly according to 
performance. In deciding how much 
grant funding to channel through the 
pooled Fund, the donors should keep 
in mind their Paris Declaration com-
mitment to provide two-thirds of their 
development aid on a program rather 
than a project grant basis by 2010.
The Centers should strengthen their 3. 
institutions for common action by 
consolidating common services, com-
mon policy and strategy, and program 
administration in a jointly owned 
Consortium.
Both donors and Centers should set 4. 
up decisionmaking procedures based 
on clear authorities and shared stra-
tegic objectives. Nonbinding ap-
proaches to decisionmaking are no 
longer adequate for a collective enter-
prise that spends half a billion dollars 
of public money annually, resources 
set to increase substantially if the 
foregoing actions are taken. 
The Panel has considered whether the rec-
ommended approach to governance would be 
more economical as well as more effective 
than the existing system. It seems clear that 
the true costs of governance will be less when 
the dysfunctions of the current system are 
remedied. 
Recommendation 2. Establish a legally 
structured Consortium of Centers 
Building on the conclusions of prior stud-
ies and the lessons of past reform efforts, 
the Panel recommends establishing a new 
legally structured Consortium of Centers. 
It would be owned by the Centers, governed 
by a board chosen by them, and have a Chair 
and a Chief Executive Officer chosen through 
international competition. Its board would 
be assigned clear decisionmaking authorities, 
fiduciary, and due diligence accountabilities by 
the Centers and its decisions on all delegated 
matters would be binding on members. The 
Consortium would be rules-bound. As new, 
high-impact organizations appear over time, 
the rules should allow for new and expanded 
membership. It should not be a closed shop. 
The Consortium would provide a single 
point of entry and, in partnership with the 
Fund, project a single coherent voice in in-
ternational policy forums, a much stronger 
position than single Centers can occupy. The 
Consortium will enable the Centers to man-
age their common interests more coherently 
and strategically. In particular, it would pro-
vide an instrument for common services, pro-
gram coordination and administration, and 
results-based management. 
CGIAR Fund-supported programs 
should have an administrative home in the 
Consortium.
Many of the CGIAR’s main donors will 
continue to expect consolidations and dem-
onstrations of major cost-effectiveness gains 
over the next few years, and this will affect 
decisions on levels of financing. The Panel 
believes, therefore, that the new Consortium 
must address as a very high priority the reality 
of total governance size and costs. 
To improve on past performance in spe-
cific areas, a new Consortium of Centers 
should:
Improve financial management and •	
financial reporting. Specifically, the 
Consortium should evaluate transac-
tion costs of small grants and establish 
minimum grant requirements, move 
to full cost recovery on all projects, 
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The Fund would work to 
ensure follow-through 
on financial pledges, to 
receive and hold funds 
provided to the Fund, and 
to make funds available to 
the Consortium of Centers
increase reserve requirements to 180 
days (and should not be penalized for 
higher reserves), immediately assess 
the need for capital improvements 
across Centers, provide more detail 
in financial reports on nonmember 
contributions, and develop annual fi-
nancial statements for Challenge Pro-
grams, which should be subject to an 
annual independent audit. 
Simplify the Challenge Programs to •	
focus on Center-led consortia. This 
change should not reduce the valu-
able involvement of external institu-
tions in program development and 
implementation if it is made a condi-
tion of program award and if propos-
als are adequately peer reviewed. It 
will help make Challenge or “mega” 
Programs an effective tool of Sys-
tem strategy. Further, the Challenge 
Programs and Systemwide and Eco-
regional Programs (SWEPs) should 
be integrated into a more strategic 
(derived from System strategy and 
strategic objectives) new mechanism 
for inter-Center programmatic re-
search with partners. Design and 
management of these programmatic 
initiatives should be based more on 
what is required to achieve results 
and less on a portfolio of specific in-
struments. The Consortium of Cen-
ters could provide a mechanism for 
managing programs that would avoid 
conflicts of interest and improve fi-
nancial oversight.
Establish common services such as •	
strategic communications, financial 
reporting, and results management 
systems, internal audit, information 
technology, and properly equipped 
human resources function. The 
human resources function must en-
sure equity in internal Consortium 
and Center hiring, training, and com-
pensation and other rewards. Once 
established, the new function could 
prepare gender and diversity policies. 
As the new human resources function 
becomes established, the Gender and 
Diversity Program should gradually 
hand over its mainstream activities 
(such as the staff survey) to human 
resources. 
Centers should develop a common •	
strategy to protect their internally 
generated intellectual property and 
know-how, including filing their 
own patent applications. The CGIAR 
must resolve issues related to its pol-
icy of making research results publicly 
available. The interests of the CGIAR 
and developing countries must be re-
spected, along with the interests of 
public sector companies. These issues 
have been pending for more than a 
decade, and the Panel recommends 
urgent and decisive attention.
Recommendation 3. Establish a CGIAR 
Fund for Agricultural Research 
The new CGIAR Fund for Agricultural 
Research would be established under a gov-
erning Council that would receive, hold, com-
mit, and allocate financial resources assigned 
to it in trust. This would be principally a 
shareholder governing body made up of con-
tributing members, including foundations. 
An option would be to assign voting shares 
on the basis of groupings (constituencies) to 
accommodate both large and smaller share-
holders and other stakeholders.
The Fund would work to ensure follow-
through on financial pledges, to receive and 
hold funds provided to the Fund, and to 
make funds available to the Consortium of 
Centers. In making funds available, it would 
apply the conditions and schedules agreed in 
multiyear financing discussions, including 
performance- and results-based reporting, 
milestones, and benchmarks. Together with 
the Board of the Consortium, it would be re-
sponsible for ensuring that transparency and 
full cost recovery are applied to all financing 
agreements falling outside of the Fund. 
Once allocated from the CGIAR Fund 
to the Centers, funds should be unrestricted. 
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The World Bank should 
chair the new Fund 
and cochair strategy 
and replenishment-
like triennial meetings 
with the Consortium
Financial management should be strength-
ened, partly by giving programs a common 
administrative home in the Consortium, as-
suming that the Consortium would have a 
formal Finance Committee and would be ac-
countable to the Fund for financial manage-
ment of contributions.
The key responsibilities of the Fund would 
be to lead funding negotiations, to maintain 
strong links with the development and re-
search community on poverty reduction, and 
to create opportunities for complementary 
programs to support the science and research 
of the Centres. The Fund would use its devel-
opment knowledge to allocate its resources 
to programs and Centers according to agreed 
criteria and rules.
The main functions to be carried by the 
Fund would include:
Establishing a multiyear financ-•	
ing mechanism on the lines recom-
mended in this report and based on 
the Monterrey principles of good do-
norship (adequacy and predictability 
of financing and mutual accountabil-
ity for results). The aim should also 
be that such financing equal approxi-
mately two-thirds of total CGIAR fi-
nancing by 2010. The CGIAR Chair 
would exercise collective leadership in 
this regard and would provide over-
sight for establishing the Fund. 
Approving transfers from the Fund •	
to the Consortium based on agreed 
schedules, performance-based indica-
tors, targeted milestones and reviews 
of the specific program proposals that 
would follow from the agreed strate-
gic framework. 
Ensuring accountability and standards •	
of due diligence over all funds held 
and assigned to the Consortium.
The World Bank should maintain its spe-
cial relationship with the CGIAR and its affil-
iated Centers. It should focus its engagement 
on strategy, resource mobilization and allo-
cation, and building of the substantive links 
between the Bank and the development com-
munity, including its own Agriculture and 
Rural Development Department. The World 
Bank needs to disengage from operational 
management of the CGIAR network of Cen-
ters. The leadership of the World Bank in con-
sultative group arrangements argues strongly 
that the Bank should assume the leadership 
of this revitalized and modernized body. The 
Bank’s convening power would be an essential 
ingredient of success. The World Bank should 
chair the new Fund and cochair strategy and 
replenishment-like triennial meetings with 
the Consortium. 
Recommendation 4. Support the 
Consortium and CGIAR Fund with 
a science advisory board and an 
independent evaluation unit
The Panel considered what common institu-
tions should be maintained as part of a strong 
partnership between the Centers (and their 
joint Consortium) and the proposed Fund, 
concluding that there should be at least three:
A joint strategy and results frame-•	
work developed for the inaugural 
conference and renewed preferably 
as part of replenishment-like negotia-
tions on a triennial basis.
An independent evaluation unit, re-•	
porting to the council of the Fund, 
but working closely with the board of 
the Consortium as well.
A committee of eminent advisors •	
that form a science advisory board. It 
might be called the Science Council, 
as at present, or perhaps something 
broader if the inaugural conference 
decides to include anti-poverty exper-
tise as well as science expertise.
Joint Strategy and Results Framework: The 
Panel recommends establishment of a system-
wide strategic management for results frame-
work. Strategic results frameworks are the key 
link between donors and Centers, the glue 
that holds the CGIAR System together. They 
should be prepared in consultation with all 
relevant partners, including those in charge 
of scientific advice and those responsible for 
independent evaluations.
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As managing for results is 
essentially a responsibility 
of management, the 
Consortium should take 
the lead on performance 
management and 
measurement once new 
systems are established
Although Centers have put in place strate-
gic planning, management, and performance 
measurement systems, these are as yet absent 
at the System level. In addition to guiding pri-
ority setting and resource allocation, jointly 
developed systemwide strategic management 
for results frameworks provide the means for 
grounding the mutual accountability between 
donors and Centers on indicators, facts, and 
evidence. These, in turn, increase transpar-
ency and allow performance assessment of 
both parties in achieving commonly defined 
objectives and results. Together with an in-
ternational public goods delivery system ap-
proach, these frameworks inform the design 
and implementation of partnerships and lead 
to an effective division of labor between Cen-
ters and their partners. They establish clear 
lines of accountability for activities that are 
directly under Center control, and of respon-
sibility for influencing partners in those they 
do not control. 
The results framework would be the basis 
for Performance Contracts between the Con-
sortium and the Fund, against which imple-
mentation would be managed and perfor-
mance monitored. As managing for results is 
essentially a responsibility of management, the 
Consortium should take the lead on perfor-
mance management and measurement once 
new systems are established. The Fund should 
develop its own results framework against 
which to judge its performance and report to 
the Consortium on its effectiveness.
Science Advisory Board: This would take up 
those functions of the current Science Council 
that are solidly service based and that aim to 
furnish the  Consortium of Centers with the 
highest caliber of scientific counsel, including 
the results of foresight exercises to keep the 
work of the rebalanced partnership “ahead of 
the curve” on the needs of science for develop-
ment. This body would provide the CGIAR 
System with scientific and technical advice 
and would be a broker to mobilize science and 
technology for agricultural development. 
As required by the Consortium, it would 
also provide advice in the formulation of 
strategy and program proposals. It would 
not, however, carry out performance evalua-
tions, as is the current practice of the Science 
Council. This is at fundamental variance 
with accepted best practice, as it has placed 
the Science Council in a conflicted position, 
whereby it provides scientific and program-
matic advice, mandates programmatic norms 
and standards, and evaluates performance 
arising from its advice but without account-
ability for the performance. 
The Panel recommends that the strate-
gic role of the current Science Council, em-
bodied in the former activities of the Science 
Council’s Standing Panel on Priorities and 
Strategies and the Standing Panel on Mobi-
lizing Science, be made the principle role of 
the future Science Advisory Board. This body 
should remain an independent advisory body 
that provides advice to the Consortium of 
Centers. Its advice will also be useful to the 
donor Fund, but the Science Advisory Board 
should not in any way be an instrument of the 
Fund to organize or conduct monitoring and 
evaluation of the Centers or Consortium.
A future role for the Science Advisory 
Board should include strategic studies on is-
sues of potential importance to the CGIAR 
and to global agricultural research for devel-
opment. Relative to current Science Council 
activity, these studies need to be increased and 
made more timely in their delivery. Most im-
portantly, they need to be developed in con-
sultation with the Centers, with a clear ini-
tial understanding of how their results will 
be used.
The Panel also recommends that the cur-
rent focus of the Science Council’s Stand-
ing Panel on Impact Assessment remain as 
an activity of the science advisory body as 
self- assessment assistance. Further, the Panel 
stresses the need to better assess the impact 
of all research areas, improving methods and 
levels of assessment for natural resource man-
agement and policy- oriented research and 
for capacity building, and understanding the 
contribution of all these research activities to 
the delivery of specific strategic objectives. 
In this context, the Panel also recommends 
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The Panel stresses the 
need to better assess 
the impact of all research 
areas, improving methods 
and levels of assessment 
for natural resource 
management and policy-
oriented research and 
for capacity building, 
and understanding the 
contribution of all these 
research activities to 
the delivery of specific 
strategic objectives
continued effort to understand the impact 
of CGIAR research on poverty reduction. 
There is a particular need to focus on under-
standing the impacts of CGIAR research in 
Africa, given the comparatively low historical 
impact and recent investment and promising 
outputs. Finally, the Panel recommends that 
future impact assessment make efforts to ac-
curately assess environmental, gender, and 
other indirect effects of agricultural research 
for development. There are some impact as-
sessment activities that are most appropriately 
undertaken by the Centers themselves, and 
the links between the science advisory body 
and the Consortium regarding impact assess-
ment would need to be worked out in more 
detail.
Independent Evaluation Unit: The Panel also 
recommends that an Independent Evaluation 
Unit be established to conduct systems reviews 
and to evaluate progress on the Joint Strategy 
and nested Center and program strategies. 
That is, as well as conducting overall systems 
evaluations, it would also take on the Science 
Council’s current role in managing external 
evaluations of CGIAR activity, including 
Centers and Challenge Programs. The Con-
sortium of Centers will need to develop their 
own capacity for results-based performance 
management and measurement.2
The Independent Evaluation Unit would 
report to the Council of the Fund. The Evalu-
ation Director would develop an evaluation 
strategy and work plans with the input of 
the Consortium, the Fund, and partners for 
tracking performance of the Consortium and 
the Fund toward the agreed strategic objec-
tives and desired programmatic outcomes and 
impacts defined in the strategy and the results 
framework.
It would follow donor agreed guidelines 
for evaluating global programs. It would work 
to reduce transaction costs for the Centers by 
working toward joint evaluations with do-
nors. It would report triennially on its own 
results and yearly on the evaluation results of 
the products set out in its multiyear strategy 
and on the implementation of the previous 
study recommendation. The program would 
also cover “process evaluations” to cover 
process effectiveness as well as investment 
effectiveness. 
Recommendation 5.  The Consortium 
and the Fund adopt a gender strategy 
based on accountability for integrating 
gender in the work of partnerships.
The Panel recommends that IFPRI, on behalf 
of the Consortium, develop by 2009 a gender 
strategy and results framework for inclusion 
in the new, overarching CGIAR strategy and 
results management process. IFPRI, along 
with the Participatory Research and Gender 
Analysis program, would establish an inter-
Center and stakeholder task force to develop 
Systemwide strategic objectives for gender 
integration in Center research nested under 
each of the CGIAR strategic objectives. The 
task force would review guidelines for all 
management and accountability instruments 
to include indicators of achievement of the 
proposed gender strategy.
The Panel recommends that one of the first 
mega programs to be developed address the 
productivity, production, and sustainability 
issues facing women in agriculture and the 
special health and nutrition needs of women 
and girls.
The Panel also recommends expansion of 
the Gender and Diversity African Women 
in Agricultural Research and Development 
(AWARD) Program into a global scientific 
capacity-building program for women and 
Group 2 nationals. Through a joint ven-
ture with universities in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries and with centers of excellence in 
developing countries, this would increase 
the number of female and Group 2 nation-
als who earn PhDs in agricultural science, 
economics, and other agriculture-related 
disciplines (including health). The Centers 
could assist Gender and Diversity Program 
work with donors to match universities and 
CGIAR Centers where postgraduate re-
search for development can be undertaken 
and supported.
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Members would be able 
to focus their energies 
on development strategy, 
resource allocation and 
oversight—matters that are 
more important and much 
more appropriate to them 
than micromanagement of 
Center network operations
Recommendation 6. The Consortium 
and the CGIAR Fund together take a 
more strategic approach to partnerships 
with other actors in the production and 
delivery of international public goods
The CGIAR cannot function effectively as a 
component of an international public goods 
delivery system in the absence of robust part-
nerships that ensure production and scaled up 
application of public goods. Current ad hoc, 
short-term approaches to partnerships are 
unsustainable. The results, relationships, and 
requirements for strategic partnerships need 
to be made explicit and operationalized within 
a results-based performance framework.
Within the balanced partnership •	
model, the Panel recommends as the 
highest priority for partnership devel-
opment in the CGIAR, that partner-
ships be approached as integral com-
ponents of a medium-term strategy 
and results framework. 
The Panel recommends that the •	
CGIAR donor community and the 
governments of developing countries 
approach the needs of Africa systemi-
cally by assuring adequate provision 
for institution and capacity building 
in the partnership among CGIAR, 
NARS, and advanced research 
institutes. 
The Panel also recommends the estab-•	
lishment of a separate financing facil-
ity as a contingency fund for partner-
ship opportunities, not envisaged in 
the strategic framework. This would 
be available, for example, to meet 
the short-term financing needs of a 
NARS partnership to test a promis-
ing new technology or to gain rapid 
and timely access to scientific equip-
ment available only in an advanced 
research institute.
The Panel recommends a facilitated •	
high-level dialogue with Chatham 
House rules among representatives of 
civil society organizations, the private 
sector, representatives of Centers and 
the Consortium, and independent 
experts on intellectual property 
rights. A multi stakeholder dialogue 
can be used to achieve greater clar-
ity on the nexus between intellectual 
property rights and public agricul-
tural research.
The Panel recommends the CGIAR •	
continue to apply its new policy for 
building partnerships with nongov-
ernmental organizations. The sys-
tematic nature and concrete steps 
proposed in the policy should be 
applied and tested over time. The 
Panel accords particular importance 
in this regard to conducting regular 
three-year evaluations of CGIAR– 
nongovernmental organization part-
nerships. At least the first such eval-
uation should be conducted on an 
independent basis.
Moving forward with a 
balanced partnership
From the Members’ perspective, in accepting 
a rebalanced partnership, Members would 
achieve four benefits: 
First, Members would have an in-•	
strument, the Fund, to achieve the 
quantum advance in the funding of 
research in agriculture and natural 
resource management that climate 
change and the current crisis in food 
prices demand. 
Second, strategic allocation of pooled •	
funds would enable a programmatic 
approach to investment in agricul-
tural and natural resource manage-
ment research for development.
Third, authorities would be clarified •	
and accountability enhanced. 
Fourth, members would be freed •	
from management responsibilities, 
which would be assumed by the joint 
Consortium of the Centers. This 
would be a significant gain in time 
and energy. Members would be able 
to focus their energies on develop-
ment strategy, resource allocation and 
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The Centers would “up 
their game” by focusing 
on large regional and 
global challenges. In 
doing so, their stature 
and relevance would 
increase in the eyes of the 
international community
oversight—matters that are more im-
portant and much more appropriate 
to them than micromanagement of 
Center network operations. 
Members would accept the loss of some 
powers in return for gains that are more im-
portant to them. They would:
Give up their quasi management of •	
Center affairs. 
Face a stronger, more confident and •	
probably more assertive network or 
partnership of Centers.
Relinquish some sovereignty because •	
financial contributions that were 
previously direct from individual 
Members to Centers would now be 
partly shared in the pooled Fund. But 
members would still exercise strategic 
sovereignty through their agreed re-
source allocation framework.
In summary, the Members would be re-
lieved of management responsibilities and 
the conflicts of interest that attend them. In-
stead, they would have an appropriate instru-
ment for results-based resource allocation 
(the Fund). The pooled Fund would enable 
Members to institute a results-based frame-
work, within which they could exercise due 
diligence on development “value for money” 
from the Centers. They would be working 
within a governance structure more in ac-
cord with the spirit of the Paris and Monterey 
Declarations, which encourage harmoniza-
tion and encourage Members to focus on 
strategy, resource allocation, and oversight 
rather than on the ownership of projects and 
operations.
From the Centers’ perspective, in accept-
ing the balanced partnership model, the Cen-
ters would gain certain benefits:
The Centers would “up their game” by •	
focusing on large regional and global 
challenges. In doing so, their stature 
and relevance would increase in the 
eyes of the international community. 
They would have access to a major new •	
source of unrestricted and restricted 
money through a new pooled Fund 
with the objective of substantially 
increasing the total funding of the 
Centers and Programs within the first 
commitment and pledging period. 
They would enhance their compara-•	
tive strategic advantage, not only 
by the capabilities made possible by 
substantial incremental funding, but 
also by having a single entry point 
and single voice in international fo-
rums. The brand and coherence of 
the network or partnership would be 
enhanced. 
They would be served by common •	
services owned by them. 
They would have a stronger role in the •	
joint management of programs. 
But accepting the rebalanced partnership 
model of governance for the common good 
and mission would involve tradeoffs for the 
Centers: 
They would cede some important •	
decisionmaking powers to the joint 
Consortium. 
They would accept that much of the •	
flow of unrestricted and restricted 
(programmatic) funds would come 
through the CGIAR Fund, rather 
than directly from individual mem-
bers, and that it would be allocated 
by members strategically, partly ac-
cording to Center performance and 
program performance. 
They would take more responsibil-•	
ity, individually and collectively, for 
financial risk management, and there 
would be a lower probability of a bail-
out if a Center had serious financial 
difficulties. 
They would pay significant fees and •	
levies to the joint Consortium, to 
cover its operations, including joint 
services to the Centers and adminis-
tering programs. These expenditures 
might be partly (or mostly) compen-
sated by transfers to the Centers of 
funds that previously have gone di-
rectly to pay for system management. 
But there might be significant incre-
mental costs to the Centers.
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The Panel believes that 
all aspects of the new 
governance system 
cannot be decided in 
the absence of serious 
discussions between the 
Member/donors and the 
Centers. In this spirit the 
Panel recommends an 
inaugural conference to 
reach agreement on a new 
reform compact for the 
rebalanced partnership 
and the requirements 
for its implementation
In summary, authorities and responsibili-
ties in the new model of governance would be 
clarified and rebalanced to the long-term ben-
efit of all parties.
Transition arrangements
There is now a window of opportunity for 
the reformation of the CGIAR. The current 
world food price crisis demands immediate 
action. Therefore the Panel recommends that 
funding be made available to exploit exist-
ing programming and to accelerate program 
design to fully engage past investments and 
to engage cutting edge science.
If the CGIAR and the Centers decided 
to move to a partnership structure similar to 
the one outlined here, the Panel recommends 
an eight-month transition to bring the new 
structures into existence. The process would 
entail two six-person task forces, one led by 
the World Bank to propose the details of the 
Fund and the other led by a chairperson desig-
nated by the Centers to formulate the details 
for legal incorporation in a jurisdiction that 
it would determine in consultation with the 
Centers. The task forces would present their 
proposals to the inaugural conference for the 
launch of the compact.
The Panel believes that all aspects of 
the new governance system cannot be de-
cided in the absence of serious discussions 
between the Member/donors and the Cen-
ters. In this spirit the Panel recommends an 
inaugural conference to reach agreement on 
a new reform compact for the rebalanced 
partnership and the requirements for its 
implementation. 
In the future a triennial assembly of all 
stakeholders would be organized and co-
chaired by the chairs of the Fund and the 
Consortium. Its purpose would be to present 
and seek feedback on strategies and programs 
and to review all matters of interest to the 
well-being of the CGIAR partnership. This 
could also seek to bring together the leaders of 
the leading organizations concerned with ag-
ricultural research and development, food se-
curity, and the interface between  agriculture 
and natural resource sustainability and major 
international research networks. 
Getting on with it
Real progress cannot come one institution at 
a time. The CGIAR Centers need to lift their 
partnership game at all levels and with the 
private sector and nongovernmental organi-
zations. But they cannot reform on their own. 
Nor can they address global challenges with-
out institutional supports from their global 
partners. The next step is for the govern-
ments responsible for the five organizations 
comprising the core entities of the interna-
tional agriculture architecture to review the 
recent evaluations of the International Fund 
for Agriculture Development, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, 
the World Food Programme, and the CGIAR 
to determine how these important institutions 
can be better supported to work more effec-
tively within more nimble, mission-directed, 
and integrated international structures.
Within this broad reform agenda, the 
CGIAR must enhance its global leadership. 
Science (including that for policy and insti-
tutional innovations) will be at the heart of 
faster productivity growth, adaptation to cli-
mate change and the use of scarce water. The 
priority challenges are becoming more trans-
national in scope, putting a premium on re-
gional and global collective action and on the 
development of international public goods. 
The Panel’s main message is that change 
at the CGIAR is essential—and possible. Get 
on with it.
Notes
Nested frameworks from overarching strategy to Center 1. 
and program strategy would guide the achievement of 
agreed strategic objectives. The results systems should 
first and foremost serve the management of the Centers 
to guide staff and secondly to demonstrate development 
impact achieved with partners. Efforts should be made to 
reduce reporting at each level of the system to just what is 
needed at the next to make decisions.
Governance is making sure an organization is doing the 2. 
right things; management is making sure the organization 
is doing them right.
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The Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was created 
in 1971 as an informal partnership among 
governments, private foundations, and inter-
national organizations interested in sup-
porting agricultural research for developing 
countries through a small network of inter-
national agricultural research centers. The 
CGIAR System (the Consultative Group and 
the Centers) was guided by an independent 
Technical Advisory Committee. Since then, 
the CGIAR System has grown to include 64 
Members, 15 research Centers, and an inde-
pendent Science Council. It is supported by 
an Executive Council, a System Office, and 
various standing and ad hoc committees. 
The CGIAR periodically commissions 
independent reviews. The most recent sys-
temwide review (the Third System Review) 
was completed in 1998. In 2003, the World 
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department 
conducted a meta-evaluation of the CGIAR 
System as part of a larger study of the World 
Bank’s involvement in global programs. Thus, 
this is the first full-fledged systemwide review 
of the CGIAR in 10 years. 
Today, the CGIAR operates in a very dif-
ferent context from that in 1971. New issues 
have come to the fore, putting at risk gains in 
agricultural productivity and related poverty 
reduction. These include greatly increased 
populations in some countries, loss of arable 
land to urbanization, increased pollution and 
degradation of water and soils, climate change, 
and rising demand for biofuels. Yet, official de-
velopment assistance to agriculture and agri-
cultural research has stagnated in real terms.
Objectives of the Independent 
Review Panel 
The Independent Review Panel was asked 
to “assess whether the CGIAR is well posi-
tioned to address emerging food security 
and agriculture-related problems of develop-
ing countries.” The objectives of this Review 
were to take stock and assess the efficacy of 
the partnership, to assess the effectiveness 
of the CGIAR research, and to recommend 
changes in the CGIAR System to improve its 
efficacy and effectiveness for dealing with the 
emerging challenges for food security, agricul-
ture, and natural resource management of the 
poor.
The terms of reference for this evaluation 
cover three linked topics: 
Governance, partnership, man-1. 
agement, and alignment of the 
CGIAR.
The scientific work of the CGIAR.2. 
Partnerships (national agricultural 3. 
research systems, advanced research 
institutes, the private sector, and non-
governmental organizations). 
The Panel’s terms of reference included 
questions on the positioning of the CGIAR 
along the research to development con-
tinuum. The Panel assessed whether the 
CGIAR System remains relevant and well 
positioned to make its best possible contri-
bution to the agricultural research needs of 
developing countries, including natural re-
source management, and, ultimately, to sup-
port the food security of poor people around 
the world. 
IntroductionCh
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Review standards and 
methodology
The standards for an independent review 
have evolved since the Third System Review 
10 years ago. In this Review, the Panel was 
guided by the World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group’s guidelines for the review 
of global partnership programs and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development– Development Assistance 
Committee criteria for evaluations.1
As with previous independent reviews, the 
Panel did not conduct or commission direct 
measures of the impact of the CGIAR Centers 
and programs but relied largely on existing evi-
dence. Box 1.1 lists the main sources of infor-
mation used by the Panel during the Review.
Participation and inclusion
The Panel sought input from a broad range 
of stakeholders, both internal and external 
to the CGIAR, from both industrialized 
and developing countries. The Panel visited 
eight Centers, surveyed some 240 stakehold-
ers directly involved in the CGIAR System 
through a written survey,2 interviewed more 
than 300 people, and conducted a stakeholder 
workshop to solicit feedback on its draft Tech-
nical Report. People consulted during the 
Review are listed in appendix 4.
Scope and limitations 
of the Review
The Independent Review of the CGIAR Sys-
tem had an appropriately broad scope, similar 
to that of the three previous comprehensive 
reviews. But the time allocated for the Review 
was short relative to the breadth of the terms 
of reference, previous reviews, and reviews 
of similar scope of other global programs 
and institutions. The members of the Panel 
were unable to work full-time on the Review 
because of other senior-level responsibilities 
they had to manage at the same time. Finally, 
it was a challenge to conduct the Review 
CGIAR Performance Measurement System and other in-•	
formation on the accountability and transparency of the 
CGIAR System.
Review of the extensive literature of reports previously •	
commissioned by the CGIAR or by the CGIAR’s stakehold-
ers and shareholders,1 and other documents relevant to the 
development impact of the CGIAR.2 
Examination of previous independent reviews and major •	
evaluations conducted by CGIAR Members, including the 
independent World Bank Operations Evaluation Depart-
ment Meta-evaluation of the CGIAR.
Evaluations of other global programs, including the recent •	
independent evaluations of IFAD (2005) and FAO (2007).
The •	 World Development Report 2008 analysis of the ef-
fectiveness of the World Bank in the agriculture and rural 
development sector, and the 2007 Independent Evaluation 
Group Report “World Bank Assistance To Agriculture In 
Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
Examination of financial information from the CGIAR Sys-•	
tem Office and the Centers.
Information on and recent reviews of governance and man-•	
agement of the CGIAR System.
Documents on financial risk management.•	
A written survey seeking the views of all those involved di-•	
rectly in the CGIAR System since 2001.
Structured Interviews with stakeholders and shareholders.•	
Visits to and interviews with the cosponsors, the CGIAR’s •	
administrative and coordinating units, CGIAR scientists and 
management at CGIAR-supported Centers and national 
agricultural research systems, and others involved with the 
Centers. 
Inputs by consultants to the Panel.•	
Participation of the Panel Chair in the Steering Committee •	
of the Facilitated Change Management Process.
Core CGIAR documents (for example, Charter), CGIAR/Executive 1. 
Council decision records, reports of previous reviews and studies 
(for example, System Office, Stripe Review of Corporate Gover-
nance of CGIAR Centers), and the general literature of agricultural 
research and development impact.
Reviews of Centers External Program and Management Reviews, 2. 
external reviews of the Challenge Programs and Systemwide and 
Ecoregional Programs, and evaluations of impact and other CGIAR 
evaluations, including evaluations done by Centers to assess the 
impact of the CGIAR on poverty reduction.
Box 1.1 Sources of information for the Independent Review
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simultaneously with the Facilitated Change 
Management Process. The Facilitated Change 
Management Process has rightly captured the 
attention, enthusiasm, and resources of the 
CGIAR. However, the time and energy that 
went into that process diminished the sup-
port that would otherwise have been avail-
able to the Review. On the positive side, the 
concurrent nature of the exercises created an 
openness in the CGIAR System that had not 
existed during past reviews.
Notes
See comments in World Bank (2003); OECD/DAC (1999, 1. 
2002, 2004, 2006); http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/grpp.
The survey was sent to 237 individuals in five target groups: 2. 
the Executive Council and other member representatives, 
board chairs and Center executives, Challenge Program 
representatives, the Science Council, and professional 
staff. The overall response rate was 85 percent (201 
responses). The intent was to examine how well those 
knowledgeable about or directly involved in managing 
the CGIAR network think it is being managed and what 
corrective steps might be taken to improve this. Others 
involved in the network—such as the large number of 
scientists doing Center work, their partners (such as those 
working in the national agricultural research systems and 
advanced research institutes), or the direct beneficiaries 
of their efforts (such as farmers and fishers)—were not 
asked to respond. However, Panel members did interview 
Center scientists, partner representatives, and others in 
person during visits as part of the Independent Review 
process. Their opinions did not differ substantially from 
those of survey respondents. Survey questions focused on 
the development and implementation of Center research 
priorities; the roles of the World Bank (financial and other); 
gender and diversity; the role and effectiveness of Science 
Council, of CGIAR partnerships, and of CGIAR Members 
and cosponsors; the Challenge Programs; funding and 
financial management; and governance reform. Several 
questions compared the importance of an issue with the 
effectiveness or adequacy with which it is being addressed. 
Over one-third asked respondents to select possible actions 
that might deal with the issues identified and invited them 
to comment on these and related concerns.
 20 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
All institutions, including the 
CGIAR, are lagging behind 
in the ability to respond 
to today’s challenges. 
There has never been a 
better time for the CGIAR 
to re-assert its role and 
relevance and redefine 
its vision and strategy
The CGIAr in a changing contextCh
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Agriculture returned to the international 
spotlight in 2008, when food riots erupted in 
many poor countries in response to a dramatic 
spike in food prices. The underlying causes 
are structural, and the problem will not be 
quickly corrected. All this heightens the need 
for coordinated efforts across sectors and insti-
tutions. But the institutions and mechanisms 
to implement and finance the global agenda 
were developed for a very different world. 
All institutions, including the CGIAR, are 
lagging behind in the ability to respond to 
today’s challenges. There has never been a bet-
ter time for the CGIAR to re-assert its role 
and relevance and redefine its vision and strat-
egy. Three broad principles should orient the 
CGIAR’s response to these challenges. 
Reforms of the global organizations 1. 
responsible for agriculture need to be 
conducted holistically, to clearly es-
tablish comparative advantages and 
areas of expertise.
Specialized global organizations for 2. 
agriculture will have to work together 
more effectively and with specialized 
agencies in other sectors.
The emerging global architecture will 3. 
need to be able to respond rapidly to 
emergencies of global scope and to 
make sustained investments over de-
cades to address some of the difficult 
challenges, such as adaptation to cli-
mate change and biotechnology for 
the poor.
Within this broad reform agenda, the 
CGIAR needs to enhance its global leader-
ship role. Science will be central to the solution 
to many challenges, such as faster productiv-
ity growth, adaptation to climate change, and 
use of scarce water. And priority challenges are 
increasingly transnational in scope, emphasiz-
ing regional and global collective action and 
the development of international public goods, 
areas of the CGIAR’s comparative advantage.
Global food security: 
turning full circle
In the early 1970s, when the CGIAR was 
created, there was deep concern about global 
food security and the prospect of famine in 
developing countries. Agriculture stood at the 
center of the international political economy. 
By 1982, agriculture was receiving the largest 
sectoral share of official development assis-
tance, at 17 percent. 
Much of the concern vanished with the 
green revolution of the 1980s. From 1980 to 
2005, agricultural production expanded glob-
ally by an average of 2.2 percent a year, faster 
than the population growth of 1.7 percent a 
year. This rapid agricultural growth pushed 
down the real price of grains in world mar-
kets some 1.8 percent a year, even as crop land 
per capita declined 40 percent over the same 
period. 
These impressive successes, however, soon 
turned to neglect. The share of official devel-
opment assistance for agriculture stalled and 
then declined steadily to less than 2.9 percent 
in 2006 (figure 2.1). As the priorities of the 
development community shifted to other 
emerging goals, especially poverty, health, and 
environmental sustainability, total official de-
velopment assistance (expressed in 2002 US 
dollars) to agriculture declined from $6.2 bil-
lion in 1980 to $2.3 billion in 2003. Over the 
same period, multilaterals cut their assistance 
to agriculture from $3.4 billion to $0.5 billion 
(an 85 percent drop). 
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These overall trends have been reflected 
in the trajectory of the CGIAR. Following 
20 years of continuous program growth and 
budgetary expansion, CGIAR financing ex-
perienced a rapid deterioration, which led to 
a severe financial crisis in 1994. The CGIAR’s 
share of publicly funded agricultural research 
in developing countries fell from about 10 per-
cent in 1980 to 1.5 percent in 2000.1
Today, history is repeating itself. Agricul-
ture returned to the international spotlight in 
2008, when food riots erupted in many poor 
countries in response to a dramatic spike in 
food prices. The causes and effects of what has 
been called the “food price crisis” are global, 
however. The negative effects are being felt 
throughout the world. Its underlying causes 
are structural, and the problem will not be 
quickly corrected. These causes include high 
oil prices and a shift toward biofuels, but there 
are also much deeper structural factors. 
Aggregate demand for food is now higher 
than at any time during the past half century, 
and since 1984 population growth has ex-
ceeded food production growth. Growth in 
demand for food over the past half century 
has been about 1.5 percent a year, rising re-
cently to 2 percent and is forecast to rise as 
high as 2.6 percent within a decade, driven 
mainly by rapidly expanding affluence in 
developing countries, especially China and 
India.2 The World Bank estimates that food 
production will need to grow by another 50 
percent by 2030 to keep pace.3
But rising demand alone is not the major 
challenge, since demand is projected to grow 
more slowly than it has over the past 20 years, 
although much depends on when second-
 generation biofuels using crop wastes and 
other feedstocks become profitable.4 The real 
challenge to the future of food production 
and global food security comes from rising 
demand combined with severe constraints on 
the supply-side. Among the key supply side 
factors are acute resource constraints, slow-
ing technical change, uncertain effects of cli-
mate change, high energy prices, and lagging 
regions.
These factors have moved issues of agri-
culture and food security back to the center 
stage of the international political economy. 
At the recent Group of Eight Summit, world 
leaders announced their commitment to ad-
dress this “multifaceted and structural crisis.” 
World Bank President Robert Zoellick has 
called for “a new deal of global food policy,” 
warning that a failure to act could result in 
the loss of the poverty reduction gains of the 
last decade. In the same statement, he called 
for a doubling of financing for the CGIAR.5 
These factors have also dramatically altered 
the context in which the CGIAR operates. 
Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
Figure 2.1 Official development assistance (ODA) to agriculture, 1995–2006
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The agricultural development agenda includes 
more than restoring global food security. It 
includes other critical global challenges, some 
well known and others just emerging, relat-
ing to poverty, environmental sustainability, 
human health, and gender (box 2.1). 
Both short-term and long-term factors 
are driving the current food crisis. The crisis 
requires emergency responses, such as emer-
gency aid, safety nets, and crash production 
programs. But over the long term, sharply in-
creased and better coordinated global invest-
ments are urgently needed to address critical 
challenges to global food supply. A revitalized 
CGIAR would be uniquely well positioned to 
lead the attack on many of these challenges. 
Dramatic recent changes in 
global agriculture present 
a major opportunity—and 
obligation—for CGIAR leadership
When the CGIAR was established in 1971, it 
occupied a unique position in the international 
development architecture (see box 2.2 for a 
brief profile of the CGIAR system and table 
2.1 for an overview of the 15 Centers). No lon-
ger. The relative importance of the CGIAR, 
measured by its financial share of agricul-
tural research and development (R&D), has 
diminished over the past 15 years. At the same 
time, the international development architec-
ture has become populated by a multitude of 
new actors. The international development 
directory6 now lists more than 50,000 enti-
ties involved in international development. 
Most are nongovernmental organizations, 
and many are directly engaged in rural devel-
opment and agricultural work. Some large 
nongovernmental organizations are now bet-
ter financed and more influential than many 
long established agencies, including bilateral 
donors. 
In agricultural research for development, 
the research systems in Brazil, China, India 
and some other developing countries have be-
come world leaders and could become leading 
sources of new technologies and knowledge 
Uncertain effects of climate change: Global climate change has 
introduced major uncertainties for agriculture. The combined ef-
fects of higher average temperatures, greater variability of temper-
ature and rainfall, more frequent and intense droughts and floods, 
and reduced availability of water for irrigation could be devastating 
for agriculture in many tropical regions. Unless current trends are 
reversed and new agricultural technologies developed, the recent 
Fourth Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change 
points to the risk of famine for hundreds of millions.
Slowing of technical change: The yield growth for the major 
cereals has slowed sharply since the 1980s in most develop-
ing countries, suggesting that the easy gains from the green 
revolution inputs have already been realized, except in Africa. 
Resistance to new products of biotechnology is also a factor in 
slowing the pace of technical change.
Access to new science in an era of privatization: Much of the 
molecular biology revolution is driven by multinational, private 
sector firms, and the patenting of new tools and technologies 
is now the norm in developed countries. A major challenge in 
harnessing these technologies to benefit the poor is to develop 
a new “global commons” of tools and technologies and to find 
ways to provide ready access by developing countries to genes 
and techniques protected by intellectual property rights.
Gender: The design of technologies rarely takes account of the 
special needs of female farmers and laborers. The increasing 
commercialization of agriculture and the growing importance of 
rural labor markets and migration as pathways out of poverty 
will accentuate these disadvantages.
New market structures: The institutional setting for technologi-
cal innovation is changing rapidly. With the development of mar-
kets and integrated supply chains, innovation becomes driven 
less by science (supply side) and more by markets (demand 
side). The challenge is to link science to users both within and 
outside agriculture—including farmers, consumers, and market 
agents—in an innovations systems framework.
Health risks from agricultural practices: Many agricultural prac-
tices pose threats to the health of the rural poor. Irrigation can 
increase the incidence of malaria, and pesticide poisoning is 
estimated to cause 355,000 deaths annually. Zoonotic diseases 
such as avian influenza that arise from the proximity of humans 
and animals pose growing threats to human health.
Box 2.1 The changed context for agriculture: key factors and challenges
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for other countries and regions. The Bra-
zilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(EMBRAPA) has launched programs in Af-
rica and has a budget more than three times 
larger than the CGIAR’s. Regional research 
organizations and networks are also playing 
a much greater role, while many developing 
countries, including several in Africa, now 
have national agricultural research institutes 
with solid capabilities. The private sector, as 
noted in box 2.1, is at the forefront in molecu-
lar biology research, which holds the greatest 
promise for future food security. And new 
philanthropic actors, such as the Bill & Me-
linda Gates Foundation, are becoming major 
players in financing international agricultural 
Created in 1971 as an informal association of 17 donors sup-
porting four international agricultural research centers, the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) was to serve “both as a mechanism for coordinating 
donor policies and actions and as an informal forum for discus-
sion.”1 Since then, it has expanded to 64 Members (25 develop-
ing countries, 22 industrialized countries, 4 private foundations, 
and 13 regional and international organizations) supporting 15 
Centers (see table 2.1). 
Today, the mission of the CGIAR is “to achieve sustain-
able food security and to reduce poverty in developing coun-
tries through scientific research and research-related activities 
in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and en-
vironment.” The CGIAR’s six founding governing principles—
Member sovereignty, Center autonomy, independent scientific 
advice, consensus decisionmaking, informal status (the 15 
Centers are the only legal entities), and nonpolitical nature—
remain in force, although some are under review in the current 
change management process.
The CGIAR System includes the CGIAR Members, the 15 
Centers, and the Science Council, which provides independent 
scientific advice. An Executive Council, standing committees, 
and a System Office provide administrative support. The CGIAR 
System is chaired by the World Bank and cosponsored by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, the United Nations Development 
Programme, and the World Bank. 
The CGIAR’s research agenda received $495 million in 
funding in 2007, $437 million (88 percent) from Members and 
$57 million (12 percent) from nonmembers. The European Com-
munity, United States, World Bank, United Kingdom, and Can-
ada were the top five donors in 2007, accounting for half of all 
funding. Developing country Members contributed 3 percent of 
funding. While overall funding has increased in nominal terms, 
the Centers’ inflation-adjusted buying power has remained flat. 
Project-based or restricted funding has risen as a share of total 
funding in recent years, reaching 64 percent in 2007, leaving 36 
percent of funding unrestricted. 
In 2007, the ecoregional Centers accounted for the largest 
share (33 percent) of total funding, followed by the commodity 
Centers (31 percent), natural resource management Centers (19 
percent), and policy Centers (18 percent). On a regional basis, 
48 percent of CGIAR investment is directed to Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Besides research undertaken by individual Centers, 
CGIAR research includes 17 Systemwide and Ecoregional 
Programs, such as Alternatives to Slash and Burn and the 
Rice-Wheat Consortium for the Indo-Gangetic Plains, and 
such inter-Center initiatives as the Systemwide Information 
Network for Genetic Resources and the Consortium for Spa-
tial Information. The CGIAR also supports four Challenge 
Programs, time-bound, independently governed programs 
of high-impact research that target CGIAR goals on complex 
issues of overwhelming global or regional significance that 
require partnerships among a wide range of institutions to de-
liver their products. These four are Water and Food (improv-
ing the productivity of water in river basins in ways that are 
pro-poor, gender equitable, and environmentally sustainable), 
Generation (using plant genetic diversity, genomic science, 
and comparative biology to develop technologies to help plant 
breeders in developing countries produce better crop varieties 
for resource-poor farmers), HarvestPlus (using biofortification 
to increase levels of micronutrients to improve human nutri-
tion by breeding new varieties of staple food crops consumed 
by the poor), and Sub-Saharan Africa (addressing key con-
straints to reviving agriculture in Africa—failures of agricultural 
markets and policies, natural resource degradation—through 
integrated agricultural research for development). The Execu-
tive Council recently approved development of a Challenge 
Program on Climate Change. 
Eleven Centers together maintain more than 650,000 sam-
ples of crop, forage, and agroforestry genetic resources, held 
in trust in the public domain on behalf of humanity. The 15 Cen-
ters have more than 200 regional or country offices in some 68 
countries worldwide, 75 percent of them in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia and Pacific. They employ 7,716 staff, 3,300 of them 
scientific staff. Eighteen percent of managers are women, and 
35 percent are developing country nationals. The Centers col-
laborate with a wide range of partners. 
The Charter of the CGIAR System, March 2007, p. 2.1. 
Box 2.2 The CGIAR System in brief
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research. The Gates Foundation has decided—
so far at least—not to become a Member of 
the CGIAR. 
Thus the CGIAR today is in a very 
crowded field with numerous alternative sup-
ply sources for the goods and services it pro-
vides. In its early years, the CGIAR’s main 
focus was on increasing the productivity of 
cereal crops. In the vanguard for this work 
were the four original founding Centers, 
and CGIAR’s reputation to this day contin-
ues to derive mainly from the achievements 
of that period. With expansion in the 1970s 
and again in the 1990s to reach the current 15 
Centers, the system became more administra-
tively complex and more expensive. Financing 
became accordingly more complex and prob-
lematic. Restrictions to available financing 
Center Headquarters’ location
Year  
established
Year  
joined CGIAR
2007 funding 
outcome
(US$ millions) Mandate
Commodity Centers
Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) Cotonou, Benin 1970 1975 10.2 Rice production in West Africa
International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT)
Mexico City, Mexico 1966 1971 43.3 Wheat, maize, triticale
International Potato Center (CIP) Lima, Peru 1970 1973 26.0 Potato, sweet potato
International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI)
Nairobi, Kenya 1995a 1995 35.2 Livestock diseases, cattle, sheep, 
goats, feed and production systems 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Los Banos, Philippines 1960 1971 32.5 Rice and rice-based ecosystems
Ecoregional Centers
International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT)
Cali, Colombia 1967 1971 45.1 Beans, cassava, tropical forages, rice, 
hillsides, forest margins, savannas
International Center for Agricultural 
Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)
Aleppo, Syria 1975 1975 27.7 Barley, lentils, fava beans, durum and 
bread wheats, chickpeas, pasture and 
forage legumes; small ruminants; on-
farm water management; rangelands
International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)
Patancheru, India 1972 1972 37.4 Sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet, 
chickpea, pigeon pea, groundnut; 
sustainable production systems 
for the semi-arid tropics
International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA)
Ibadan, Nigeria 1967 1971 45.1 Soybean, maize, cassava, cowpea, banana, 
plantain, yams; sustainable production 
systems for the humid lowland tropics
Natural resource management Centers
Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR)
Bogor, Indonesia 1993 1993 18.2 Sustainable forestry management
International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI)b
Colombo, Sri Lanka 1984 1991 23.5 Irrigation and water resource management
World Agroforestryc Nairobi, Kenya 1977 1991 31.5 Agroforestry; multipurpose trees 
WorldFishd Penang, Malaysia 1977 1992 15.1 Sustainable aquatic resource management
Policy Centers
Bioversitye Rome, Italy 1974 1974 39.0 Plant genetic resources of crops 
and forages; collection and 
gene pool conservation
International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI)
Washington, DC, United States 1974 1980 46.4 Socioeconomic research related 
to agricultural development 
a. Created in 1995 through the merger of the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (established in 1973) and the International Livestock Center for Africa (established in 1974). 
b. Formerly the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI)
c. Formerly the International Centre for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF)
d. Formerly the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM)
e. Formerly the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and previous to that, the International Board on Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). 
Source: OED 2003; www.cgiar.org; CGIAR Secretariat.
Table 2.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers
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There has never been 
a better time for the 
CGIAR to re-assert its 
role and relevance and 
redefine its vision and 
strategy. But this cannot 
be “business as usual”
created increasing competition among Cen-
ters, and restricted or project funding grew 
steadily as a percentage of the total. At the 
same time, emphasis shifted from crop pro-
ductivity to reflect changes in donor priorities 
in sustainability, natural resource manage-
ment, participatory- and community-based 
research, micronutrient nutrition, income 
distribution, and poverty reduction.
The dramatic recent changes in the global 
agricultural situation represent not only a 
major opportunity but also an obligation for 
the CGIAR to provide leadership. As the 
CGIAR itself recognizes, there has never 
been a better time for the CGIAR to re- assert 
its role and relevance and redefine its vision 
and strategy.7 But this cannot be “business as 
usual.” As World Development Report 2008 
notes, “the emerging global agenda for ag-
riculture has new challenges, driven by new 
actors, cutting across sectors.”8 Many of the 
challenges are interrelated, with environ-
mental, poverty, and gender dimensions, and 
many intersect with human health.
All this heightens the need for coordinated 
efforts across sectors and institutions. But the 
institutions and mechanisms to implement 
and finance the global agenda were developed 
for a very different world. All institutions, in-
cluding the CGIAR, are lagging behind in 
the ability to respond to today’s challenges. 
How can they be reformed to respond to the 
new political and economic realities?
Findings on continued relevance: 
need to function more as a system
With both the context and the CGIAR’s 
position in the international architecture 
for agricultural research having changed 
dramatically, the principal challenge for the 
CGIAR is to continue to occupy a strong 
position of comparative advantage. Attention 
to the risk of changing circumstances to the 
system’s comparative advantage was raised 
in the World Bank’s 2003 meta-evaluation, 
which noted that “the CGIAR has a strong 
comparative advantage and core compe-
tency in germplasm research and in research 
activities of a transnational scope that draw 
on its unique germplasm collection. Many of 
its new research areas—not yet evaluated—
involve the CGIAR in providing small-scale 
activities at the national or sub-national level, 
areas where national agricultural research sys-
tems normally have a comparative advantage 
and core competencies.”9
Since the World Bank’s 2003 evaluation, 
many of the CGIAR’s newer areas of endeavor 
have been evaluated and some of the results 
are very encouraging (see chapter 3). Nev-
ertheless, a recent review prepared as back-
ground for World Development Report 2008 
still concluded that the CGIAR has been los-
ing comparative advantage and that it is in ur-
gent need of a course correction. That report 
stated “the comparative advantage of the CG 
system does not appear to have been a major 
criterion in more recent decision-making. An 
apparent abundance of research resources may 
have led to a perception that there was no op-
portunity cost to accommodating the newer 
political agendas in the system. This percep-
tion was clearly wrong.”10
A second recent review by IFPRI went 
further in examining the place of the CGIAR 
in the international architecture. It concluded 
that the CGIAR has lost strategic direction 
and that “it is no longer in a strategic position 
to exercise the leadership envisaged for it by 
its original architects.” The review implies a 
negative response to its question of whether 
it is too late to re-assert comparative advan-
tage and leadership. It positions the answer 
within the larger context of an international 
approach to agricultural R&D in general 
and states that “it is time to rethink interna-
tional approaches to agricultural R&D, both 
because of the changes that have taken place 
within the CG system and the changing con-
text in which it will have to operate.”11
The Panel agrees. It finds that the CGIAR 
System continues to provide a broad range of 
goods and services that add value. And it con-
cludes that a major source of CGIAR compar-
ative advantage is the 37-year-old partnership 
between the Centers and the international 
donor community: no other arrangement 
 26 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
rivals the accumulated social capital of this 
collaboration between agricultural research 
and public financing for international public 
goods. 
The Panel also finds, however, that the 
CGIAR is a system adrift. The donor-doer 
partnership has become fragile, and the sys-
tem as a whole is seriously underperforming. 
Individual Center strategies exist, but the 
whole has become considerably less than the 
sum of the component parts. There is no sys-
temwide strategy, and the CGIAR has been 
largely absent from the main debates and in-
ternational forums on agriculture for develop-
ment. The current situation is well described 
by the warning of former CGIAR Chairman 
Ismail Serageldin, in his 2000 farewell speech 
to Members, that the CGIAR faces “the pros-
pect of . . . gradually fading into obsolescence 
and, ultimately, oblivion, while other actors, 
more swift, better endowed, and more respon-
sive to the needs of our clients, pass us by.12
The changed international context for ag-
riculture, including the risks of climate change 
to food security and food adequacy, means 
that the need for new agricultural technolo-
gies has never been greater. This presents the 
CGIAR with a once in a lifetime opportunity 
to play a major role in responding to new chal-
lenges. To do so, it will need much more ro-
bust strategies and a much sharper delineation 
of its comparative advantage. The system will 
need to function far more as a system. 
Notes
Pardy et al. (2008). 1. 
Currie (2007).2. 
World Bank (2008).3. 
World Bank (2007b).4. 
World Bank (2007b).5. 
http://www.devdir.org6. /
CGIAR Secretariat (2008b). 7. 
World Bank (2007b).8. 
World Bank (2003). 9. 
Pardy, et. al. (2008), p. 71 10. 
Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey (2006), p. 23. 11. 
Cited in World Bank (2003), p. 3.12. 
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To achieve poverty 
reduction and other 
long-term societal gains, 
CGIAR research depends 
on partner institutions 
that transform CGIAR 
research outputs into 
outcomes and impact. 
This takes time, making it 
difficult to measure impact 
from recent research
The Panel was asked to consider the CGIAR 
and Centers’ effectiveness across a broad 
range of topics to assess whether the CGIAR 
is making the best possible contribution to 
the agricultural research needs of developing 
countries. Specifically, the Panel considered 
four issues to better understand the effective-
ness of the CGIAR and Centers. 
What evidence is there of the impact •	
of the Centers’ research? 
What is known about Centers’ per-•	
formance, including the volume and 
quality of research? 
How well has the CGIAR System de-•	
fined priorities against which to mea-
sure effectiveness? 
What kind of results framework •	
should the new CGIAR System use 
to guide the partnership and network 
of Centers, and would it differ from 
its impact assessments and perfor-
mance measures?
The Panel’s detailed assessment of impact 
studies is in appendix 2.
CGIAR research has had high 
overall returns, but impact 
assessment needs improvement
Previous reviews identified the CGIAR’s 
important contribution to agricultural devel-
opment through crop genetic improvement 
research, its principle activity during its first 20 
years. Since the early 1990s, as the international 
agricultural context has changed, the CGIAR’s 
research agenda has diversified. It moved into 
natural resource management and policy-ori-
ented research directed to achieving the benefits 
of crop improvement and into animal resources. 
As research diversified, research funding 
stagnated in constant dollars (see chapter 5), 
while the CGIAR’s share of global research and 
development for agriculture declined to about 
1.5 percent. Meanwhile, rapidly growing devel-
oping countries such as China, Brazil, and India 
have made great strides in agricultural research, 
altering their needs for CGIAR research, 
while in parts of Africa, national agricultural 
research has remained underdeveloped. With 
this changing context for international agricul-
tural research comes the question of whether 
CGIAR research is having the greatest impact 
where it is needed most. 
To achieve poverty reduction and other 
long-term societal gains, CGIAR research de-
pends on partner institutions that transform 
CGIAR research outputs into outcomes and 
impact. This takes time, making it difficult to 
measure impact from recent research, such as 
over the Panel Review period since 2001. Im-
pact and associated outputs and outcomes can 
be assessed over a longer period, however, and 
then compared with more recent outputs and 
outcomes to get a sense of what future impact 
might be. 
Since 2001, the CGIAR has invested heav-
ily in assessing its impact through the Stand-
ing Panel on Impact Assessment, within the 
Science Council. A comprehensive assessment 
of the global impacts of crop genetic improve-
ment was published in 2003. Assessment of 
the relatively neglected areas of natural re-
source management and policy-oriented re-
search followed. Impact studies have been ini-
tiated in capacity building and participatory 
research. Impact assessment in these newer 
areas of CGIAR research is challenging, re-
quiring new, often more qualitative method-
ologies than for assessment of the impact of 
crop genetic improvement. 
effectiveness, quality, 
and results management
 28 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
High overall returns on 
research investment
Overall, recent global, regional, and local 
assessments of CGIAR research reveal very 
high returns on investment. Meta-analysis 
of impact assessments of global and regional 
impact suggest that total investments in the 
CGIAR have paid for themselves by a wide 
margin, even when just a few well documented 
successes are considered (box 3.1). Regional 
impact studies in South Asia and Sub-Saha-
ran Africa point to substantial benefits of crop 
genetic improvement research in Asia and of 
crop genetic improvement and biological con-
trol research in Africa. They also illustrate 
that research impacts in Africa have been lim-
ited, with lower returns on investment than 
in other regions—this despite Sub-Saharan 
Africa receiving the largest regional share of 
CGIAR investment (41 percent) since 1971.
Trends in impact assessments in 
main areas of research vary
Expenditure trends since the early 1990s in 
the three main research area of crop genetic 
improvement, natural resource management, 
and policy-oriented research have differed 
(table 3.1). Crop genetic improvement (much 
of which falls under “increasing productivity” 
in table 3.1) has remained the principal area 
of investment, falling from 49 percent of the 
total in 1992 to 37 percent in 2007. Expendi-
ture on natural resource management (“sav-
ing biodiversity” and “protecting the environ-
ment” in table 3.1) has fluctuated, rising from 
19 percent in 1992 to 29 percent in 2001 and 
falling to 11 percent in 2007. Policy research 
has grown rapidly since 2001, rising from 14 
percent to 17 percent. 
Crop genetic improvement research has 
received the most assessment and has gener-
ated evidence of profound positive impacts 
arising from the broad diffusion of improved 
varieties and subsequent spillover effects. 
Yield- enhancing and yield-stabilizing modern 
varieties produced by the Centers and their 
national partners have produced benefits of 
more than $10 billion annually, due largely to 
improved wheat, rice, and maize. Recent re-
search on a range of crops and traits (drought 
resistance and nutritional content) is gener-
ating outputs and outcomes assessed as very 
promising for potential impact. 
Recent studies on the impact of natural 
resource management research, including 
pest management, show substantial benefits 
and positive internal rates of return on in-
vestment. Some benefits have occurred at a 
considerable scale and are of international 
significance; notable examples are the work 
of the rice-wheat consortium in South Asia, 
biological control programs in Africa, and the 
A 2003 meta-analysis of all ex post impact assessments in peer-reviewed jour-
nal articles, book chapters, and Center publications that estimated systemwide 
benefits is the only comprehensive benefit-cost assessment of CGIAR research 
investments over the System’s lifetime.1 It found benefits ranging from nearly 
$14 billion to more $120 billion. The benefit-cost ratios suggest that investments 
in the CGIAR have paid for themselves by a wide margin: even by the most con-
servative criterion, overall benefits attributable to CGIAR research were roughly 
double the costs of the research. 
The very small number of impact assessments of natural resource man-
agement and policy-oriented research, together with the inclusion of all sys-
temwide expenditures in the analysis, means that the overall benefits of CGIAR 
research were understated. 
A very high proportion of benefits were associated with just a few of the 
CGIAR’s many programs. Roughly half (47 percent) of total benefits were attrib-
uted to rice breeding, and almost a third (31 percent) to spring wheat breeding. 
Biocontrol research that led to reduced crop damage from the cassava mealy-
bug accounted for most of the remaining total benefits (15 percent). 
Raitzer (2003).1. 
Box 3.1 Meta-analysis of systemwide impact suggests substantial 
benefits from investment in CGIAR research
Percent of total
Undertaking 1992 2001 2007a
Increasing productivity 49.3 34.8 37.1
Saving biodiversity 7.7 9.6 9.7
Protecting the environment 11.5 18.9 15.0
Improving policies 9.9 13.8 16.7
Strengthening national 
agricultural research systems 21.7 22.9 21.4
a. Estimated. 
Source: Centers’ medium-term plans, 2008–10; ILRI medium-term plan 2007–09; World Bank (2003); CGIAR Secretariat (2001a).
Table 3.1 Center expenditure by research area, 1992–2007
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Alternatives to Slash and Burn Program. But 
much of the research impact for natural re-
source management is on a smaller geographic 
scale than that for crop genetic improvement, 
often because adoption depends on local col-
lective action, extension services, or assign-
ment of property rights. That means that the 
spillovers can be very limited, and the overall 
impacts constrained. 
The number of studies on the impact of 
policy-oriented research have risen consider-
ably in recent years. Seven impact assessments 
of policy-oriented research were commis-
sioned in 2007 (publication forthcoming). 
All found substantial returns to investment 
in high internal rates of return and large 
benefit- cost ratios. Moreover, the total mea-
sured benefits of the projects were large—in 
the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in 
net present value terms.1 Policy research offers 
strong potential for generating broad impacts 
affecting many people in many countries. But 
it is more difficult to estimate benefit-cost ra-
tios for policy research than for most other 
types of research. Even where the evidence 
is clear that policy advice was applied, the 
advice is usually only one of many influences. 
For example, there is convincing evidence that 
IFPRI’s evaluations of Mexico’s cash-transfer 
program, Progresa, and Bangladesh’s Food for 
Education furnished important added value 
to these programs, but the evaluations were 
just one of several contributors to the overall 
impacts (box 3.2).
Demonstration of substantial positive 
impacts for natural resource management 
and policy-oriented research is important. 
A dearth of assessment studies in these areas 
in the 2003 meta-evaluation fed concern 
that growing investment in these areas (see 
table 3.1) might not be optimizing CGIAR 
research impact. Crop genetic improvement 
research remains the major area of research ac-
tivity, and this is appropriate to its significant 
potential for spillover effects. 
Complementary evidence from the In-
dependent Review Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders and External Program and Man-
agement Reviews (EPMRs) supports the find-
ings on impacts. The great majority (82 per-
cent) of those stakeholders surveyed believe 
that the CGIAR has been effective or highly 
The poor were particularly hard hit during the severe economic 
downturn in Mexico during the mid-1990s. To help them survive 
the economic turmoil, a team of Mexican social scientists in the 
incoming Zedillo government designed a program of conditional 
cash transfers for mothers of young children and adolescents to 
replace the traditional food distribution program. Conditions for 
receiving the cash assistance included ensuring that children 
attended school, that infants received nutritional supplements, 
and that all family members received regular health and nutri-
tion checkups.
Progresa contracted IFPRI to evaluate the program dur-
ing 1998–2000; subsequent evaluations were taken over by 
the Mexican Institute of Nutrition and Public Health. From in-
ception, the program had incorporated state-of-the art analy-
sis of data collected from tens of thousands of participating 
households. These evaluations guided continuing refinements 
and improvements to the program and revealed very large 
benefits from improved nutritional and schooling outcomes 
for program participants compared with nonparticipants. They 
also raised the international profile of Progresa. Progresa (now 
called Oportunidades) has achieved international renown in 
large part because of how it integrated evaluation into the 
program.
Quantitative assessment of IFPRI’s contribution to the pro-
gram’s success relied on a combination of interviews with key 
informants, written reviews of the program, and articles in the 
popular press. These revealed four categories of impacts: re-
duced delays in implementation, improvements in evaluation 
techniques and accompanying improvements in Mexican pro-
gram managers, enhanced likelihood of program continuation 
beyond current political regime, and spillovers to programs in 
other countries seeking to emulate Progresa.
Using conservative assumptions of the benefits attributable 
to Progresa’s primary outputs (improved schooling and child 
nutritional outcomes) and of the contribution of IFPRI’s involve-
ment, quantitative estimates suggest that benefits greatly ex-
ceed costs for all four categories of impact. Thus, even under 
the very conservative assumptions made about IFPRI’s role in 
the program, the benefits attributable to IFPRI were still quite 
large relative to the costs of its participation. 
Source: Behrman (2007).
Box 3.2 IFPRI and Mexico’s Progresa conditional cash transfer program
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The most striking 
observations emerging 
from a review of EPMRs 
is the clear conflict in 
some Centers between 
generating international 
public goods outputs and 
working with partners 
to turn outputs into 
outcomes and impacts
effective in conserving and improving plant 
and animal genetic resources (box 3.3). Only 
about half of respondents thought that natu-
ral resource management research was effec-
tive or highly effective, and only about a third 
thought that policy- oriented research was.
Impacts from poverty reduction, 
capacity building, and 
international public goods have 
been more difficult to assess
Poverty alleviation is a core mission of the 
CGIAR, and a large share of research from its 
inception has been oriented toward improv-
ing the welfare of the poor. Attributing pov-
erty reduction to specific CGIAR research 
activities is difficult, however, because of the 
large number of social, economic, and politi-
cal influences not under the CGIAR’s con-
trol. Still, some estimates show profound but 
declining pro-poor impacts, such as those of 
improved rice varieties in China and India, 
mainly through lower food prices. 
The CGIAR invests about 20 percent of 
its resources in capacity building to support 
technology delivery, particularly through 
strengthening national agricultural research 
systems (NARS). Yet, there are very few im-
pact evaluations of this activity, and they have 
confronted methodological challenges. Sev-
eral qualitative analyses tell convincing stories 
of human capital formation and institutional 
effectiveness, but fall well short of providing 
rigorous empirical evaluation. 
A review of Centers’ EPMRs supports 
evidence of substantial impacts by individual 
centers. It also reveals a clear conflict in some 
Centers between generating international 
pubic goods and working on the applied re-
search and capacity building of partners in 
turning outputs into outcomes and impacts. 
Impacts reported in EPMRs are more 
apparent for crop genetic improvement re-
search than for natural resource management 
research, likely because of the more complex 
impact pathways for such research and less 
developed methods for measuring impact. In 
general, impact assessment is regarded as de-
ficient across Centers, in quantity and qual-
ity, with some exceptions. Ex ante impact 
assessment is receiving more attention from 
Centers. Still, only 3 of the 15 recent EPMRs 
recognized evidence of the Science Council’s 
recent efforts to foster an “impact assessment 
culture” in the Centers. 
It was clear from EPMRs that many Cen-
ters are under pressure from donors and NARS 
to undertake more applied research and capac-
ity building aimed at more local and immedi-
ate outcomes and impact. Some Centers are 
committed to maintaining a balance between 
strategic research and activities that support 
the delivery of outcomes and impact. This is 
evident in responses to EPMRs, particularly in 
concern expressed about international peer-re-
viewed publications as a measure of Center re-
search performance. One Center commented 
in responding to its most recent EPMR: “the 
requirements of journal publications are often 
inimical to practical adoption analysis as part 
of an on-going programme of research.”
The most striking observations emerging 
from a review of EPMRs is the clear conflict 
in some Centers between generating inter-
national public goods outputs and working 
with partners to turn outputs into outcomes 
and impacts. With a few exceptions, the re-
cent trend in EPMRs has been to emphasize 
The Independent Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders, including 
Members and Centers, reveals that the great majority (82 percent) believe that 
the CGIAR has been effective or highly effective in conserving and improving 
plant and animal genetic resources, about half believe that for natural resource 
management research, and about a third for policy-oriented research. 
More than 80 percent of respondents rated the CGIAR and Centers as work-
ing effectively or very effectively in “sustaining biodiversity” (81.6 percent) and 
“genetic improvements” (81.9 percent). “Sustainable management of resources” 
was lower (51 percent), followed by “improving policies/ facilitating institutional 
innovation” (32 percent) and “agricultural diversification” (23 percent). 
The respondents most likely to be directly concerned with meeting these 
research priorities are those responsible for managing the Centers (board 
chairs, Directors, and Deputy Directors General), Science Council members, 
and those involved in the Challenge Programs. 
Respondents identified several factors constraining effectiveness, includ-
ing lack of funding, particularly for crop improvement research; lack of time; and 
the complexity of impact pathways, particularly for natural resource manage-
ment and policy-related research.
Box 3.3 Stakeholder views on effectiveness of CGIAR research
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international public goods outputs, buttressed 
by the strong emphasis by the Science Coun-
cil and System Priorities since 2004 on more 
strategic research and international public 
goods. Since Centers generally accept all or 
most recommendations of EPMRs, Centers 
are likely to adjust their programs accord-
ingly. Thus if Center activities to support the 
delivery of outcomes and impacts are as effec-
tive as evaluations have found them to be, and 
if partners are not able to substitute for these 
Center inputs, a decline in the future impact 
of Center research is to be expected. 
Conclusion
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
CGIAR continues to undertake research with 
a high potential for impact. It is also reason-
able to conclude from the diversity of CGIAR 
research activities and its range of collabora-
tions that the CGIAR has some of the core 
attributes of a 21st century organization. It 
is multidisciplinary, functioning along an 
extended spectrum from the physical sciences 
through the social sciences to the policy sci-
ences. And its networks of actors stretches 
from other global entities to the small rural 
farm.
The Panel finds considerable evidence 
that CGIAR research has generated positive 
impacts and considerable benefits relative to 
costs. Recent research appears capable of pro-
ducing similar future impacts, although the 
dearth of outcomes reported in recent EPMRs 
recommends that this be carefully monitored. 
Research impact has been achieved across the 
range of CGIAR research, including crop ge-
netic improvement, natural resource manage-
ment, and policy-oriented research, with crop 
genetic improvement having the greatest inter-
national impact because of spillover effects. 
The Panel suggests that assessment focus 
in four areas, where better understanding and 
monitoring of CGIAR research and its con-
tributions are needed:
Impact assessment in Sub-Saharan •	
Africa, where the share of CGIAR 
expenditure is high and rising and 
where impact has been comparatively 
limited, to ensure that valuable re-
search is being generated and that im-
pact pathways and partners are being 
supported through capacity building. 
(For instance, there is concern that 
the adoption of New Rice for Africa 
[NERICA] rice and other new variet-
ies is slower than expected.)
Impact assessment of natural resource •	
management research that includes 
environmental benefits, to demon-
strate CGIAR’s progress in meeting 
its goal of promoting environmental 
sustainability. Assessments have fo-
cused on productivity benefits and 
have largely ignored environmental 
benefits—presumably because of the 
methodological difficulties in quan-
tifying them. 
Impact assessment that considers •	
higher level impacts related to system-
level goals. There has been a tendency 
to compartmentalize and contrast 
impact assessment of research in dif-
ferent areas, rather than consider how 
these areas collectively contribute to 
strategic goals. Natural resource man-
agement and policy research are es-
sential to crop genetic improvement 
research, a point made eloquently in 
the 2003 meta-evaluation.2 Inter-
Center cooperation is an important 
means of achieving integration across 
research areas.
Assessment of whether the contribu-•	
tions of women to agriculture and 
their special knowledge and needs 
are addressed at a level commensurate 
with their importance. The Panel’s 
analysis indicates that the CGIAR 
System appreciates the importance 
of gender to its research mandate, but 
the cross-cutting gender dimension is 
missing in the CGIAR Center focus, 
in EPMRs, and in impact assessment. 
The evidence is clear that unless gen-
der equality and the barriers women 
face are squarely addressed, it will not 
be possible to achieve the efficiency 
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The Performance 
Measurement System is 
not comprehensive. It is 
mainly a self-assessment 
system, but with elements 
of independent verification 
and performance scoring
and productivity gains that are criti-
cal for poverty reduction and food 
security. 
The collective effort of the CGIAR, as 
a System, has not been evaluated. This will 
need to be done as the CGIAR develops a 
compelling results strategy involving clear 
and achievable development impacts focused 
more on strategic objectives and program out-
comes than on individual Centers and their 
projects. 
Performance measurement 
has received much more 
attention since the last 
CGIAR System Review
Impact assessments are episodic, but manag-
ers need regular reporting to ensure alignment 
with and progress toward desired outcomes. 
In 2003, the CGIAR established a Working 
Group on Performance Measurement Sys-
tems. It examined performance measurement 
systems (PMS) in other organizations and 
compiled a Sourcebook. The recommended 
approach was the basis for the PMS that 
was piloted in 2005 and has since been used 
annually.3
The PMS is not comprehensive. It covers 
the Centers, but not the joint administrative 
and program units, the Science Council, or 
the Members. It is mainly a self-assessment 
system, but with elements of independent 
verification and performance scoring (by the 
Science Council, Standing Panel on Impact 
Assessment and Standing Panel on Monitor-
ing and Evaluation, and external panels).4
The CGIAR also conducted a stakeholder 
perceptions survey in 2006, which it intends 
to commission every three years.5 It was a pur-
posive sample (partners’ names were supplied 
by the Centers), and the response rate was low 
(36 percent on average). The Centers’ research 
received high marks from the stakeholders. 
Most rated performance about the same or 
improved over the previous five years, but they 
felt that CGIAR research should be directed 
more to the development needs of national 
institutions. 
The PMS collects some information annu-
ally and stakeholder perception information 
triennially (table 3.2). Intermediate outcomes 
are also reported.
Uses of Performance Measurement 
System information
In 2008, the World Bank allocated about a 
quarter of its Development Grant Facility 
funds to Centers based on their performance 
scores. Since 2005, Germany has also used 
some PMS information to allocate 25 percent 
of its funds for the Centers. Germany intends 
to increase the weight for performance from 
30 percent to 50 percent.
The main use of the CGIAR’s PMS, other 
than to guide donors’ resource allocations, is 
to guide decisions by the Centers’ boards and 
management. Some influence is easy to see. 
When the “governance checklist” lists a par-
ticular type of policy, boards have been quick 
to adopt an appropriate policy when one has 
been lacking. For example, one indicator of 
institutional health is whether the Center has 
conducted a survey of staff satisfaction within 
the previous two years. Between the introduc-
tion of this indicator in 2005 and reporting 
in 2006, the number of Centers complying 
jumped from 6 to 12. It is plausible that Cen-
ters that receive low performance scores on a 
particular criterion have an incentive to im-
prove. Tracing those influences was beyond 
the Panel’s mandate, however.
The Performance Measurement 
System is strongest on monitoring 
the number and quantity of 
research outputs (publications)
CGIAR produced more publications in 2007 
than in 2006 and improved its publication pro-
ductivity per scientist. Peer-reviewed publica-
tions rose from 2,249 in 2006 to 2,493 in 2007; 
and publication productivity per scientist rose 
from 2.01 to 2.31 (figure 3.1). The range of pub-
lication productivity across Centers narrowed 
from 0.82–3.37 in 2005 to 1.35–3.5 in 2007. 
Publication productivity in 2007 was 
roughly comparable to that of the World 
Bank’s Development Economics research 
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department, which achieved an average of 2.4 
peer-reviewed publications per research staff 
annually in recent years. 
Ecoregional Centers had the highest pub-
lication rate per scientist, commodity Centers 
the lowest. However, commodity Centers have 
the highest Institute for Statistical Informa-
tion (ISI) publication rate per scientist. Cen-
ters in other categories produce more non-ISI 
than ISI publications (for Center classifica-
tion by category, see table 2.1 in chapter 2).
A new indicator piloted in 2006 weights a 
Center’s publications by the expected impact 
of a sample of journals in which it publishes, 
with journals assessed relative to the top three 
journals in their subject category. CIAT and 
CIP achieved the highest journal impact 
scores; ICARDA and Africa Rice Centre had 
the lowest.
In 2007, IWMI produced most publica-
tions per dollar funding, with one publication 
per $120,000 budget. Bioversity is the least 
Area Criterion
Results
Outputs, outcomes, and impacts
1 Percent of medium-term plan output targets achieved
2 Science Council score on each Center’s five most significant outcomes during that year (scale 1–10)
3A Science Council/Standing Panel on Impact Assessment rating of each Center’s commitment to 
documenting impacts and creating an impact assessment culture
3B Science Council/Standing Panel on Impact Assessment rating of the rigor of two Center impact studies 
carried out in those three years (collected once every three years) 
Quality and relevance of research
4A Number of externally peer-reviewed publications per scientist in that year (excluding Thompson/ISI journals) 
4B Number of peer-reviewed publications per scientist in that year in Thompson/ISI journals
4C Percentage of scientific papers that are published with developing country partners in refereed journals, 
conference and workshop proceeding
4D Relative rating of each Center’s 10 best publications as judged by the Thompson/ISI journal impact factor 
(indicator is being piloted)
Institutional health
Governance
5A Score on governance checklist
5B Peer review panel rating of the relevance/merit and anticipated impact of two Board actions in that year that 
were, in the opinion of the Board, the most important in improving oversight
Culture of learning and change
5C Score on culture of learning and change checklist
Diversity
5D Does the Center have Board-approved gender and diversity goals? (yes/no)
5E Percent of women in management (research and nonresearch) at December 31
5F Percent of internationally recruited staff from the top two IRS list countries
5G Percent of scientists/researchers with PhDs conferred in past five years 
Financial health
6A Short-term solvency (liquidity)
6B Long-term financial stability (adequacy of reserves)
6C Efficiency of operations (indirect costs ratio)
6D Cash management on restricted operations
6E External audit opinion qualified/unqualified 
Stakeholder perceptions (every three years)
Table 3.2 Performance criteria for the Performance Measurement System
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efficient by this measure, with one publica-
tion per $360,000 (figure 3.2).
The CGIAR issues guidelines each year 
on reporting performance indicators, speci-
fying the information to be provided.6 Each 
Center is asked to report “the five most signif-
icant intermediate outcomes documented” in 
the previous year resulting from outputs that 
it produced, with an explicit link to the Cen-
ter’s medium-term plan. The Science Council 
assesses each intermediate outcome on a 10-
point scale. (Outcomes are defined as “the 
external use, adoption, or influence of a Cen-
ter output(s) [e.g., by partners, stakeholders, 
clients]).”
The quality of the submissions varies. The 
most common form is a narrative of “accom-
plishments” within a project or area. Some 
outcome statements describe the output and 
beneficiaries. Most outcomes are the result of 
many years of work, which limits the useful-
ness of annual comparisons. The best evidence 
tends to be provided when there has been a 
recent evaluation (box 3.4).
Measures of influences on performance 
for 2005–07 yield uneven results 
The Panel examined three performance vari-
ables: the Science Council’s score on each 
Center’s five most important intermediate 
outcomes, publications per scientist, and bud-
get per publication. It also looked at whether 
large Centers have a better performance 
record than small Centers.7
Science Council scores on five most important 
intermediate outcomes. The recorded average 
score for intermediate outcomes has declined 
in the past three years, from 8.08 (with a range 
of 4.7–10.0) in 2005 to 7.6 (2.0–10.0) in 2006 
Number of publications Publications per scientist
Non-ISI publications ISI publications Publications per scientist
Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System 
data.
Figure 3.1 CGIAR publications and 
 publications per scientist rose 
 from 2006 to 2007
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Figure 3.2 CGIAR Centers 2007 budget per publication
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and 6.22 (3.1–8.4) in 2007. That the interme-
diate outcomes achieved by the Centers have 
actually declined is not plausible. More likely, 
there are at least two other factors at play. 
First, the Centers’ intermediate outcomes 
are achieved as the result of many years of 
work. To consider them as though they were 
achieved separately each year is to misconceive 
the issue. In the first year of the PMS, the Cen-
ters had a backlog of intermediate outcomes 
to draw on, and they likely selected the best, 
so that some decline in scores in subsequent 
years would be unavoidable. Second, the scor-
ing method changed from year to year—from 
two questions per intermediate outcome, to 
three questions, to a single-scale rating. 
In 2007, 73 percent (55 out of 75) of in-
termediate outcomes were rated higher than 
5 out of 10 by the Science Council.8 But a sig-
nificant number of the remaining were rated 
quite low, which should be cause for reflection. 
Commodity Centers achieved the highest in-
termediate outcome ratings for both 2005–
07 and 2007 alone. Their average intermedi-
ate outcome rating for the three years was 7.9, 
followed by the ecoregional Centers at 7.2 and 
the natural resource management Centers at 
7.1, and then the policy Centers at 6.8. The 
relatively low score for the policy Centers is 
due mainly to Bioversity’s low intermediate 
outcome ratings in 2005 and 2007. But there 
is considerable unexplained variation. For 
example, the natural resource management 
Centers seem to have had an outlier year in 
2005, with an average intermediate outcome 
rating of 9.0, compared with 6.3 in 2006 and 
6.1 in 2007 (figure 3.3). Policy Centers had 
an outlier year in 2006, with an average rat-
ing of 9.0, compared with 6.0 in 2005 and 5.2 
in 2007.
The best performer in 2007 was IRRI (in-
termediate outcome rating of 8.4), followed 
Of the 75 intermediate outcomes submitted in 2007, 10 (13 per-
cent) received a score of 9 or better out of a maximum of 10 
points: 
Spatial Data and Knowledge Gateways project provides •	
water-related maps, models, and statistic for analyzing 
water use (as a global public good). The data are widely 
used around the world, and the project has won recogni-
tion. IWMI, score = 10
Laboratory information management systems software for •	
use in applied genomics was made available on the web in 
2006 and has been used by partners. ICRISAT, 9.8
Research organizations and universities in Africa and Asia •	
are applying new knowledge and skills from the ILRI– 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences training pro-
gram through the animal genetics training resource to rede-
sign their training courses, influence their national livestock 
policies, and develop breeding programs for livestock im-
provement. ILRI, 9.8
Small but specifically diverse subsets of the world germ-•	
plasm collection of ICRISAT-mandate crops, of a size to be 
functionally manageable by breeders, particularly NARS, 
enhanced the efficiency of breeding programs globally. 
ICRISAT, 9.4
A 2006 study comparing the impact of two World Vision •	
Programs in Haiti found that one approach (preventing chil-
dren from becoming undernourished) was more effective 
than another. As a result of the study, the more effective 
approach was adopted in US Agency for International De-
velopment– and World Vision–supported programs. IFPRI, 
9.4
IFPRI’s research on pro-poor public investment has been •	
widely cited and was used in World Development Report 
2008 to argue for a reversal of the trend of declining govern-
ment budget allocations for agriculture. IFPRI, 9.4
NARS in Bangladesh released a locally adapted salt-•	
 tolerant variety (BRRI dhan 47), the first available for farm-
ers in southern Bangladesh. Farmer intermediaries have 
started to disseminate BBRI dhan 47, but dissemination is 
constrained because of seed supply shortages. IRRI, 9.4
Advanced research institutes in Australia and the United •	
States started to use pre-screened rice mutants (an IRRI 
output) as a core resource to address the high susceptibility 
of wheat to mutating rust pathogens. IRRI, 9.4
New ILRI research methodologies for identifying genes for •	
disease tolerance in cattle are being used to identify ge-
netic traits affecting human health. ILRI, 9.2
A series of publications gave World Agroforestry a voice •	
in the international deliberations on the potential and con-
straints of agroforestry for mitigating and adapting to cli-
mate change and raised awareness of the crucial impor-
tance of trees in farming landscapes for adaptation and 
mitigation. World Agroforestry, 9.2
Box 3.4 Best intermediate outcomes resulting from CGIAR Center outputs, 2007
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by IWMI (8.0), and CIP and ICRISAT (7.8). 
Some Centers received much lower scores (figure 
3.4). The range is so wide (from 5.4 to 8.9) that 
further study is needed to determine whether it 
reflects true differences in effectiveness or is the 
result of as yet unanalyzed factors.
The Panel found the PMS to be a rich source 
of data, though still evolving, about the inter-
mediate outcomes of the Centers’ work. The 
Panel was able, in the time available for the Re-
view, to examine only a small part of the data on 
intermediate outcomes and publications. The 
data are worth further careful analysis.
There is no relation between the size of a 
Center measured by its budget and its inter-
mediate outcome ratings. A simple linear re-
gression with 2005–07 average intermediate 
outcome ratings and budget size yields a triv-
ial coefficient of 0.02 with no significance. 
Publications per scientist and budget per publi-
cation and intermediate outcome ratings. The 
Source: Independent Review Panel analysis of Performance Measurement System data.
Figure 3.4 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center, 2005–07
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Figure 3.3 Average intermediate outcome ratings of CGIAR Centers, by Center categories, 
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Centers that publish a 
lot also produce highly 
rated intermediate 
outcomes. To simplify 
somewhat, good science 
does produce good 
development outcomes
relationship between intermediate outcome 
ratings and publications per scientist over 
the period 2005–07 is interesting. A simple 
linear regression delivers a high positive coef-
ficient of 0.55, but it is not statistically signifi-
cant. Commodity Centers achieve the high-
est intermediate outcome ratings and have the 
highest number of Thompson/ISI publica-
tions per scientists, but have the lowest num-
ber of total publications per scientist.
In 2007, publications per scientist is signifi-
cantly positively related to intermediate out-
come ratings. Centers that publish a lot also pro-
duce highly rated intermediate outcomes. The 
regression analysis also indicates that the qual-
ity of productivity matters, since publications in 
more prestigious journals have a larger positive 
relationship with intermediate outcome ratings 
than publications in less prestigious journals. To 
simplify somewhat, good science does produce 
good development outcomes.
In 2007, there is a significant negative re-
lationship between a Center’s intermediate 
outcome ratings and its “efficiency,” measured 
in overall budget per publication. The more 
a Center spends per publication the higher 
its top five intermediate outcomes tend to be 
ranked. This relationship is not particularly 
strong, however, and overall budget per pub-
lication is a crude measure of efficiency.
Performance Measurement System 
objectives and achievements
The PMS has several objectives.9 They are 
listed below, each followed by a summary 
assessment by the Panel of the degree of 
achievement of the objective.
To be a learning tool for each Center 1. 
to manage its own performance and to 
be able to compare its performance with 
other Centers using benchmarks.
The PMS is not well positioned 
as a learning tool for the Centers be-
cause it is difficult for the one instru-
ment to play three divergent roles—
accountability, resource allocation, 
and learning. It is managed by the 
CGIAR Secretariat and the Science 
Council to monitor the Centers. 
It should be transferred to the new 
Consortium proposed by the Panel 
(see chapter 8), enabling it to be a tool 
for self-management by the Centers.
To facilitate transparent report-2. 
ing and accountability to CGIAR 
stakeholders.
The PMS is primarily a reporting 
and accountability tool and, within 
its limited scope, it does this task 
well. Its “results orientation” can be 
improved, but it is a good start.
To complement other evaluation instru-3. 
ments (mainly EPMRs and Center-
 commissioned external reviews).
The timing of the PMS (annual) 
complements the EPMRs (every five 
years). The PMS data, particularly 
outcome ratings and governance rat-
ings, should gradually become an 
increasingly important source of in-
formation for the teams conducting 
EPMRs. Progress and prospects seem 
good.
To provide standard performance data 4. 
that can be aggregated up to the System 
level.
The PMS data can be aggregated 
to the System level. However, simple 
aggregations are not very instructive 
because the 15 Centers are so hetero-
geneous. More finely grained analysis 
of the performance data and the fac-
tors that appear to influence perfor-
mance is needed. Also, the Centers 
are not the whole System. The PMS 
should be expanded to cover the other 
System components.
To be an input to funding and other 5. 
decisions by CGIAR Members.
The PMS data are used by the 
World Bank and by Germany to al-
locate some of their funds among the 
Centers. This provides an incentive 
for the Centers to take the PMS seri-
ously. The World Bank has assigned 
weights to each of the PMS criteria. 
These are not consensus weights. The 
Centers and other donors should be 
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Performance is highly 
variable across Centers 
and over time for each 
Center: ecoregional 
Centers have had the 
highest publication rate per 
scientist, and commodity 
Centers achieved the 
highest intermediate 
outcome ratings
consulted to see whether it is pos-
sible to develop consensus weights. 
These will be necessary if a major 
new pooled Fund is established and 
its funds are allocated partly by per-
formance (see chapter 8).
To be an early warning system for prob-6. 
lems and weaknesses.
The PMS needs to be linked sys-
tematically with a “red flag” system 
to make Centers at risk more visible. 
Financial data need to be collected 
and analyzed more frequently than 
annually—probably quarterly.
Summary findings on performance
It is too soon to analyze trends in the perfor-
mance data from the PMS in part because 
three years is not long enough and in part 
because the definitions of variables changed 
significantly from year to year as lessons were 
drawn and the system was improved.
Performance is highly variable across Cen-
ters and over time for each Center. How im-
portant these variations are needs to be ana-
lyzed once more data are accumulated. So far 
it seems that ecoregional Centers have had the 
highest publication rate per scientist and com-
modity Centers the lowest. However, com-
modity Centers have the highest Thomson/
ISI publication rate per scientist. Commod-
ity Centers achieved the highest intermediate 
outcome ratings, and policy Centers the low-
est. While the best science seems to be associ-
ated with the best development outcomes, the 
limited data should not be overinterpreted. 
Weighting publications per scientist by jour-
nal impact (one year of data only) does not 
seem to change the ranking of Centers much, 
but this deserves further investigation.
Within the limitations of the data, there 
are indications of strong performance by many 
Centers. CGIAR overall produced more pub-
lications in 2007 than in 2006 and improved 
its productivity per scientist. CGIAR’s aver-
age 2.31 peer-reviewed publications per sci-
entist per year have not been benchmarked 
against comparable institutions (but compare 
well to the 2.4 average of the World Bank’s 
Development Economics research depart-
ment10). The average intermediate outcome 
ratings of the Centers declined substantially 
between 2005 and 2007, but the decline seems 
to be an artifact of changes in the measure-
ment system and the nature of the variable 
rather than a real change in performance. 
The greatest weakness in the data relates 
to the measurement and reporting of results: 
At the output level, publications are •	
extremely important to global public 
goods because the sharing of knowl-
edge is basic to the production of the 
public good. However, more work is 
needed to conceptualize other signif-
icant outputs. The PMS should give 
Centers strong incentives to make 
their research available and useful for 
development, in line with the global 
public good mission of the CGIAR. 
At the intermediate outcome level, •	
not only numbers of publications but 
also use of those publications should 
be monitored (citations, website hits, 
downloads, and the like). 
At the outcome level, listing the five •	
best outcomes per year is a flawed 
measure of Center performance in 
a particular year. It is too selective. 
There must be a better resting point 
somewhere between listing five best 
outcomes and listing all outcomes for 
the year, an unwieldy burden. Match-
ing the number of outcomes to Center 
size is too mechanical and superficial. 
The Panel suggests that each Center 
present its outcomes within a results-
based framework each year.
Actual impacts, not just “impact •	
culture,” need to be assessed. More 
work is needed on a systemwide re-
sults framework and nested Center-
specific results frameworks within 
which to assess intermediate and 
final outcomes. It has been proposed 
that an actual measure of impact be 
developed for presentation at the 
2008 Annual General Meeting. The 
Panel applauds the intention while 
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Performance 
accountability should 
be mutual—the PMS 
Annual Report should 
recount the performance 
of all components of 
the CGIAR System, 
individually and as a whole
not underestimating the difficulty of 
measuring impact. However, impact 
is best addressed by an independent 
evaluation unit, not annually but as 
part of the three-year strategy and 
funding cycle (see chapter 8).
Despite its limitations the PMS data are 
being used to allocate part of World Bank 
funding to the Centers. This use may become 
even more important if a similar system is used 
to allocate funds from the pooled CGIAR 
Fund advocated by the Panel (see chapter 8). 
The Panel believes that the World Bank should 
assign greater weight to the results indicators 
than to the other indicators of performance in 
the PMS in its allocation system.
Performance measurement and manage-
ment should be the responsibility mainly 
of managers, not donors. Therefore, a PMS 
based on a results framework aligned with the 
strategic objectives should be the responsibil-
ity of the Consortium in the new governance 
structure suggested by the Panel (see chap-
ter 8). Centers should take more collective re-
sponsibility for monitoring performance and 
using performance information for manage-
ment purposes. 
Some performance indicators need more 
work to avoid creating perverse incentives. 
For example, the Centers lose points if their 
“long-term financial stability (adequacy of re-
serves)” is above a certain modest level. This 
produces a disincentive for Centers to build 
an endowment that would help stabilize their 
finances (see chapter 5). 
Performance accountability should be 
mutual—not one-way accountability from 
the Centers to the donors. Therefore, the 
PMS Annual Report should recount the per-
formance of all components of the CGIAR 
System, individually and as a whole.
The use of PMS data should be more ana-
lytical. What influences or hinders good out-
comes? The first step toward better use of the 
PMS data is to produce a single integrated data-
base with standard record layout for each Cen-
ter and for each year that includes descriptive 
data about the Centers (explainers or indepen-
dent variables) as well as performance data.
The design of the CGIAR stakeholder 
perceptions survey should be rethought be-
fore the 2009 survey. Target stakeholders 
should be defined better and sampled more 
rigorously, and other procedures should be 
put in place to obtain a high response rate.
In the past five years, the CGIAR and 
the Centers have made considerable progress 
in annual performance measurement. The 
principles stated by the Science Council in 
2002 have been followed with some success. 
The stakeholder perceptions survey was less 
successful because of difficulties of a purpo-
sive sample and a low response rate. The PMS 
may be even more important in the future if 
there is a substantial pooled Fund that allo-
cates funds to Centers and programs partly 
according to performance.
System Priorities fall 
short of objectives
A Standing Panel on Priorities and Strategies 
was set up in early 2003 under the interim Sci-
ence Council. Its mandate was to develop new 
System Priorities to:
Focus CGIAR research more closely •	
on its poverty reduction mission.
Reduce the dispersion of research •	
projects in the CGIAR and the drift 
toward development projects by refo-
cusing on strategic research and deliv-
ery of international public goods.
Mobilize research across the Centers •	
through inter-Center collaboration.
Improve partnerships and attract new •	
research partners.
Improve accountability and help do-•	
nors allocate resources.
The priority-setting exercise produced five 
System Priorities each with four subpriorities. 
These were released with detailed descriptions 
of each priority, their development, relevance 
to Millennium Development Goals, and plans 
for implementation. 
The System Priorities broadly match cur-
rent CGIAR research activities with some 
minor adjustments (table 3.3). One major ad-
dition is new research on high-value products 
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and associated research on increasing market 
access and income for poor farmers (mostly 
priority 3). A few areas of earlier research such 
as post-harvest research have been excluded. 
The major change in research activity 
driven by the System Priorities was in the na-
ture of the research rather than in research 
areas. The Science Council proposed that 80 
percent of each Center’s research be strategic, 
on priority themes, and directed at delivering 
international public goods. Of the remain-
ing 20 percent, the Science Council recom-
mended that at least half be strategic research 
aimed at developing future research areas. 
Squeezed into this 20 percent must also be 
all nonstrategic research activities, including 
applied research to support impact pathways, 
capacity building (although research on capac-
ity building may be included in the 80 percent 
strategic research), and other Center activities 
that help research outputs achieve impact. 
The Science Council assumed that develop-
ment partners will pick up outputs and un-
dertake necessary subsequent research. It ac-
knowledged that this will be easier for “strong 
NARS” than “weak NARS,” implying that 
research in support of weak NARS should be 
limited to activities where there are partners 
to ensure uptake and impact.
The Science Council developed a three-part 
three-year plan for implementing these Sys-
tem Priorities over 2006–08.11 First, Centers 
Priority area Description
Area 1 Sustaining biodiversity for current and future generations
1A Conserving and characterizing staple crops
1B Promoting conservation and characterizing underutilized plant genetic 
resources to increase the income of the poor
1C Conserving indigenous livestock
1D Conserving aquatic animal genetic resources
Area 2 Producing more and better food at lower cost through genetic improvements
2A Maintaining and enhancing yields and yield potential of food staples
2B Increasing tolerance to selected abiotic stresses
2C Enhancing nutritional quality and safety
2D Enhancing the genetic quality of selected species to increase income generation by the poor
Area 3 Reducing rural poverty through agricultural diversification and emerging 
opportunities for high-value commodities and products
3A Increasing income from fruits and vegetables
3B Increasing income from livestock
3C Enhancing income through increased productivity of fisheries and aquaculture
3D Promoting sustainable income generation from forests and trees
Area 4 Alleviating poverty and managing water, land, and forest resources sustainably
4A Promoting integrated land, water, and forest management at landscape level
4B Sustaining and managing aquatic ecosystems for food and livelihoods
4C Improving water productivity
4D Promoting sustainable agro-ecological intensification in low- and high-potential areas
Area 5 Improving policies and facilitating institutional innovation to support 
sustainable reduction of poverty and hunger
5A Improving science and technology policies and institutions
5B Making international and domestic markets work for the poor
5C Strengthening rural institutions and their governance
5D Improving research and development options to reduce rural poverty and vulnerability.
Source: Science Council, Standing Panel on Priorities and Strategies, 2005.
Table 3.3 CGIAR System priorities, 2005
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Even accepting that the 
System Priorities have 
not delivered a research 
strategy for the CGIAR, 
they have nonetheless 
been an instructive 
exercise. Using the System 
Priorities framework as 
a resource allocation 
mechanism has identified 
important and challenging 
preconditions for success
would specify in their 2007–09 medium-term 
plans how they would assign research activi-
ties and budgets to particular System Priori-
ties or to other categories of “development, 
new research, and stand-alone training” (the 
other 20 percent of research). Second, Centers 
would develop framework plans for each Sys-
tems Priority—strategic documents defining 
the long-term goal of CGIAR research in that 
area, along with its scope and plans for system-
wide implementation. Third, a parallel process 
would be established to design a mechanism 
for funding the System Priorities. 
The Centers and Science Council have 
struggled to find a common vision for imple-
menting the System Priorities. The recent de-
cision to discontinue work on the framework 
plans, and the mandate of the change design 
process to develop a small set of outcome-
 oriented strategic objectives for the System, 
would suggest that the CGIAR has decided 
that the System Priorities have not been 
effective.
The System Priorities failed as 
a spur to donor funding
Some envisioned the System Priorities as a way 
to elicit funds from donors. The Executive 
Council established a task force and then an 
Ad Hoc Committee on Funding System Prior-
ities to develop principles and models for fund-
ing the CGIAR through System Priorities.12 It 
developed a model based on a matrix with Cen-
ters or Challenge Programs on one axis and Sys-
tem Priorities on the other. Across this matrix, 
Centers would distribute their “demand” in 
terms of planned research investments under 
different System Priorities, and donors would 
distribute their “supply” in terms of planned 
funding to Centers and System Priorities. 
However, the changes in donor and Cen-
ter behavior needed to make this system work 
seem unlikely. The mechanism bears a super-
ficial likeness to the way unrestricted funds 
had been allocated by the Technical Advisory 
Committee before System reform, based on 
System priorities established by the Techni-
cal Advisory Committee. What is different 
here, however, is that this mechanism would 
involve all participating donors in deciding 
about allocation (based on priorities on which 
they have all agreed) and all Centers in agree-
ing to a common funding approach. 
What can be done with the 
System Priorities?
The System Priorities exercise suffered from a 
lack of a common vision between the Science 
Council and the Centers. Centers resisted 
major restructuring of their research pro-
grams around System Priorities, for a variety 
of reasons. An important lesson from this 
exercise is that the Centers must have a major 
role in developing the strategy that they will 
implement, to ensure both ownership and 
feasibility. 
Even accepting that the System Priorities 
have not delivered a research strategy for the 
CGIAR, they have nonetheless been an in-
structive exercise. Using the System Priorities 
framework as a resource allocation mecha-
nism has identified important and challenging 
preconditions for success. The initial frame-
work planning exercise has demonstrated 
that moving to a more programmatic, cross-
Center research approach may incur substan-
tial transaction costs and challenge Center 
research strategies. The exercise has shown 
how research in different Centers might fit 
together in a systemwide research framework 
and how special inter-Center initiatives, such 
as Challenge Programs and Systemwide and 
Ecoregional Programs can strengthen that. It 
stimulated consideration of how boundaries 
might be put around CGIAR research. And 
it highlighted important issues for any future 
Consortium of Centers, such as how genetic 
improvement, natural resource management, 
and policy research should be managed to-
gether across Centers. 
Managing for results is key 
to revitalizing the CGIAR-
Centers partnership 
The CGIAR and the Centers are operating in 
a fast-changing context of international devel-
opment cooperation. Managing for results has 
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become an essential tool for demonstrating 
learning and value in this context (box 3.5). 
The CGIAR and Centers have not yet fully 
mastered this imperative. 
The current international impetus for 
change began with adoption of the Millen-
nium Development Goals in 2000, continued 
through the Monterrey Financing for Devel-
opment Conference of 2002 and several inter-
national roundtables on managing for results, 
and culminated in the Paris Declaration at 
the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
in March 2005.13 Through all this, the inter-
national community has developed a shared 
understanding of the power of focusing on re-
sults rather than on inputs and processes. 
CGIAR Members and donors are com-
mitted by the Paris Declaration to mutual 
accountability, managing for results, harmo-
nization, alignment, and coordination among 
themselves to provide support to the Centers. 
In turn, the Centers need to adopt good gov-
ernance practices and to deliver results-based 
and transparent management. 
What needs to change for the 
CGIAR to be more effective?
A recurring theme in the Panel’s and in the 
EPMR analysis of the Centers and the Chal-
lenge Programs is the lack of an agreed strate-
gic framework. At the System level, Centers 
and funders have no compass to guide diffi-
cult decisions and to align behavior with pri-
orities in a way that can be easily communi-
cated and internalized by staff. The CGIAR’s 
current System Priorities are too numerous, 
and they lack alignment with any overarching 
strategy or core strategic objectives or metrics 
of achievement. Table 3.4 notes some of the 
differences between CGIAR practice and a 
managing for results framework.
How the CGIAR System produces and 
delivers international public goods needs to 
be considered within a results framework. 
There has long been tension in the CGIAR 
between producing international public goods 
(through science) and delivering development 
impact. International public goods and meas-
uring for results approaches recognize that 
no institution or sector can achieve develop-
ment outcomes alone, especially at a global, 
Managing for results is a coherent frame-
work for strategic planning, management, 
and communications based on continuous 
learning and accountability. It applies sev-
eral principles:
Results-oriented strategy sets strategic •	
directions and outcomes.
Management decisions and resource al-•	
locations align with strategic outcomes.
Program performance indicators target •	
clients and their beneficiaries and the 
differences to be made in beneficiaries’ 
lives.
Indicators are used as signals to motivate •	
staff and to provide a base for under-
standing how service can be improved.
Box 3.5 What is managing for results?
What managing for results involves What CGIAR does
Results-oriented strategy sets strategic directions and 
defines desired outcomes of Centers and programs 
relative to the mission and strategic objective indicators
Competency-oriented strategy, not 
prioritizing research for results
Management decisions and resources 
aligned with strategic objectives 
There is no management system: independent 
Centers are not working together or effectively 
with CGIAR and its coordinating bodies 
Program performance targets clients/partners and client/
partner’s beneficiaries quality of life improvements
Program performance targets outputs and is unclear about 
international public goods “core” and “complementary” roles
Indicators used to direct resources to most effective 
results, motivate staff, and improve service
Mistrust between System and Centers relates to indicators 
and evaluation and leads to poor cooperation.
Source: Independent Review Panel.
Table 3.4 Differences between the CGIAR and managing for results
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regional, or network level. The world is made 
up of increasingly complex systems and inter-
dependent institutions. Agricultural pro-
ductivity depends on trade regimes, environ-
mental conventions and laws, transportation 
infrastructure, rural finance, and education 
policies. Science depends on uptake by a wide 
variety of partners. Science is also becoming 
more demand driven and answerable to a 
broader range of constituencies. 
To achieve development impact from the 
provision of international public goods re-
quires a delivery system with core and com-
plementary components. Activities in the 
core components (those that define the mis-
sion, goals, and objectives and that transform 
inputs into outputs, making them available to 
other partners and users) are under the direct 
control of the Centers, which can be held di-
rectly accountable for how they are performed 
and made available to partners. The comple-
mentary activities (those carried out by part-
ner organizations such as NARS, government 
agencies, civil society organizations, private 
firms, farmer associations, international orga-
nizations) transform CGIAR system outputs 
into intermediate and final outcomes, which 
should ultimately have a development impact 
on the ground. The complementary activities 
are not under the direct control of the Cen-
ters, but they are under their influence; the 
Centers can play the roles of catalyst, facilita-
tor, convener, and promoter, among others, to 
enable their uptake. CGIAR Centers can be 
held responsible for understanding and help-
ing to improve the way other entities in the in-
ternational public goods delivery system value, 
adopt, and use the outputs of Center work. 
The Panel suggests that the CGIAR Sys-
tem and the Centers are accountable for pro-
ducing outputs: high-quality science products 
that are launched within an agreed timeframe 
and financial allocations and that are relevant 
to the agreed mission of the CGIAR. The 
Centers could continue to measure the qual-
ity of their research output through reports or 
publications against agreed benchmarks. The 
Centers would use measures to ensure their 
funders that the collections of genetically 
diverse seeds and other plant materials are 
safeguarded within the public domain. Cen-
ter management would use measurement 
indicators to manage investment across the 
production line to demonstrate that project 
schedules from discovery to product to prod-
uct adoption have been adhered to within 
benchmarked variances on cost and time. 
The Centers would also be responsible for 
monitoring intermediate outcomes: the influ-
ence of their outputs on client behavior. The 
Centers and would track CGIAR influence 
on international institutions to determine 
whether they benefit from CGIAR science 
advice. The Centers would track whether re-
search results on the genetic enhancement of 
high-value species being are used by national 
agricultural research systems and civil society 
organizations to assist farmers and to raise in-
come from forest and natural resource man-
agement. They would be responsible for show-
ing that their outputs are being used and that 
the clients using them are satisfied with the 
product. 
The Centers would be responsible for 
monitoring progress toward and evaluat-
ing final outcomes with clients, donors, and 
other partners to ensure that together they 
have the best mix of outputs for maximum 
citizen effect. 
The methodological challenge is to test 
causal effects of the CGIAR’s contribution 
beyond the clear zone of control (figure 3.5). 
Clear attribution of impact at a strategic level 
is not possible because of the other contribu-
tions and conditions necessary for sustainable 
development. Results information systems 
are meant to be a lean, strategic management 
tool. The systems feed into impact assessment, 
which is done periodically to measure results 
on the ground and test the validity of the re-
sults framework. Impact assessment draws on 
data outside of results reports to make judg-
ments about possible attributions and unin-
tended impact. 
The CGIAR Centers cannot reach pov-
erty reduction goals alone. Successful devel-
opment requires partnership. And it requires 
partners to manage the links between them, 
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making explicit mutual obligations to demon-
strate and take responsibility for performance 
based on shared objectives and agreed expec-
tations. Thus an important part of the results 
approach is to learn continuously with clients, 
donors, and other partners about how their 
and CGIAR-supported contributions, and the 
environment in which they occur, fit together 
to create development results. And when 
CGIAR scientists do achieve development 
goals through participatory research, they can-
not scale up to global impact without building 
on partnerships. The challenge is to strategi-
cally partner with others at global, network, 
and local levels to scale up the effects of the 
research through complementary services to 
strengthen institutions and reduce poverty.
Moving forward with a managing 
for results–international public goods 
approach
To take full advantage of a results approach, 
the leadership and managers of the CGIAR 
and Centers will have to adapt the EPMRs, 
PMS, impact studies, and strategic plans to 
a results-based system that collects common 
results indicators on what they jointly judge 
to be key strategic objectives. 
The most fundamental shift required for 
the CGIAR system may be cultural. Manag-
ing for results is meant to engage employees, 
partners, and end users in a learning-based ap-
proach that tolerates risk. It rewards knowl-
edge from failure as well as risk, as long as evi-
dence is used to improve performance. 
Management for results and international 
public goods approaches would help to im-
prove accountability in the CGIAR. These 
approaches replace hierarchical accountabil-
ity models, which involve one-way reporting 
between recipient and donor, with mutual 
accountability, which takes responsibility for 
performance in light of agreed expectations, 
and joint responsibility. Mutual accountabil-
ity is one of the five principles to which donors 
committed in the Paris Declaration in 2005. 
In the proposed strategic management for re-
sults framework, donors would report on the 
quality, predictability, and timeliness of their 
contributions to the CGIAR system, while 
the Centers would collectively report on out-
puts, outcomes, and impact.
Notes
Preliminary results from two of the other commission 1. 
studies—analyses of ICARDA research on Syrian fertilizer 
supply policies and barley production—which focused 
on direct productivity effects, did not find significant links 
between technology adoption and poverty reduction.
Raitzer (2003).2. 
There were two reports by the Working Group: CGIAR 3. 
(2004a) and Cleaver et al. (2004).
Source: Dutch Leonard, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Presentation to the World Bank, 2002.
Figure 3.5 Accountability and responsibility for achieving results
Monitoring development
changes with clients
Monitoring influence of
outputs on clients
Monitoring resource use
Goals/impact
Final outcomes
Intermediate outcomes
Outputs
Responsible:
(zone of influence)
Managing toward outcomes,
monitoring effectiveness of outputs,
learning, taking corrective action
Accountable:
(zone of control)
Producing or coproducing outputs
promised within agreed allocation
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The CGIAR Internal Audit Unit (a unit of the System 4. 
Office) did the verification at first, but now a consultant 
undertakes verification in collaboration with the Internal 
Audit Unit. For example, to verify publications, the 
consultant selects five Centers at random and verifies 
indicator 4A (“the number of externally peer-reviewed 
publications per scientist, excluding articles published 
in journals listed in the Thompson Scientific/ISI”). The 
consultant then selects another five Centers at random 
from the remaining Centers and verifies indicator 4B. The 
remaining five Centers have their 4C data verified.
Globescan Inc. (2006b). 5. 
CGIAR (2008).6. 
Some caveats are in order. First, this is very preliminary 7. 
analysis. Second, correlations do not necessarily imply 
causality. Third, the definitions of some PMS variables 
have changed significantly during the last three years, 
so comparisons over time are risky. This is especially 
the case for the rating of intermediate outcomes by 
the Science Council. The rating method has changed 
substantially from year to year. Finally, the dataset for 15 
Centers over three or four years is small.
These data are available only for 2007. In 2005 and 2006 8. 
the Science Council gave only a combined score for a 
Center’s five best intermediate outcomes, but did not rate 
individual intermediate outcomes on a 10-point scale.
Iskandarani and Reifschneider (2007), p. 3.9. 
Research staff is defined as GF-level staff and above 10. 
that work on research in the Development Economics 
Department. The department also tracks citations that 
could be a useful additional indicator to CGIAR’s PMS to 
track the impact of research.
Science Council (2006f).11. 
Wadsworth et al. (2007). 12. 
Other major conferences include the 2003 Rome 13. 
Declaration on Harmonization, the 2004 Marrakech 
Roundtable on Results, and the 2006 Vietnam 
Roundtable in 2006 on core principles for applying good 
practice results. The OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness oversees the process of ensuring progress 
on the Paris Declaration agreement. Annual reports and 
recent evaluation are available on the OECD-DAC website 
(www.oecd.org).
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Addressing gender issues 
in development is an 
institutional responsibility—
not the responsibility of 
a subset of staff drawn 
from target groups. What 
is needed is accountability 
through more gender 
analysis and performance 
measurement and reporting
C
h
A
p
Te
r4 Gender at the CGIAr
The Panel finds that despite good efforts by 
particular CGIAR Centers and progress 
made by the CGIAR’s Gender and Diversity 
Program, the CGIAR System and Centers 
have not integrated gender into their research 
and outreach mandates, nor are they yet doing 
enough to ensure that gender equity and 
diversity analysis inform their staffing.1
The Panel concludes that the CGIAR 
and its Centers need a more empirical ap-
proach to ensuring that barriers to gender eq-
uity and diversity are eliminated. Data-based 
performance measurement and reporting are 
needed to identify unintended adverse im-
pacts in seemingly gender-neutral program 
designs, science agendas, and employment 
systems. Progress on gender equity and di-
versity at the CGIAR—both for develop-
ment impact and internally—will require 
moving from an advocacy to an account-
ability model for anticipating and eliminat-
ing adverse impacts. 
To appreciate the need for a more quan-
titative, accountability-based approach, it is 
important to understand the need to frame 
gender equity and diversity appropriately. In-
tegration of equity issues has too often been 
approached as a problem of individual behav-
ior and perception, leading to solutions based 
on advocacy that are ad hoc and without sys-
tematic institutional support. Decades of ex-
perience have now shown that such solutions 
do not succeed. Instead, the CGIAR and its 
Centers must frame gender equity and diver-
sity as issues of development and institutional 
necessity.
The Panel further underlines that the 
CGIAR and its Centers cannot effectively 
address either gender or diversity simply by 
adding scientists who are women or who 
come from developing countries. That is not 
what this chapter recommends—far from it. 
Addressing gender issues in development is 
an institutional responsibility—not the re-
sponsibility of a subset of staff drawn from 
target groups. What is needed is accountabil-
ity through more gender analysis and perfor-
mance measurement and reporting.
Gender is not yet integrated 
into CGIAR research
The CGIAR System generally recognizes 
gender integration as an important or very 
important part of its research mandate. Yet 
it also acknowledges that the CGIAR and its 
Centers have not effectively integrated gender 
into their research and outreach mandates. 
Scant evidence can be produced to show that 
the CGIAR is addressing women’s agricul-
tural contributions, their special agricul-
tural knowledge, or their agricultural needs 
in ways that reflect their full importance 
to agriculture (as recognized by the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2008 and 
by CGIAR and Center leadership).
The Panel specifically finds that there is: 
No systemwide policy on gender in •	
the CGIAR.
No leadership on gender at the •	
CGIAR System level (Chairs, Execu-
tive Council, Secretariat). A pattern 
of misplaced reliance by CGIAR 
leaders on submanagerial staff func-
tions has shunted responsibility for 
gender away from operations manage-
ment and professional staff.
No attention to gender research and •	
development issues in the Annual 
CGIAR Performance Indicators. 
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Negligible attention to gender issues •	
in the CGIAR’s Science Priorities.
Negligible attention to gender is-•	
sues in the CGIAR’s Medium-Term 
Plans.
Negligible attention to gender issues •	
in External Program and Manage-
ment Reviews (EPMRs); unless spe-
cifically requested by a panelist.
Negligible attention to gender issues •	
in Center strategies and work plans 
(with a few exceptions).
No gender-disaggregated reporting re-•	
quirement for project management.
No gender-disaggregated reporting •	
requirement for monitoring and eval-
uation systems.
No mandate for any CGIAR body •	
—not even the Gender and Di-
versity Program or the Participa-
tory Research and Gender Analysis 
 Program—to track progress toward 
institutional objectives in gender re-
search and technology development.
In short, gender has not been integrated 
into the CGIAR’s research and outreach 
work.
Certainly, some individual scientists and 
Centers have already addressed gender in re-
search and outreach—at times with gender 
coordinators or advisors supporting their 
work. Donors can require attention to gender 
in the projects they fund. And although the 
Panel was not called on to assess the work of 
individual Centers on gender, it noted that 
IFPRI, ILRI, and IRRI are often cited for 
having done good work. The Participatory 
Research and Gender Analysis Program has, 
in many cases, supported such efforts. Gen-
erally, though, attention to gender analysis in 
the CGIAR is ad hoc and depends on indi-
vidual initiative.
So far, the Centers have not adopted 
proven institutional practices to measure 
gender-related impacts or to devise measures 
for meeting women’s and girls’ specific needs. 
Though there have been clear examples of ef-
forts by particular Centers on gender, such ef-
forts are not managed as a systemwide priority. 
CGIAR members have accepted System Pri-
orities that do not include gender as a priority 
or as a cross-cutting theme to be managed and 
consistently measured in priority areas. And 
neither the CGIAR nor the Centers address 
gender in their institutional guidance and 
management instruments.
Gender goes almost unmentioned in 
CGIAR’s key instruments for aligning the 
work of Centers with System Priorities. For 
example, the EPMRs have rarely covered 
gender—and where they have, such coverage 
has not been consistent (box 4.1). Similarly, 
CGIAR’s Impact Assessments reveal little ev-
idence of analysis, action, or impacts related 
to gender. The CGIAR does not systemati-
cally collect successes and lessons learned on 
gender, nor is work done by the Centers ana-
lyzed systematically for possible unintended 
results.
Having no evidence of positive or negative 
gender impact does not demonstrate a lack of 
impact. Neutral interventions can have posi-
tive or negative impacts. Whether they help or 
harm women and girls can only be known if 
gender analysis is integrated into assessments 
at all stages of a program. 
According to a review of the External Program and Management Reviews 
(EPMRs) commissioned by the Panel for this report, “Substantive consideration 
of gender in [the reviews] is still the exception rather than the rule.”
The review found that gender in programs is:
Mentioned somewhat•	  in the EPMRs of CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, and ICRISAT.
Mentioned very slightly •	 in the EPMRs of the Africa Rice Centre, ICARDA, 
ILRI, IPGRI, and IWMI.
Not mentioned •	 in the EPMRs of CIFOR, ICLARM, IFPRI, IITA, IRRI, and 
World Agroforestry.
The review stated: “Some EPMR Panels claim that good science is blind to 
gender. But if the ultimate objective of the CGIAR is an impact on food security, 
poverty reduction and sustainable natural resource management, attention to 
gender is unavoidable.”
A cursory review of the External Program and Management Review Guide-
lines (issued by the Science Council) shows that they are silent on the need for 
attention to gender in the reviews’ assessments of the Centers’ science. Thus, 
any gender coverage is purely at the discretion of each review panel.
Source: Gibbs (2008).
Box 4.1 Inattention to gender in the CGIAR’s External 
Program and Management Reviews
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This principle means 
shifting from an advocacy-
based approach, which 
addresses personal 
persuasion and is 
supply-driven, to an 
accountability-based 
approach, which addresses 
institutional standards 
and is demand-driven
The Panel is optimistic that the CGIAR 
will embrace a more serious approach to gen-
der. Some champions exist; good work has 
been done; and a critical mass of CGIAR re-
spondents show a readiness to adopt empirical 
and institutional approaches. (For example, 
43 percent of respondents to the 2008 In-
dependent Review Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders called the inclusion of gender 
measures in the Performance Measurement 
System “important.”)
Why the CGIAR and its Centers 
need an integrated gender 
accountability framework
Evidence from the recent past has taught 
us that we must test our assumptions about 
the impact of an evolving agricultural world 
on women living in a subsistence environ-
ment. Research done since the early 1980s 
has shown that no development intervention 
can claim to be gender-neutral without a sys-
tematic analysis of its impact on women’s and 
men’s social and economic roles.
For institutions this principle means shift-
ing from an advocacy-based approach, which 
addresses personal persuasion and is supply-
driven, to an accountability-based approach, 
which addresses institutional standards and 
is demand-driven. An accountability-based 
approach requires action to prevent uninten-
tional harm, and it requires action to improve 
the status of women and girls. Since integrat-
ing women is a development effectiveness 
issue, it is a professional responsibility and 
not a matter of personal persuasion. Equality-
 based organizations are organizations that 
measure such impacts—not those that claim 
to be gender-neutral. (Unfortunately the ag-
ricultural reforms of the 1990s, based on eco-
nomic liberalization and “structural adjust-
ment,” have tended to revive long-discredited 
assumptions about gender neutrality.)
Agriculture in developing countries today 
has been called “vast, varied, and changing.”2 
The Panel recognizes that this places strong 
limits on the availability of sex-disaggregated 
data. Local variation in gendered patterns 
makes generalizations awkward. Nevertheless, 
the fact that recent World Bank findings on 
gender in agriculture and development mir-
ror those of the 1970s and 1980s3 points to 
the international community’s ongoing fail-
ure to address the different needs of women 
and men in agriculture. Although women are 
now often the majority in an expanding com-
mercial workforce for developing country ag-
riculture, familiar patterns continue to favor 
men over women. For instance, in the grow-
ing horticultural sector, men tend to predom-
inate in “permanent” positions; in contrast, 
women work less rewarding and empowering 
“flexible” jobs (casual or seasonal). However, 
some opportunities for women are also being 
created with these shifts—through access to 
higher-value crop production and through in-
creased demand for labor.
Because gender inequalities are so inter-
twined with slow progress in agricultural 
development—and especially considering the 
current food crisis and the loss of potential 
productivity by women farmers—the Panel 
took a close look at the CGIAR’s record on 
gender. In the CGIAR System’s research 
agenda, the only program for responding to 
gender is the Participatory Research and Gen-
der Analysis Program (PRGA). The PRGA 
was launched in 1997 “to treat participatory 
research and gender analysis as strategic re-
search methodologies for generating agricul-
tural technologies for poor farmers,”4 with 
CIAT as its convening Center.
In 2007 the First External Review of the 
PRGA called the PRGA’s performance on 
gender unsatisfactory, arguing that this pro-
gram is unlikely to succeed at systemwide 
gender mainstreaming—in part because it 
remains focused on advancing participatory 
research, rather than gender. In addition, 
several gender specialists argued that “using 
the PRGA program . . . to mainstream gen-
der . . . re inforces the assumption that gen-
der research is qualitative, participatory, 
and soft.” The Science Council, in a note at-
tached to the First External Review, made 
 recommendations—to broaden the PRGA’s 
mandate to include institutional incentives 
for systemwide adoption and to phase out the 
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The Independent Review 
Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders found that 
fewer than half of Center 
management judged 
their collective efforts 
on gender “effective”
PRGA’s participatory research component in 
favor of its gender mandate (or else find other 
instruments to scale up gender). Those recom-
mendations have gone unheeded.
The 2008 Independent Review Panel sur-
vey of informed stakeholders sought to assess 
the CGIAR’s consideration of gender in Cen-
ter leadership. Most CGIAR respondents in-
dicated strong support for integrating gender 
into research. Seventy-nine percent of respon-
dents, and 80 percent of Center governance 
and management, judged gender integration 
“important” or “very important.” Despite 
this wide recognition of gender’s importance, 
the Independent Review Panel survey found 
that fewer than half of Center management 
judged their collective efforts on gender “ef-
fective.” And among all respondents, only 
one-third judged the CGIAR’s record on gen-
der “effective.” Asked to comment on varied 
approaches to improving the track record of 
the CGIAR and the Centers, only a minority 
of each group of respondents believed that “no 
change is needed.”
Training and best-practices materials 
are not enough—they must be 
supported with data-intensive 
approaches to ensure accountability
The Independent Review Panel survey of 
informed stakeholders asked respondents to 
indicate whether they favored various sug-
gestions for improving the CGIAR’s and 
Centers’ approach to gender in research and 
related activities. The suggestion that received 
a favorable response from the largest share of 
all respondents (59 percent) was “Provide 
training and guidance materials or best prac-
tices on gender and diversity in agriculture.” 
The Panel found that disappointing. The 
CGIAR and Centers already have many train-
ing and best-practices materials on integrat-
ing gender into development for agriculture 
and agriculture-related areas (such as health 
and nutrition). To make progress on gender, 
other, data-intensive methods are needed and 
urgently require attention.
There is no question that the CGIAR and 
Centers must continue to provide training and 
guidance on best practices. But to ensure that 
such materials are practically used to adjust sci-
ence to the needs of poor women and children 
(as well as men), accountability—with col-
lection and analysis of gender-disaggregated 
data—is essential. That has been clear to re-
searchers of development for decades.
Unfortunately, acceptance of data-
 intensive approaches is low where it counts the 
most. On the Independent Review Panel sur-
vey of informed stakeholders, just 20 percent 
of the CGIAR’s Board Chairs and Center Ex-
ecutives responded favorably to the proposal 
“Collect more gender disaggregated data and 
performance indicators for [the Performance 
Measurement] System.” This lack of support 
for performance reporting and measurement 
stands in the way of further progress on gen-
der at the CGIAR and its Centers.
The Panel recognizes that managing gen-
der well is a complex undertaking. To make 
gender a matter of professional responsibil-
ity in reaching CGIAR Strategic Objectives, 
consistent leadership will be needed (as im-
plied in the gender frameworks used by IFPRI 
and ILRI). Support on gender must include 
investing in technical capacity and provid-
ing financial support, using existing manage-
ment and accountability systems, and shaping 
a strong organizational culture that addresses 
the needs and preferences of women and girls. 
Finally, the experiences of successful gender 
programs show that—to create incentives 
for integrating gender issues through institu-
tional planning, programming, and reporting 
instruments—staff positions on gender need 
redefining to ensure that they support man-
agement to integrate gender into institutional 
accountability.
The CGIAR’s Gender and 
Diversity Program
The CGIAR’s Gender and Diversity Pro-
gram is focused on improving career oppor-
tunities and institutional environments 
for Group 2 nationals and women. Hosted 
by the World Agroforestry Centre in Nai-
robi, the program reports to the Director 
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Rather than seeking 
to remedy intentional 
discrimination by 
individuals through 
advocacy, best practice 
seeks to remedy systemic 
discrimination by 
quantitatively measuring the 
impact of seemingly neutral 
systems in employment
General there and to the CGIAR System 
Office Steering Committee. A 1999–2003 
external review of the program found that 
it had made rapid, excellent progress in the 
mere four years of its existence.5 The review 
attributed this progress to the program’s 
leader, who, with a staff of just one to three 
people, provided CGIAR Centers with 
a variety of tools. In addition, the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation has recognized 
the program’s leadership with the African 
Women In Agriculture Research and Devel-
opment (AWARD) Fellowships. The fellow-
ships include a $13 million grant to pilot a 
gender program in agriculture, which, if 
successful, will likely be extended. Clear, 
measurable outcome results have been set 
for the AWARD program and there is much 
evidence of its future promise.
The Gender and Diversity Program has 
been less successful at promoting account-
ability around systemic employment barriers 
to women and Group 2 nationals at CGIAR 
Centers. To regularly identify and eliminate 
such barriers in all aspects of CGIAR-spon-
sored Center employment—from entry to 
compensation, promotion, development, and 
exit—the Centers need to adopt a more so-
phisticated approach. This work needs to be 
harmonized to aid mutual learning among 
the Centers, and to allow progress on inter-
nal gender and diversity to be reported in the 
CGIAR Annual Report. 
The CGIAR should shift management 
for internal gender and diversity to 
a new human resources function, 
with performance-based data 
reporting and accountability
The Gender and Diversity Program has a 
strategy of allowing autonomy to the Cen-
ters, which determine their own objectives; 
the program then responds to their requests. 
The 2003 external review leaned toward safe-
guarding this autonomy. Rather than urging 
more commitment to program objectives 
through increased accountability for Cen-
ter management and boards, the review sug-
gested that greater accountability measures 
were optional. Such an approach, though, 
does not create networkwide incentives to 
identify and remove common barriers to 
equity.
The 2003 Review Panel also called for the 
system’s Human Resources Advisory Service 
to develop Human Resources Guidelines—
comparable to Financial Guidelines—includ-
ing for gender and diversity. But the Advisory 
Service has never found its feet and has not 
provided the CGIAR with adequate support 
for tackling larger human resources manage-
ment issues.
In a networked system, even more than 
in a traditional institutional setting, manage-
ment for a barrier-free environment is key. In 
recent decades, legal action and social science 
research have changed our understanding 
of workplace discrimination. As our under-
standings of different types of discrimina-
tion have evolved, so too have our remedies 
for each.
Rather than seeking to remedy in-
tentional discrimination by individuals 
through advocacy, best practice seeks to 
remedy systemic discrimination by quanti-
tatively measuring the impact of seemingly 
neutral systems in employment. This data-
intensive approach uses information on the 
representation of target group members 
in the recruitment pool—setting goals for 
proportional representation in recruitment 
based on the numbers of available qualified 
individuals.
Recognizing that gender and diversity 
tracking has been the cornerstone of employ-
ment equity programs, the Panel explored 
whether the CGIAR System measured the 
effects of its own employment systems. The 
Panel asked for data on the representation 
of women and developing country (Group 2) 
 nationals by job category and by compensa-
tion levels. It was told that although such data 
are collected, the way they are collected makes 
comparisons and trend analysis difficult. So, 
the Panel included questions on its Indepen-
dent Review Panel survey of informed stake-
holders to solicit respondents’ views on the 
present approach and to test their readiness 
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Any new Center-based 
information management 
will have to be 
accompanied by strong 
guidance on using 
performance-based data 
to manage and to report 
on gender and diversity
to move to a more institutional workplace-
equity model.
Asked “What should be done to improve 
the CGIAR and Centers’ approaches to 
achieving gender and diversity objectives?”, 
many respondents to the Independent Re-
view Panel survey called for a more empirical 
approach to—and more accountability for—
gender and diversity in the Centers’ human 
resources management. A stronger empirical 
base is needed to reveal how different groups 
fare in hiring, promotion, training, evalua-
tions, and layoffs. Centers are not using stock 
and flow data regularly to manage barrier-free 
movement of staff through hire, promotions, 
and staff development opportunities.
After the 2003 external review the Gen-
der and Diversity Program launched a new 
strategy with a strong focus on decentralized 
accountability mechanisms. But without an-
nual commitments to report on gender and 
diversity performance, the approach has no 
teeth. And visits to the Centers indicate that 
the approach has been unevenly adopted.
Overall, there has not been a sufficient 
systemwide effort to use statistical methods 
proven in identifying unintended institutional 
barriers. The CGIAR and the Centers have no 
common practice—or even understanding—
of gender and diversity performance manage-
ment. Most Centers do not conscientiously 
or consistently collect data to reduce adverse 
impact in employment practices. An update 
to a 2003 baseline staff profile, for example, is 
now behind schedule because of difficulties in 
retrieving datasets.
The Gender and Diversity Program’s 
staffing survey shows good progress 
since 2003—but more systematic 
accountability is needed
Early reports from the staffing survey led 
by the Gender and Diversity Program indi-
cate that both groups made good progress 
between 2003 and 2008. The number of 
female scientists doubled between 2003 and 
2008, increasing their share in this staff 
group from less than 20 percent to 26 per-
cent. And among Center scientists, those who 
were Group 2 nationals rose from 58 percent 
in 2003 to 66 percent in 2008. The picture for 
Center management, however, is more mixed. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the share of women 
in management doubled from 9 percent to 
18  percent—still a very low figure. Over the 
same period the share of Group 2 nationals in 
Center management decreased from 46 per-
cent to 35 percent.
These figures will have more meaning 
when the full report is available, with more 
contextual data, in February 2009. Yet they 
generally suggest that the Gender and Diver-
sity Program’s strategy has had an impact. 
Similarly, the results of the 2008 Indepen-
dent Review Panel survey of informed stake-
holders show that the Gender and Diversity 
Program has done an excellent job with few 
resources in advocating and supporting di-
versity in the workplace. But to convince the 
Centers to take accountability for managing 
equity systematically and professionally—to 
identify hidden barriers and to sustain prog-
ress—more sophisticated approaches will be 
needed.
One reason to embrace such systematic, 
professional methods for managing gender eq-
uity and diversity is to ensure science quality. 
Some comments by respondents to the Inde-
pendent Review Panel survey report an unset-
tling perception: that efforts to make progress 
on gender and diversity have threatened the 
quality of science. The experience of many or-
ganizations has shown that when recruitment 
targets are set without analyzing availability 
profiles, and without analyzing the movement 
of targeted groups once employed, two prob-
lems result:
When targets are disconnected from •	
availability, some of those hired may 
lack needed qualifications—and will 
be destined to fail.
When barriers in employment sys-•	
tems are not identified or remedied, 
exclusion will continue.
To avoid these problems at the CGIAR, 
only a more evidence-based approach to iden-
tifying employment targets—aligned with ac-
countability, and revealing unintentional and 
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hidden barriers—will do. Any new Center-
based information management will have to 
be accompanied by strong guidance on using 
performance-based data to manage and to re-
port on gender and diversity. 
Notes
The Panel reviewed performance on gender in the 1. 
research mandate. Diversity issues were not covered 
because policy and evaluations on diversity were not 
available. Gender issues do cut across all groups, and 
the approach recommended for gender could equally 
be applied to diverse social, ethnic, and economic 
groups. 
World Bank (2007b), p. 1.2. 
World Bank (2007b).3. 
CIAT Participatory Research and Gender Analysis website: 4. 
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/asia/prga.htm, accessed 
September 18, 2008.
Castillo and Fogelberg (2004).5. 
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The research Centers 
are experiencing a quiet 
financial crisis. This has 
been masked by growing 
nominal (before inflation) 
revenues and increasing 
numbers of grants. It 
is nonetheless real
The research Centers are experiencing a quiet 
financial crisis. This has been masked by 
growing nominal (before inflation) revenues 
and increasing numbers of grants. It is none-
theless real. 
The Centers face five financial challenges: 
Funding for the Centers has not •	
grown after inflation for more than 
a decade. In contrast, several inter-
national development institutions 
have received record replenishments 
of their concessionary and grant 
funds—suggesting that the problem 
has not been a lack of available re-
sources, but the failure of the CGIAR 
and Centers to set up institutions that 
mobilize funds well.
Funding has become increasingly •	
restricted, with a proliferation of 
smaller, targeted grants. While this 
has benefits for donors, it means 
higher administrative costs for Cen-
ters, some increased financial risk, 
and less flexibility to follow promis-
ing lines of research.
Funding has been increasingly piece-•	
meal rather than strategic. Every 
review of the CGIAR in the past 
decade has recommended stronger 
central coordination of funding and 
a tighter link between priorities, per-
formance, and fund allocation.
There are deficiencies in financial •	
management at some Centers— 
notably at CIAT in recent years 
(box 5.1)—and tools for managing 
financial risk across the partnership 
are limited.
As cross-cutting, multipartner •	
Challenge Programs have made the 
research network and partnership 
more complex, that complexity has 
made financial management and 
control more difficult. The ad hoc ar-
rangements for different Challenge 
Programs are not a strong founda-
tion for helping financial systems to 
cope with increasing numbers of such 
programs.
In good times these would be significant 
problems. Now, during the food price crisis, 
new ideas and approaches are needed even more 
urgently. There is no easy solution. Because the 
problems are interrelated, the Panel believes 
that the financial challenges can probably be 
resolved only as part of an overall change in the 
partnership’s institutional structure. Centers 
need more resources and, in particular, more 
unrestricted funds—and donors are unlikely 
to provide them without greater assurance of 
strategic effectiveness and performance. A new 
institutional and financial structure, with new 
tools for resource mobilization, needs to be 
part of a general reform package. 
Most multilateral organizations would 
prefer to mobilize funds on a pooled basis. 
This allows for a performance-based system 
that allocates money more strategically, by 
priority—and gives recipients strong incen-
tives for good performance.
Pooled funds also have a number of major 
advantages for stakeholders:
They enable donors and doers to agree •	
on a strategic results agenda.
They provide a channel for mobiliz-•	
ing major increments of funding.
They provide a means of eliciting •	
commitments (including financial 
management commitments) by all 
involved.
resource mobilization, 
allocation, and managementCh
A
p
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requiring donor-Center relationships that re-
sult in increased transaction costs and an inef-
ficient way of doing business. The Panel also 
finds that the lack of a single entry point for 
donors establishes a bias toward nonstrategic, 
project by project, targeted funding, depriv-
ing the CGIAR and its affiliated Centers of 
opportunities to engage in more robust, sys-
temwide, strategic programs. 
Funding is more restricted
Not only has real funding failed to grow, but 
there has also been a trend toward restricted 
funding (figure 5.1). In 1995, 37 percent of 
funding received by the Centers was restricted. 
By 2007, 64 percent was restricted—a major 
shift with significant implications for finan-
cial management (table 5.3). 
Although there are some advantages some 
donors to restricted funding, there are major 
burdens for the Centers. First, restricted 
If the CGIAR is to substantially increase 
its funding of Centers and programs and 
strengthen the financial management of the 
partnership, it must consider a pooled fund-
ing approach. 
Research funding has stagnated
From 1995 to 2007, total revenues for the 
CGIAR and its affiliated Centers increased 
from $344 million to $520 million in nominal 
US dollars, a 51 percent increase, or an average 
annual growth rate of 4 percent. A compound 
annual growth rate of 4 percent, in nominal 
revenues, has not been sufficient to fund real 
growth after inflation. In constant dollars rev-
enues have been flat, rising only $21 million 
in 12 years (tables 5.1 and 5.2).1
The Panel believes that the failure to mo-
bilize funds is attributable, in part, to the in-
efficiencies inherent in the current matrix of 
64 members and 15 independent Centers, all 
A recent financial crisis at the International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) nearly led to that Center’s closure. One of 
the CGIAR’s oldest and largest Centers, CIAT suffered great 
financial harm from injudicious management decisions and 
the failure to recognize flaws in its business model. Although 
the Center experienced a 30 percent increase in revenue since 
2000, the Center’s financial health—measured by several indi-
cators—sharply declined. By the end of 2006 CIAT’s reserves 
had fallen to an amount equivalent to just 18 days of spending 
(the CGIAR standard is 75–90 days). 
CIAT is a case study in the many financial challenges fac-
ing the Centers. A significant decline in unrestricted funding 
coupled with the Center’s inability to recover full costs on its 
restricted contracts were underlying causes of the crisis. The 
CIAT crisis unfolded over a period of years, yet the Center’s 
financial management and oversight failed to recognize that 
full direct and indirect costs for projects were not being recov-
ered. In the words of CIAT management, “Overheads to cover 
institutional costs (indirect project costs) . . . were often not in-
cluded at realistic levels (largely a result of limitations imposed 
by donors) and full direct costs, prior to June 2007, were rarely 
included at all.”1
The fiduciary responsibility for CIAT’s financial woes lies 
with CIAT’s Board of Trustees and executive management. But 
financial oversight and leadership at the CGIAR System level 
did not help—it failed to stem CIAT’s losses over the long term. 
Though the CGIAR Secretariat flagged CIAT’s poor financial 
state year after year, the Secretariat took no further action to 
correct the CIAT business model’s grave underlying problems. 
For example, if the Secretariat had reviewed variances against 
project budgets it could have learned that the cost recovery 
issue was a chronic one—and an intervention with donors to 
rectify some underpricing might have been possible.
The Panel notes that, during the CIAT crisis, the CGIAR 
disbanded its Finance Committee and eliminated an important 
instrument of financial oversight and transparency. The Panel 
notes, further, that neither the CGIAR financial report for 2006 
nor the CGIAR financial report for 2007 discussed the CIAT cri-
sis at significant length.
CIAT exemplifies an extreme case of the difficulties that 
Centers face when financial management systems do not re-
spond properly. Presently, most Centers are recovering less 
than 100 percent of full indirect costs on restricted projects 
while continuing to deal with declining levels of unrestricted 
funding. There is evidence that even the Challenge Programs—
a program design by the CGIAR and its affiliated Centers—do 
not allow full recovery of indirect costs. 
CGIAR, Ad Hoc Finance Committee of the Executive Council (2008).1. 
Box 5.1 CIAT’s financial crisis—a case study of financial challenges currently facing the Centers
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US$ millions
Funding source 1995 2007
Change 12-year compound 
annual growth 
rate (percent)Amount Percent
Grant funding 329 495 166 50 4
Other income 15 25 10 67 4
Total revenue 344 520 176 51 4 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007).
Table 5.1 Nominal funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007
2007 US$ millions
Funding source 1995 2007 
Change 12-year compound 
annual growth 
rate (percent)Amount Percent
Grant funding 477 495 18 4 0
Other income 22 25 3 1 0
Total revenue 499 520 21 4 0 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007b), adjusted for inflation index (2007 base).
Table 5.2 Constant dollar funding of CGIAR and affiliated Centers, 1995 and 2007
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base.
2007 US$ millions
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Unrestricted funding
Total funding
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Figure 5.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR
2007 US$ millions
Type of funding 1995
Percent of 
total funding 2007
Percent of 
total funding
Change
Amount Percent
Restricted 175 37 316 64 141 81 
Unrestricted 302 63 179 36 –123 –41
Total 477 100 495 100 18 4 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports (CGIAR 1995, 2007b), adjusted for inflation index (2007 base).
Table 5.3 Restricted and unrestricted funding for the CGIAR System
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grants have a higher level of administrative 
costs. Second, restricted funds cannot be rec-
ognized as revenue until costs are incurred, 
a situation noted in annual financial reports 
as causing unfavorable budget variances (al-
though the funding is available, it cannot be 
recognized). Third, and most important, re-
stricted funding is directly correlated with fi-
nancial instability at the Center level. Regres-
sion analysis shows a positive correlation of 38 
percent between restricted funding levels and 
surpluses/deficits.
Research work programs have 
become more fragmented
The Panel finds that several unfavorable trends 
in grants, most notably the increasing number 
and decreasing size of research grants, place 
additional administrative burdens on the 
Centers. For example, CIAT, ICRISAT, and 
IITA were each managing more than 200 
restricted grants in 2007. From 1999 to 2007 
the total number of ICRISAT’s restricted 
grants rose by 130 percent (an increase of 127 
restricted grants). IITA now has about twice 
as many restricted grants to manage as it did 
in 1999 (figure 5.2). 
The shift toward smaller restricted grants 
(figures 5.3 and 5.4) exacerbates the trans-
action cost problem (fixed transaction costs 
translate into higher costs for smaller grants). 
The smaller grants also tend to be of a non-
strategic, project by project nature.
The Panel’s grant findings are not new. In 
March 2006, the Report of the Third External 
Program and Management Review of World 
Agroforestry reached similar conclusions and 
noted concerns that “smaller projects carry a 
heavy administrative burden which is out of 
proportion to the science and income they 
generate.”2 The External Program and Man-
agement Review Panel noted that in 2005, 67 
of 162 of World Agroforestry’s active projects 
were funded at less than $50,000. While ac-
counting for 41 percent of total grants, this 
group of projects represented only 6 percent 
of World Agroforestry’s restricted income and 
less of its total income.3 
While small grants are not all bad, the 
overall balance in funding for some Centers 
has shifted too far toward small grants. In 
such cases, small grants generate a dispropor-
tionate amount of administrative activity, po-
tentially distracting resources from important 
research objectives. Although difficult, the 
CGIAR System and affiliated Centers need 
to consider what is a reasonable minimum for 
Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers.
Figure 5.3 Rising numbers of small grants 
 (less than $100,000) to selected 
 CGIAR Centers, 1999–2007
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Note: CIAT data are for 2000, as details for 1999 were unavailable.
Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers.
Figure 5.2 Rising numbers of restricted 
 grants to selected CGIAR 
 Centers, 1999–2007
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restricted grants to ensure that costs of such 
grants do not outweigh the benefits. 
Under the proposed model, a new initia-
tive to pool donor funds, the CGIAR Fund 
(see chapter 8), should work to redress the bal-
ance in grant size.
Business practices must keep 
pace with shifts in funding
As more and more funding is restricted, Cen-
ters must strengthen their cost controls, espe-
cially their ability to fully recover indirect 
costs on restricted projects. To date, full cost 
recovery varies significantly across Centers. A 
few Centers have reported 100 percent recov-
ery of indirect costs—but others struggle with 
the need to renegotiate contracts where donor 
practices and constraints restrict such recov-
ery. In some cases, there may also be a failure 
of Center management to fully understand, 
manage, and negotiate full cost recovery con-
tracts. Until all restricted projects assume 
their full share of indirect costs, donors of 
unrestricted funds are subsidizing restricted 
projects. The recommended Consortium of 
Centers, with a formal policy on full costing 
of research (see chapter 8), will help.
The question is often asked about what 
level of unrestricted funding is adequate or 
appropriate. As a benchmark indicator, a con-
sultant to the Panel calculated total indirect 
costs for each Center (as reported in Exhibit II 
of the 2006 financial reports) and compared 
the indirect cost with the unrestricted fund-
ing available to each Center. Each Center had 
more than adequate unrestricted funding to 
cover all indirect expenses. At the low end, 
unrestricted funding covered 1.57 times indi-
rect costs (World Agroforestry). At the high 
end, unrestricted funding covered 3.59 times 
indirect cost (CIP; see figure 5.5). Although 
the benchmark is useful in comparing indi-
rect cost coverage, it does not take into con-
sideration other expenses that are typically 
covered by unrestricted funding, including 
capital expenditures. 
Cash flow is strong—but reserve 
targets should be increased
From a financial perspective, cash is the life-
blood of an organization. In 2007, the CGIAR 
and its affiliated Centers had a strong (cash 
flow) liquidity position, with enough cash or 
near-cash assets to meet short-term liabilities. 
In addition to a liquidity indicator, each 
Center also calculates a reserve benchmark 
to determine whether it is prepared to meet 
 longer-term financial disruptions. The Panel 
reviewed current reserve indicators for the 
Centers and recommends two changes. First, 
the CGIAR’s current cash reserve “bench-
mark” of 75–90 days should be extended to 
180 days or six months to reflect the intended 
“longer-term” nature of the benchmark. Sec-
ond, Centers should not be penalized if they 
build even larger reserves (for some Centers 
these might eventually approach the size of 
endowments). It would also be useful to iden-
tify where and to what extent reserve balances 
have been earmarked or designated (what are 
the reserve restrictions). In reviewing bench-
marks, the Panel noted a shortcoming in the 
calculation of the reserve and liquidity bench-
marks. In cases where a Center does not have 
long- or medium-term assets, the reserve 
Note: Numbers in each column are the number of grants at each level.
Source: Grant schedules provided by individual Centers.
Figure 5.4 Restricted grants by size for 
 selected CGIAR Centers, 2007
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calculation is not meaningful as it is the same 
calculation as the liquidity indicator. 
Capital investment declined 
sharply to 2003 and has 
only partly recovered
Capital investment is essential for keeping at 
the forward edge of science. But capital invest-
ment (in constant US dollars) declined across 
the Centers, from $30.3 million in 1994, to 
below $10 million in 2002 and 2003. It rose 
to $18.7 million in 2007—still 38 percent 
below its 1994 level (figure 5.6).
Center reserves are used to fund capital ex-
penditures, but Center reserves can be replen-
ished only with adequate levels of unrestricted 
funding. It is no surprise that levels of capital 
expenditures have decreased as unrestricted 
funding levels have decreased. With declining 
levels of unrestricted funding already stretched 
to cover indirect costs, the Panel finds that some 
Centers have not had the resources to make nec-
essary capital investments. Discussions with se-
lected Center financial Directors confirmed 
that capital expenditure levels do not adequately 
cover either cyclical investment requirements or 
investments in new systems and technologies.
The Centers and the new Consortium 
of Centers (see chapter 8) should identify 
investment needs, taking into consideration 
long-term strategic goals and what will be re-
quired to maintain comparative advantage. 
Challenge Programs greatly 
increase the complexity 
of financial management 
of the CGIAR System
The Challenge Programs, collaborative 
research efforts on issues of global or regional 
significance, were introduced in 2003. They 
were expected to mobilize incremental funds 
for the Centers. In some cases, however, they 
have instead absorbed funding that otherwise 
would have gone directly to the Centers. 
Although what would have happened 
without the Challenge Programs cannot be 
known with certainty, it is clear that they have 
not driven revenue growth for the System as a 
whole. To achieve major gains in funding for 
the CGIAR System, other tools for mobiliz-
ing resources probably will be needed.
Challenge Programs have created prob-
lems in other areas of financial management 
within the CGIAR System. First, since fund-
ing for Challenge Programs is by definition 
“restricted,” it has contributed to the rise in 
the share of restricted funds. Second, the gov-
ernance and financial management of each 
Source: CGIAR Financial Report (CGIAR 2006d).
Figure 5.5 Unrestricted funding compared with total indirect costs, by CGIAR Center, 2006
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Challenge Program is unique. A program may 
be an incorporated or unincorporated joint 
venture, a program of a host Center, or some 
other form of partnership. It may or may not 
have audited financial statements. The Panel 
advises that all Challenge Programs should 
have independently audited annual financial 
statements, with governance arrangements to 
enable such audits. Third, the complexity of 
the Challenge Programs creates obstacles to 
overall financial reporting by the CGIAR Sec-
retariat. There are inconsistencies in report-
ing across the System (CGIAR Secretariat), 
program (Challenge Program management), 
and Center (host) levels. Some sources report 
funding on a cash basis, some on an accrual 
basis, and some on a “hybrid” of both. It is 
difficult to relate or reconcile what the Secre-
tariat reports to what the Challenge Programs 
and Centers report individually.
The Panel believes that the materiality, 
importance, and multipartner complexity of 
the Challenge Programs require more finan-
cial control—not less. It recommends that a 
single administrative home be created, with 
standardized policies and procedures for 
establishing and managing the Challenge 
Programs.
The Panel’s recommendation of a single 
administrative home for Challenge Programs 
in the Consortium of Centers (see chapter 8) 
partly reflects the desirability of simplifica-
tion and standardization. But it also reflects 
the Panel’s view that having one or two “host 
Centers” manage the finances of the Chal-
lenge Programs—while those Centers pay 
for a substantial amount of research funded 
by the Challenge Programs—presents a con-
flict of interest. Five years of experience with 
pilot programs and Challenge Programs in-
dicate that the Challenge Programs have not 
led to major increases in funding. They have 
not led to more unrestricted funding, longer-
term funding, or strategic performance-based 
allocation of pooled resources.
The Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
is too limited a model
The World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
(MDTF) for the CGIAR was established in 
2005 to enable donors to channel funds to 
the CGIAR and the Centers.4 In 2007, about 
$100 million—nearly a quarter of all contri-
butions to the CGIAR that year—were chan-
neled through the MDTF.
Trust Fund Administration Agreements 
are prepared annually by the CGIAR Secre-
tariat with each Center and each donor wish-
ing to use the MDTF. For its services the 
World Bank charges an administrative fee 
(0.175 percent of the total sum).5
Note: Constant dollar calculations based on inflation data included in CGIAR financial reports. The base year is 2007. 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1994–2007.
Figure 5.6 Capital investments of CGIAR Centers, 1994–2007
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To achieve a quantum 
improvement in funding, 
more is needed than a 
slightly modified MDTF
Each agreement names a Center or Cen-
ters to receive funds and notes the condi-
tions—if any—on their use.6 A donor may 
require the World Bank, through the CGIAR 
Secretariat, to make specific agreements with 
Centers before disbursing the funds. But the 
Bank does not audit compliance with the 
conditions.7
That the Bank does not audit Centers’ 
compliance with conditions in MDTF agree-
ments has caused concern. In 2006, the Euro-
pean Commission asked the Bank to provide 
assurance that the funds channeled through 
the MDTF were used as agreed—but the 
question of who should provide such assur-
ance remained unresolved.8 This problem of 
assurance is related to a larger problem with 
the Centers’ accountability for how funds are 
used.
The MDTF is an important convenience 
to donors. It reduces transactions costs and 
simplifies accounting, avoiding the need for 
multiple agreements and separate transactions 
between the donor and Centers. And, because 
of policy or program constraints internal to 
each donor, it might be easier for some donors 
to make contributions through a multilateral 
institution than directly to a research center. 
Nevertheless, to provide the structure for 
a rejuvenated resource mobilization system, 
and meet the needs of a revitalized CGIAR, 
the MDTF would need to be a much more 
substantial operation.
The Panel suggests that to achieve a quan-
tum improvement in funding, more is needed 
than a slightly modified MDTF. The Panel 
proposes a balanced partnership model as the 
governance structure for the partnership be-
tween the CGIAR and the network of Cen-
ters (see chapter 8).
There must be a link 
between resource allocation 
and System priorities
The 2005 CGIAR Annual General Meeting 
endorsed a set of 5 research areas and 20 over-
all priorities for 2005–15, proposed by the 
Science Council.9 Chapter 3 discusses how 
these System Priorities have not effectively 
guided resource allocation. 
In June 2008, Working Group 1 of the 
CGIAR Facilitated Change Process began to 
outline a foundation for a strategy and results 
framework which—with more articulation—
could guide performance-based allocations. 
The Working Group produced a new vision, 
two mission statements, and three main stra-
tegic objectives, as follows:
Food for people.•	  Sustainably increase 
productivity and the production of 
healthy food and for the poor.
Environments for people.•	  Conserve, 
enhance, and sustainably use natu-
ral resources and biodiversity to im-
prove the livelihoods of the poor in 
response to climate change and other 
factors.
Policies for people.•	  Promote policy 
and institutional change to stimulate 
agricultural growth and equity that 
will benefit the poor, especially rural 
women and other disadvantaged 
groups.
Each of the three objectives is accompa-
nied by notional indicators (to be further de-
veloped) and by an appreciation of key oppor-
tunities, major players on the scene, CGIAR 
advantages, and CGIAR functions that sup-
port the key opportunities.10
There is no process yet for determining how 
to allocate resources among priority areas.
The existing model that most closely re-
sembles the Panel’s recommended approach to 
CGIAR resource mobilization and allocation 
is the management of the World Bank’s $50 
million annual grant from the Development 
Grants Facility to the CGIAR, Centers, and 
programs. The Panel examined the evolution 
of this approach alongside other options. 11 
The World Bank’s allocation of 
its contribution to the CGIAR 
The World Bank plays several funding roles 
in resource mobilization and allocation. It has 
been the largest single donor, has coordinated 
management of the MDTF, and has managed 
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its own allocation of funds in the interest of 
the CGIAR System as a whole. Over time the 
Bank has taken three different approaches to 
allocating its grant to the CGIAR and the 
Centers: 
Filling funding gaps (1972–93), •	
sometimes called “balancing” and 
sometimes “donor of last resort.” 
Matching funds (1993–2004).•	
Strategic allocation, applying a formula •	
that includes Center need, potential, 
and performance (2004–present).
Filling funding gaps and matching funds 
are discussed in the Panel’s full Technical Re-
port. Strategic allocation is described below. 
In 2003, the first full year of Challenge 
Program funding and the major funding year 
for a project to rehabilitate germplasm collec-
tions,12 the World Bank Operations Evalu-
ation Department recommended that the 
Bank abandon the matching grant model.13 
In 2004, the Bank introduced its strategic 
allocation system, which is partly similar—
being formula-based and, to some degree, 
performance-based—to the allocation system 
for its own major concessionary fund (Inter-
national Development Association). 
Since 2004, the World Bank has divided 
its annual $50 million contribution to the 
CGIAR into differently allocated segments 
(figure 5.7). About half the funds pay for the 
CGIAR, special projects, and programs. The 
other half are allocated to the Centers by for-
mula, and are divided into two tranches:
Base support—unrestricted grants re-•	
lated to the size of each Center
General support—funds allocated to •	
each Center based on its score on 16 
performance criteria.14
In 2007 about equal amounts were allo-
cated as base support and general support. So, 
about one-quarter of the funds were linked di-
rectly to scores on the 16 performance criteria.
Among the performance criteria, four are 
explicitly related to results—achievement of 
outputs targets, most significant outcomes, 
and the quality of impacts monitoring, as as-
sessed by the Science Council and were given 
a 35 percent weight. The other criteria cover-
ing quality and relevance of current research, 
institutional health, and financial health 
were given a 65 percent weight.15 In addition, 
a small weight was first given in 2007 to the 
“focus areas” identified in the stakeholder per-
ception survey. The criterion with the largest 
weight is “solvency.”16 
There are no restrictions on how the Cen-
ters may use the World Bank funds allocated 
by formula, either as base support or as gen-
eral support. 
Source: CGIAR Secretariat 2007c.
Figure 5.7 Allocation of the World Bank Grant to the CGIAR 2007
Challenge Programs/Systemwide and
Ecoregional Programs $9.0M
Global public goods project $7.8M
Restructure/emergency $1.4M
Science Council and committees $1.0M
General support (based on
performance and potential)
$13.2M
Base support
(based on size)
$13.2M
Specific programs
and committees
$19.2M
CGIAR Secretariat
$4.4M
Targeted to
specific purposes
$23.6M
Formula-based
$26.4M
Total grant
$50M
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Notes
CGIAR Annual Reports, 1995 to 2007, The inflation rates 1. 
are dollar-based annual rates for each Center. They are 
derived from three elements: the currency basket of a 
Center’s expenditures (source: Centers); annual inflation 
rates (as measured by the consumer price index) on 
the currencies in the basket (source: IMF International 
Financial Statistics); and annual changes in exchange 
rates of each currency in the basket against the US dollar 
(source: IMF International Financial Statistics).
World Agroforestry Centre (2006).2. 
World Agroforestry Centre (2006).3. 
Prior to 2005 the World Bank managed a number of 4. 
different funds targeted to the Centers. It instituted the 
MDTF partly to standardize the Trust Fund Administration 
Agreements by which it manages funds contributed by 
other donors to the Bank for disbursement to the CGIAR 
and the Centers. The CGIAR Secretariat obtained approval 
for an Initiating Brief for the Trust Fund that effectively 
established a global multidonor trust fund. Approval of a 
new standardized administrative agreement (MDTFAA) 
was obtained on September 1, 2005 (World Bank 2005, 
p. 2). On September 8, 2006, the Vice President of 
Sustainable Development and the Chair of CGIAR reported 
that the new arrangement was fully implemented. (“Update 
on the Implementation of the Management Action Plan.”)
The World Bank plays a “limited trustee” role. Services 5. 
include receiving donor funds, managing those funds, 
disbursing funds, providing periodic reports, and 
producing an externally audited financial statement for the 
MDTF every three years.
Each donor may attach any terms and conditions to its 6. 
funds that it wishes, and the World Bank attaches those 
same terms and conditions to its agreement with the 
Center(s) that are to receive funds. A donor may specify 
that its funds are to be disbursed as unrestricted “core 
contributions” or that their use is to be restricted to a 
specific region, Center, program, or project. The donor 
may instruct the MDTF on different uses and conditions 
for different tranches of funds.
In addition to there being no compliance audit, there has 7. 
not yet been a financial audit of the MDTF. The World 
Bank will conduct the first audit of the Fund in 2008. It 
will examine the period from inception (October 2005) to 
December 2007.
Consequently, the traditional 2006 EC contribution to the 8. 
CGIAR of about €23–24 million was not forthcoming. In 
2007 the EC concluded an intermediate arrangement 
with IFAD, and its CGIAR contribution that year was 
approximately twice the traditional annual amount, 
presumably to compensate for the lack of funding the 
previous year. 
CGIAR Science Council (2005d).9. 
CGIAR Secretariat (2008b).10. 
Wadsworth (2007). 11. 
In 2003, the World Bank allocated $24 million to general 12. 
support, $7 million to the Challenge Programs, $17 million 
to rehabilitation of global public goods assets, $1.7 million 
to Systemwide Programs, and $1.4 million to special 
allocations (CGIAR 2003, p.15).
World Bank (2003), p. 37.13. 
Two groups of indicators were used. One was indicators 14. 
of results, including “achievement of acceptable output 
targets,” “Science Council ratings of Center reports on 
research outcomes,” “SC/SPIA rating of overall institutional 
impact assessment,” and “SC/SPIA rating of two Center 
impact studies.” The other was indicators of potential 
to perform, including “quality and relevance of current 
research,” “institutional health,” and “financial health.”
Quality and relevance of current research (peer-reviewed 15. 
publications per scientist other than ISI; peer-reviewed 
publications per scientist in journals listed in the ISI; and 
the percentage of publications coauthored with developing 
country partners); institutional health (governance score, 
board statement, culture of learning and change, and 
diversity); and financial health (solvency/reserves in days 
of expenditures, efficiency of operations [indirect cost 
ratio], and cash management on restricted operations).
The reduction in weight of the weight of “liquidity in days 16. 
of expenditure” from 10 percent in 2006 to 0 percent in 
2007, and the similar reduction of “solvency/reserves in 
days of expenditures” from 15 percent to 12 percent was 
decided in light of the 2006 reprogramming of $6 million 
of the World Bank contribution from performance-based 
support to base support in response to the nondelivery of 
the EC contribution to the CGIAR in 2006.
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While there is evidence at 
the Centers of an important 
range of partnerships with 
measurable added value, 
on the whole, the Panel 
finds that the CGIAR and its 
Centers are falling far short 
of developing the strategic 
potential of partnerships
reaching out— 
partners in development
Partnerships are essential to the effectiveness 
and relevance of the CGIAR, to its mandate 
of poverty reduction, and to providing inter-
national public goods. Robust partnership 
strategies are needed at both the CGIAR 
System and Center levels that integrate the 
actions of different actors around major objec-
tives with specified, measurable outcomes. 
While there is evidence at the Centers of an 
important range of partnerships with measur-
able added value, on the whole, the Panel finds 
that the CGIAR and its Centers are falling 
far short of developing the strategic potential 
of partnerships. 
The Panel found that the Centers have 
formed many sound partnerships but that 
most are one-off and short-term. The recent 
External Program and Management Reviews 
(EPMRs) of all 15 CGIAR Centers refer con-
sistently to the Centers’ lack of appropriate 
tools to engage in and manage partnerships. 
The reviews also point frequently to partner-
ships that provide limited value to the Centers 
or involve work more appropriately done by 
others. The result is a host of ad hoc partner-
ship arrangements that lack strategic purpose. 
Part of the problem is financial. But another 
at least equal part is the absence of ambitious 
strategies with embedded partnerships that 
promise major development breakthroughs 
and that attract financing enthusiasm. 
The 2008 Independent Review Panel sur-
vey of informed stakeholders confirms these 
conclusions, as does the CGIAR Stakeholder 
Perceptions Survey of 2006. Consultations 
with representatives of national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) point to the need 
for new approaches that differentiate more 
sharply between advanced and less advanced 
NARS and that recognize the achievements 
of NARS more explicitly when they partner 
with Centers. 
At the System level, partnership com-
mittees with membership in the Executive 
Council were intended to serve as the basic 
architecture for building and strengthening 
partnerships. The approach failed for nongov-
ernmental organizations, and the initiative 
was suspended. It is doubtful that a commit-
tee approach could successfully represent the 
diversity of nongovernmental organizations. 
The Private Sector Committee has proved 
more durable, but evidence of progress toward 
measurable benefits remains elusive. From the 
private sector perspective, the absence of an 
empowered entry point into the CGIAR is a 
constraint to interaction. 
The objective for the CGIAR System is 
to act on the basis of comparative advantage 
and to add value to outcomes. The problem 
for the CGIAR is that its comparative advan-
tage has become opaque. At all levels—global, 
regional, national, and local—there are many 
alternative sources of supply for the goods and 
services that the CGIAR alone once provided. 
Recently, there have been a growing number 
of calls to bring alignment to the interna-
tional agricultural architecture. This presents 
an opportunity for the CGIAR to define its 
comparative advantage, formulate in time-
bound targets what it could contribute to a 
global effort, and indicate the partnership di-
vision of labor requirements for the produc-
tion, distribution, adaptation, and application 
of international public goods. 
At the regional level, the new efforts under 
way to strengthen regional research and devel-
opment capacities in agriculture particularly in 
Africa where these are most urgently required, 
offer new potential for partnership. They also 
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The CGIAR cannot 
produce and deliver 
alone the international 
public goods that are 
the core of its mandate
require new strategic understandings on spe-
cialization, subsidiarity, and division of labor. 
As regional bodies such as the Association for 
Strengthening Agricultural Research in East 
and Central Africa, the West and Central Af-
rican Council for Agricultural Research and 
Development, and the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa in Africa, and the Asia-Pa-
cific Association of Agricultural Research In-
stitutes in Asia expand and strengthen, the role 
of the CGIAR will doubtless need to change. 
This should be envisaged, planned, and inte-
grated into specific partnership agreements 
with measurable milestones. Here again, the 
need is for a strategic framework with partner-
ships as an integral component. 
At the national level, the neglect of capac-
ity and institution building of the past two 
decades will need to be reversed if a global ef-
fort is to succeed and be sustained. To what 
extent should this be a continuing role for the 
CGIAR and to what extent for other regional 
bodies or other international organizations or 
the many strong professional organizations of 
civil society? To reignite the kind of vision for 
the CGIAR-NARS partnership that made 
the green revolution of the 1970s possible will 
require new and determined attention to and 
financing for capacity and institution build-
ing, especially for Africa. 
Why invest in partnerships?
The CGIAR invests in both internal and 
external consultative group partnerships for 
many reasons.
First, the CGIAR cannot produce and de-
liver alone the international public goods that 
are the core of its mandate. While the Centers 
can provide the core components of interna-
tional public goods delivery systems, they need 
to collaborate with partners in the private, 
public, civil society, and international sectors 
to provide the complementary components re-
quired for development impact (see chapter 3). 
The CGIAR can achieve development impacts 
where they matter—for farmers, families, and 
societies—only by being part of an interna-
tional public goods delivery system. At one end 
of that system, the CGIAR needs effective link-
ages to other international science centers and 
private research laboratories to remain at the 
leading edge of science and technology. At the 
other end, it needs solid linkages with national 
adaptive and delivery agents, principally NARS 
and nongovernmental organizations.
Second, agricultural research has become 
more complex as a result of scientific and tech-
nological advances, social and economic devel-
opments, and environmental changes. Tradi-
tional disciplinary approaches to agricultural 
research are giving way to multidisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary approaches to deal with 
this complexity. No single Center possesses the 
expertise and infrastructure to single-handedly 
address such change. Centers must collaborate 
with each other and with other international 
entities to establish multidisciplinary teams. 
Third, considerably higher costs are asso-
ciated with new lines of research. The CGIAR 
and its Centers need to forge partnerships in 
order to share resources such as laboratory 
equipment, information and communication 
technology infrastructure, administrative 
and finance capacities, and technical exper-
tise. Centers can exploit economies of scale 
if they share resources through structured 
partnerships. In areas such as bioinformatics, 
some Centers are unlikely to possess adequate 
resources to invest in state-of-the art equip-
ment and laboratories. 
Fourth, the CGIAR needs partnerships 
with the private sector and advanced research 
institutes in order to access proprietary scien-
tific information and technologies. 
Recent System-level evaluations (the Third 
System Review and the World Bank Operation 
Evaluation Department’s meta- evaluation) 
and reform efforts (the 2001 Change Design 
and Management Team and the 2005 Sub-
Saharan Africa Task Force) found weaknesses 
in CGIAR partnerships (such as poorly devel-
oped linkages with nongovernmental organi-
zations and the private sector, insufficient at-
tention to capacity-building with NARS, and 
weak or absent strategy). The CGIAR’s own 
2006 Stakeholder Perceptions Survey reported 
serious difficulties in partnerships (box 6.1).
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The cosponsors: opportunities for 
improved alignment and division of 
labor among the main multilateral 
agriculture organizations
Along with the CGIAR, the main institu-
tions that make up the international public 
architecture for agricultural development are 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), the World Food 
Programme (WFP), the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the 
World Bank, and the regional banks. FAO, 
IFAD, and the World Bank are cosponsors of 
the CGIAR, along with the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). 
Today there are major opportunities for 
improved alignment and division of labor 
among the main multilateral organizations 
with mandates in agriculture and rural devel-
opment. The Independent Review Panel survey 
of informed stakeholders found that 73 per-
cent of respondents considered these partner-
ships with cosponsors to be important or very 
important but that only 28 percent thought 
that they were “playing their role effectively.” 
Among respondent groups, however, there are 
differing assessments of the importance and 
value of the existing partnerships with the 
FAO, IFAD, and UNDP as cosponsors. At the 
same time, all groups agree (79 percent) that 
the CGIAR should make better use of cospon-
sors to influence broad international policies 
in agriculture and development.
The CGIAR System has undervalued its 
role in policy dialogue. The policy-oriented 
Centers such as CIFOR, Bioversity, and 
IFPRI (and other institutions in their area of 
expertise) have actively participated in inter-
national policy arenas. But the 15 Centers do 
not have a single entry point that facilitates 
dialogue or joint action on larger policy is-
sues to reduce transactions cost for partner 
institutions. The lack of an integrative voice 
was seen in the absence of systemwide prepa-
rations in advance of the Bali conference on 
climate change and the Rome conference on 
food security. There is no collective policy and 
strategy to guide international interactions. 
There are obvious complementarities be-
tween the FAO as an organization with con-
vening power to frame international and 
regional issues and create policy and the 
CGIAR as the most successful international 
producer of applied agriculture technology in 
history. There are similar complementarities 
between the IFAD mandate to support poor 
landholders and the UNDP’s coordination 
and policy mandate role. Creating institu-
tional platforms and a legal identity for the 
CGIAR will require systemwide reform—
reliance on individual institutional reforms 
now under way at the CGIAR, FAO, IFAD, 
and WFP cannot bridge the gaps. 
The Global Forum for Agricultural 
Research: facilitating CGIAR 
engagement with stakeholders
In October 1996, stakeholders of agricultural 
research for development, together with a 
group of donors and four facilitating agencies, 
including the CGIAR, established the Global 
Forum for Agricultural Research (GFAR) as 
Civil society organizations are among the most critical of CGIAR’s stake-•	
holders and had the greatest influence on CGIAR’s overall reputation, in-
cluding with CGIAR Members.
Coordination of activities across Centers and the quality of partnerships •	
were two perceived weakness of the CGIAR. Other concerns included ex-
cessive bureaucracy, lack of funding, and relevance.
Survey respondents indicated the two areas of the CGIAR most in need of •	
improvement were collaboration with external organizations and research 
collaboration with partners.
Specific to Centers, good partnership ratings ranged from 43.2 percent to •	
66.6 percent.
On average across all Centers:
Only 51 percent of respondents agreed that Centers share credit for the •	
success of projects with the partners involved.
Only 42 percent agreed that Centers do not duplicate the efforts of other •	
research institutions.
Only 40 percent agreed that Centers fully and meaningfully involve partners •	
in important decisionmaking.
Only 45 percent of respondents agreed that Centers serve local needs well.•	
Source: GlobeScan 2006a,b.
Box 6.1 Some key findings of the CGIAR’s 2006 
Stakeholder Perceptions Survey
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This Panel concurs that 
the Global Forum for 
Agricultural Research 
has a central role to play 
in facilitating CGIAR 
engagement with the 
breadth of stakeholders 
in agricultural research for 
development and that the 
CGIAR should support the 
strengthening of GFAR
a multistakeholder forum to promote part-
nership, dialogue, and action on agricul-
tural research for development. Stakeholders 
include NARS from industrial and develop-
ing countries, the CGIAR and its Centers, 
other international agricultural research cen-
ters, farmer organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, the private sector, and donor 
and development agencies.1 
The Third System Review of the CGIAR 
in 1998 recognized the potential of GFAR 
for enhancing the CGIAR’s work and part-
nerships.2 Eight years later, a GFAR-initiated 
review found that GFAR’s visibility in the 
global community remained low3 and that 
ties between GFAR and the CGIAR had 
weakened since the CGIAR’s financial sup-
port for GFAR ended in 2003.4
More recently, GFAR has worked to in-
crease its visibility and enhance its attractiveness 
as a forum for stakeholder consultation. Despite 
GFAR’s weaknesses, it continues to be the ob-
vious choice for facilitating cooperation in ag-
ricultural research for development. Working 
Group 2 of the CGIAR’s Change Management 
process indicated that it “considers GFAR to be 
the most appropriate institutional mechanism 
to organize this process” even though GFAR 
has not been effective so far and noted that the 
active support of the CGIAR and other part-
ners is vital for achieving a strong GFAR.5
This Panel concurs that GFAR has a cen-
tral role to play in facilitating CGIAR engage-
ment with the breadth of stakeholders in ag-
ricultural research for development and that 
the CGIAR should support the strengthen-
ing of GFAR.
The donors: broad agreement on 
what is working and what is not
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) donors provide 75 per-
cent of CGIAR’s financing. Current trends in 
OECD donor financing are toward fragmenta-
tion of effort and increasing cost-inefficiencies 
and reduction of impact potential (these fac-
tors are examined in detail in the full technical 
report of the Panel’s evaluation; see also chapter 
5). The main factors for concern in donor fund-
ing for the CGIAR are these: 
A steady rise in uncoordinated re-•	
stricted financing linked to short-
term deliverables.
Unevenness in how overhead costs are •	
calculated and provided for, resulting 
in inconsistent and inadequate cost 
recovery and a free-rider problem.
A rise in the number of small projects •	
in Center portfolios, which boosts 
administrative costs and, when not 
linked to higher order objectives, dis-
tracts from Center priorities. 
A rise in the number of individual •	
donor evaluations.
More rapid growth in nonmember •	
than Member financing, reducing the 
collective merits of the partnership. 
Neglect of the complementary invest-•	
ments required for the CGIAR Cen-
ters to function effectively in a high-
impact international public goods 
delivery system. 
Donors are aware of these negative con-
sequences. A background paper for a Mem-
ber Coordination Forum at the 2006 Annual 
General Meeting focusing on harmonization 
of financing and evaluation reported on re-
sponses from 17 donors on restrictions in 
their financing policies and practices. Twelve 
donors reported that their financing was re-
stricted to projects; only two indicated that 
their financing restrictions were linked to 
CGIAR priorities (figure 6.1). About a quar-
ter of donors that responded indicated that 
they did not provide Centers with full cost re-
covery on their financing.6 
Interviews with some donors indicated 
agreement on the need for good donorship 
principles: financing intentions should be 
stated early and clearly; funding should be 
broadly stable and predictable; multiyear fi-
nancing is preferable; donors should hold 
organizations principally accountable for 
development impacts; and the Paris Declara-
tion principles should apply. Several donors 
also volunteered that their national political 
systems impeded them from applying those 
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donors indicated 
agreement on the need for 
good donorship principles: 
funding should be broadly 
stable; donors should hold 
organizations accountable 
for development impacts; 
and the Paris Declaration 
principles should apply
principles in the CGIAR. Most, but not all, 
were critical (some even self-critical) of donors 
seeking ownership or attribution of project 
benefits and of using the CGIAR Centers to 
promote national foreign policy objectives. 
The Panel discovered substantial agree-
ment in assessments of what is right and what 
is wrong with the CGIAR and on the need 
for change. The main areas of agreement were 
as follows:
The CGIAR is punching below its •	
weight. CGIAR System performance 
has been declining in relevance and 
impact in a field that has become 
crowded with new actors, from strong 
NARS and research universities in 
developing countries to multinational 
corporations. Yet, the CGIAR has an 
important role as an independent in-
ternational agriculture research sys-
tem in tackling global challenges. 
The CGIAR is an organizational •	
paradox. Donors tend to portray the 
CGIAR as a paradox—an ultramod-
ern, 21st century organization estab-
lished on the basis of networks and 
alliances, with a vista from the global 
to the local, and committed to partner-
ships, yet rigid, slow, and indecisive. 
Strategy and results are unclear. •	
Most donors voiced concern that the 
CGIAR lacks a strategy and clear ob-
jective indicators. In interviews some 
donors placed a stronger emphasis on 
conducting good science and others 
on demonstrating poverty reduction 
benefits. All agreed, however, on the 
importance of the link between the 
two and that their authorizing en-
vironments require more persuasive 
demonstration of links to observable 
development results or—“part of a col-
lective effort to secure” such results.
Fundamental changes in governance •	
are needed. Change attempts have as-
sumed that change can be made in-
crementally and at the margin; the 
general view among donors is that 
these efforts have been mainly un-
successful and that major structural 
reform is called for. To paraphrase 
one donor: “This review and change 
management process can’t be like past 
efforts. The CGIAR is at risk now as 
never before. Change is needed and it 
must be deep and serious.” 
Governance and decisionmaking ca-•	
pacities are the keys. There is agree-
ment among donors interviewed that 
CGIAR governance is weaker than 
that of other multilateral organiza-
tions and that, while decisionmaking 
might have improved somewhat with 
the establishment of the Executive 
Council, the CGIAR’s consensus 
model of decisionmaking is not ade-
quate for a network enterprise of this 
importance, scale, and complexity
Inter-Center partnerships: 
important, but lacking 
in effectiveness
More than half of respondents to the 
2008 Independent Review Panel survey of 
informed stakeholders considered Center to 
Center partnerships as “very important” for 
the delivery of the CGIAR mandate and pro-
grams, but fewer than a quarter rated them as 
“effective.” EPMRs indicate that relationships 
Source: CGIAR (2006e).
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More than half of 
respondents to the 
Independent Review 
Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders considered 
Center to Center 
partnerships as “very 
important” for the delivery 
of the CGIAR mandate, 
but fewer than a quarter 
rated them as “effective”
between the Centers are generally good and 
that Directors General viewed the other 
Centers positively, although areas of tension 
between certain Centers are also reported. 
Center to Center partnerships tend to be 
under-resourced, with the exception of the 
Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs. 
Center to Center relationships are gener-
ally organized around projects, most of short 
duration, limiting collaborations to one-off 
efforts. There are, however, numerous exam-
ples of Centers trying to work around such 
constraints to forge longer, more systematic 
collaboration (World Agroforestry and ILRI 
share information and communication tech-
nology procurement; CIFOR, IWMI, and 
WorldFish share some cooperative services; 
the Africa Rice Centre and IITA have inte-
grated many of their administration func-
tions) and to work out mutually agreeable 
divisions of labor (IITA and CIMMYT col-
laborate on maize research; IITA focuses on 
lowlands and CIMMYT works in mid- to 
high altitude).7 
Advanced research institutes: 
need for more joint programs
EPMRs suggest wide variability in individual 
Centers’ collaboration and relationships with 
advanced research institutes. The eight reviews 
that discuss Center partnerships with advanced 
research institutes indicate that collaboration is 
concentrated in such upstream work as molec-
ular biology, genetic engineering, genomics, 
and bioinformatics. CIMMYT’s EPMR views 
partnering with ARIs as providing it with “the 
ability to participate in cutting edge research in 
a wide range of subject areas . . . eliminating or 
reducing CIMMYT’s need to make the invest-
ments in expertise or infrastructure required 
to be competitive.”8 The Africa Rice Centre’s 
review commended the Center for its long-
standing relationships with advanced research 
institutes, but notes the need for a specific bud-
get to enhance such collaborations.9
That finding of the Africa Rice Centre re-
view is echoed in responses to the Independent 
Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders 
about what should be done to improve part-
nerships between Centers and advanced re-
search institutes: 75 percent of respondents 
indicated that they should be strengthened 
by funding joint projects and programs.10
National agricultural research 
systems: key partnerships 
but in need of improvement
The relationship between the CGIAR and 
NARS has changed considerably over 35 
years. In some regions (for example, Asia) and 
some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (for 
example, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), 
the Centers have changed from mentors to 
collaborators or partners with NARS. A sig-
nificant portion of Centers’ scientific publi-
cations are produced in collaboration with 
their developing country partners (45 percent 
on average across all Centers, ranging from 29 
percent for Africa Rice Centre to 66 percent 
for ICARDA), according to data collected by 
the CGIAR’s Performance Measurement Sys-
tem (see chapter 3). Where NARS are still rel-
atively weak, the CGIAR continues to work 
on institutional capacity building, although 
with severely constrained resources. On the 
whole, the CGIAR has co-evolved well with 
most NARS around the world. 
The number of developing country Mem-
bers of the CGIAR increased greatly in the 
1990s, and today, 25 of 64 Members are de-
veloping countries. Many are represented 
in CGIAR governance by their NARS. But 
participation has been uneven, and the voices 
of developing country partners in CGIAR 
governance have been muted. As Working 
Group 2 of the Change Management process 
summarized the situation: “Developing coun-
try participation in [annual general meetings] 
and other governance bodies has been weak, 
and their voices are not strongly heard, in part 
because they have not been able to follow the 
complex decisionmaking processes in the 
CGIAR and prepare adequately to participate 
and influence the decisions. Those that par-
ticipate tend to represent the larger and more 
powerful developing countries.”11
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in the Independent 
Review Panel’s survey of 
informed stakeholders 
consider partnerships 
with NARS as important. 
But only 45 percent 
believe that such 
partnerships are effective
Forums for CGIAR engagement with 
NARS include regional and subregional or-
ganizations, such as the Asia-Pacific Associa-
tion of Agricultural Research Institutions, 
the Forum for the Americas on Agricultural 
Research and Technology Development, the 
Forum on Agricultural Research in Africa, 
and GFAR. Engagement has been consulta-
tive, for the most part. 
NARS remain key partners with the Cen-
ters. IRRI’s 2004 EPMR shows that the Cen-
ter had bilateral arrangements with 16 rice-
growing countries in Asia. Each country had 
a staff member at IRRI as liaison. The review 
concluded that this arrangement has been very 
successful in providing a single point of scien-
tific contact with IRRI headquarters. NARS, 
particularly in Asia, collaborate with IRRI in 
upstream areas of research such as genom-
ics and bioinformatics.12 WorldFish’s 2007 
EPMR also found that NARS work with the 
Center mostly in upstream areas of research 
and that NARS represent 74 percent of the 
Center’s memoranda of understanding and 
letters of agreement.13 More than half of Bio-
versity’s and ICARDA’s partners at the time 
of their most recent EPMRs (2004 and 2007) 
were NARS. Most Centers report NARS in-
volvement in the development of medium-
term plans. A Center-commissioned review 
of Africa Rice Centre partnerships in 2005 
concluded that they were growing in number 
and intensity. In 2006, the Africa Rice Cen-
tre was awarded the United Nations South-
South Triangular Partnership award, the first 
of such awards in the CGIAR. That same 
year, however, the CGIAR Stakeholder Per-
ceptions Survey reported that only 43 percent 
of Africa Rice Centre partners agreed that it 
performed well on partnerships attributes—
the lowest rating of all 15 Centers.14
The Association for Strengthening Agri-
cultural Research in Eastern and Central Af-
rica and the West and Central African Council 
for Agricultural Research and Development as-
sign priority to CGIAR involvement in NARS 
capacity building in post-conflict states. At 
least one EPMR, however, has questioned Cen-
ters’ involvement in post-conflict situations as 
“by nature country-specific with low research 
content. The inputs of Centers into such areas 
should be strategic and brief. . . .”15 
The relations between Centers and NARS 
are not all positive, however. Nearly all re-
spondents (90 percent) in the Independent 
Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders 
consider partnerships with NARS as impor-
tant or very important. But only 45 percent 
of respondents believe that such partnerships 
are effective or very effective. Some 32 percent 
find them neither effective nor ineffective, and 
23 percent believe that CGIAR and Centers’ 
partnerships with NARS are marginally or 
completely ineffective.
In more than one Center, relationships 
with NARS are tense, at best. EPMRs and 
Panel interviews with NARS indicate that 
interactions are too often characterized by 
competition rather than collaboration. More 
than one NARS representative complained 
of patronizing treatment of the NARS by the 
CGIAR. Competition for funding is an under-
current in tensions between Centers and their 
NARS partners. In the Independent Review 
Panel survey, developing country respondents 
articulated a desire for Centers to devolve rel-
evant activities to strong NARS and for NARS 
to play a greater role in priority setting.
The Panel believes that the Centers need 
to address the tension with the NARS. Two 
major funders told the Panel that they had 
significantly curtailed new funding to the 
CGIAR Centers because of this tension. One 
said that the tension signals that the CGIAR 
is not the best channel for building sustain-
able capacity in agriculture research in devel-
oping countries. 
Partnerships for capacity 
and institution building: 
much more needs to be 
done by all participants
Preliminary results of a United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
global study of scientific and research capaci-
ties, including in agriculture, depict a severe 
and accelerating brain drain from developing 
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The Centers’ expenditures 
on strengthening NARS 
have not changed 
appreciably as a 
percentage of total 
expenditures since 
the early 1990s
to developed countries that is especially pro-
nounced in the life sciences, including agricul-
ture. Sub-Saharan Africa overall (not just in 
agriculture) has 83 scientists per 1 million peo-
ple. By comparison, Asia has 785 scientists per 
1 million people and OECD countries have 
1,100 per 1 million. Even in relatively strong 
regions, distribution is highly skewed. Brazil, 
for example, accounts for half the agricultural 
research expenditure in Latin America. About 
half the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa spent 
less in 2000 on agricultural research and devel-
opment than in 1991.16 
These findings are disturbing for the 
work and mission of the CGIAR and, more 
broadly, for Africa, where major productivity 
gains are urgently needed. The success of the 
green revolution in Asia in the 1970s was due 
to a strong CGIAR and the massive comple-
mentary investments in support of national 
agriculture research and development institu-
tions that could produce agricultural develop-
ment strategies; receive, adapt, and apply new 
technologies; and establish effective field de-
livery systems. 
Some initiatives are under way to address 
this problem, but they seem worryingly mod-
est given the magnitude of the challenge. 
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and 
the Rockefeller Foundation are supporting a 
partnership of 12 African universities to offer 
joint doctorates in agricultural subjects. They 
have also worked with IFPRI to establish a 
program of educational support for female 
agricultural scientists in Africa. Within the 
CGIAR, there have been discussions on pro-
moting a world agricultural university, but 
there is some disagreement about whether this 
is an area of comparative advantage. ICRISAT 
and IFPRI, with support from the Gates 
Foundation, have also developed the Global 
Open Food and Agriculture University, now 
called the Agricultural Open Curriculum 
and Learning Initiative. The Panel did not 
evaluate to what extent this furnishes a foun-
dation for a cross-CGIAR strategic initiative, 
including perhaps a major donor partnership 
linking in universities in industrial countries, 
but it deserves serious examination. 
The Centers’ expenditures on strengthen-
ing NARS have not changed appreciably as 
a percentage of total expenditures since the 
early 1990s (21.7 percent in 1992, 22.9 per-
cent in 2001, and 21.4 percent in 2007), even 
in light of reformulated system priorities and 
IFPRI’s absorption of a downsized Interna-
tional Service for National Agricultural Re-
search. Many recent EPMRs also point to a 
continuing commitment by Centers to train-
ing and capacity building activities, despite 
funding limitations.
The interim Science Council commis-
sioned an independent evaluation of train-
ing in the CGIAR, which was completed in 
2006. Among its findings and conclusions:
NARS have become more differenti-•	
ated, with some becoming equal part-
ner to the CGIAR Centers.
The CGIAR’s investment in training •	
and learning continues to be high, 
with about a quarter of researchers’ 
time dedicated to training.
The panel found “strong and consis-•	
tent evidence” of the effectiveness of 
CGIAR investments in training and 
learning.17 
With the rising predominance of •	
project funding, Centers are decen-
tralizing training to researchers and 
reducing the role of centralized train-
ing units, to the detriment of institu-
tional strengthening of NARS and 
the Centers’ abilities to fully exploit 
past investments.
The CGIAR needs to collaborate •	
with institutions with development-
oriented mandates to address broader 
NARS’ capacity needs. Centers 
should not cover resource shortages 
in NARS out of project funds that 
cannot be sustained. 
Partnerships with 
nongovernmental organizations: 
mutuality of values a driving force
Nongovernmental organizations have become 
a vital actor for the delivery of international 
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public goods, especially in weak states with 
poorly developed public institutions. In many 
countries, NGOs exert a strong influence in 
the agriculture sector. 
As developing country governments and 
official aid agencies moved away from agri-
culture and rural development in the 1980s, 
international NGOs assumed an increasingly 
prominent position. Relief-oriented NGOs 
such as Oxfam, CARE International, Catho-
lic Relief Services, and World Vision extended 
their activities beyond relief operations to ad-
dress agricultural productivity and food secu-
rity. As the global environmental movement of 
the 1980s and 1990s took root, environmen-
tal NGOs shifted from pure conservation to 
sustainable agriculture and “sustainable rural 
livelihoods.” In the last two decades, several 
of these NGOs have created a worldwide net-
work of country offices and field operations. 
They also demonstrate an increasing capacity 
to attract the highest levels of professional and 
technical expertise. 
Formal engagement between the CGIAR 
System and NGOs dates from the Lucerne 
Ministerial Meeting of 1995, when the CGIAR 
decided to establish an NGO Committee to 
serve as a mechanism for interactions between 
the CGIAR and NGOs and as a springboard 
to new partnerships. The NGO Committee 
adopted as its main objectives strengthening a 
people-centered approach to sustainable agri-
culture research and development and contrib-
uting to the mutual understanding between 
the NGOs, the CGIAR, and farmer, fisheries, 
and forestry organizations.18 
Almost from the outset, the relationship 
ran into difficulties. The NGO Committee 
felt that its recommendations and contribu-
tions were not being treated seriously, while 
others viewed its positions on matters such 
as biotechnology and CGIAR collaboration 
with the private sector as extreme and unwel-
come. Matters came to a head in 2002 when 
the NGO Committee suspended its member-
ship in the CGIAR. Over the past four years, 
steps have been taken to recast a systemwide 
CGIAR-NGO relationship. The 2006 Annual 
General Meeting approved a policy paper on 
engagement with NGOs indicating that part-
nerships can be established only where there is 
a strong mutuality of values and interests.19 
A Center collaboration survey by the Sci-
ence Council in 2006 found evidence of nu-
merous active partnerships between Centers 
and NGOs. In total, the Centers reported 
3,395 partnerships, although this number may 
count the same organization more than once as 
Centers often collaborate with the same orga-
nizations multiple times. The largest number of 
reported partnerships was with NARS (30 per-
cent), followed by developing country NGOs 
(12 percent). Only 4 percent of reported part-
nerships were with developed country NGOs. 
Almost no multiple partnerships were re-
ported; 87 percent were partnerships between 
one Center and one organization.
In the Independent Review Panel survey 
of informed stakeholders, 58.7 percent of 
respondents said that CGIAR and Centers’ 
partnerships with NGOs were important or 
very important, although only 20 percent 
considered them effective.
There have been no specific evaluations 
of the effectiveness of Center-NGO partner-
ships, however, and EPMRs generally give 
them cursory treatment. An exception was 
the 2007 EPMR of WorldFish, which exam-
ined the performance and value of the Center’s 
partnerships with NGOs. It found that NGOs 
and NARS constitute the largest partnership 
categories of WorldFish and that more than 
60 percent of its partners in Asia are NGOs. 
It added specifically that most of WorldFish’s 
work in transforming outputs to outcomes 
and impacts has been achieved with NGOs. 
Partnerships with the private 
sector: multiple obstacles
The 1995 Special Ministerial Meeting in 
Lucerne, Switzerland, launched a formal sys-
temwide partnership arrangement with the pri-
vate sector. The Private Sector Committee was 
established and accorded membership on the 
CGIAR’s Executive Council.20 There has been 
little progress at the System level in establishing 
partnerships through the Lucerne mechanism. 
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The chair of the Private Sector Committee 
reports continuing frustration and concern 
that the CGIAR System still lacks clarity on 
what it wants from the private sector. A princi-
pal barrier continues to be the absence of a Sys-
tem entry point: the private sector claims that 
it cannot form scientific research and develop-
ment partnerships with 15 Centers. 
At the Center level, partnerships with 
the private sector constitute a small share of 
CGIAR collaborations or structured rela-
tionships. The main ones are concentrated in 
four of the larger or older commodity centers: 
CIAT, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, and IRRI. Ac-
cording a survey of CGIAR collaborations 
published by the Science Council in March 
2006, only these four Centers considered the 
private sector a highly relevant collaborator. 
Center directors and senior management 
suggest that the main reasons for limited part-
nerships with the private sector include:
Difficulty securing funding for part-•	
nerships with the private sector, with 
donors hesitant to fund Center link-
ages with private companies.
Concern in some quarters (including •	
Center board members) that partner-
ships with the private sector could di-
vert the CGIAR from its core business 
of producing global public goods.
Fear that NGO opposition could pro-•	
duce bad publicity in the international 
press, resulting in loss of reputation. 
(Some NGOs are convinced that large 
private sector corporations are inter-
ested in public-private partnerships 
in developing countries merely as a 
means to opening regulatory doors to 
their transgenic products.)
Weak CGIAR and Center capacities •	
to manage the intellectual property 
rights of private companies and related 
technology licensing agreements.
Political correctness fears, driven by a •	
lack of resolve. 
A recent IFPRI study suggests that yet an-
other obstacle is the absence of examples of 
successful public-private partnerships in agri-
cultural research.21 The study also notes that 
the private sector can be discouraged by the 
slow pace of decisionmaking and action in the 
public sector. 
Intellectual property rights, however, seem 
to pose the greatest obstacle. Not enough 
progress has been made in the decade since 
the Third System Review recommended high-
est priority attention to a clear policy on intel-
lectual property and investment in systemwide 
capacity to manage all aspects of intellectual 
property rights pertaining to agriculture. 
Some interviewees, including serving Direc-
tors General, pointed to the complexity and 
divisiveness of intellectual property rights as 
a reason for the continuing lag in partnering 
with the private sector. Yet many organizations 
whose mandates are poverty reduction and the 
production and delivery of international pub-
lic goods have resolved these issues, including 
the World Health Organization, the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and 
the African Agricultural Technology Founda-
tion. The CGIAR can do the same.
Intellectual property management 
is essential for partnerships
There are more than a dozen international 
treaties and protocols that govern the protec-
tion of intellectual property in such forms as 
inventions, knowledge, and genetic material. 
Of these regimes, the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity (CBD), Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
and the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) are the most recent and compre-
hensive. Along with the International Con-
vention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV), they directly impinge on 
public agricultural research and the produc-
tion of international public goods in general. 
International agreements on 
intellectual property have created 
new rules that the Centers have 
to consider in their operations
How they affect the work of CGIAR Centers 
depends largely on national interpretation 
 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt 73
The CGIAR cannot 
ignore or casually handle 
issues of intellectual 
property protection
of provisions of the regimes and on how the 
agreements are implemented through domes-
tic legislation. On the whole, agreements gov-
ern the production, use, and control of intel-
lectual property and genetic resources. They 
have created new rules that the Centers have 
to consider in their operations. Centers’ host 
countries have also laid out national legisla-
tion and regulations for intellectual prop-
erty protection, access to genetic resources, 
respect for and protection of traditional and 
indigenous knowledge, and a wide range of 
other aspects of the governance of research 
and technological innovation. Centers have a 
legal obligation to follow national procedures, 
regulations, and laws.
The CGIAR and its Centers’ capacity 
to handle issues of intellectual property and 
governance of genetic resources affects the sta-
tus of collections in genebanks, exchange of 
germplasm, and the ability of the Centers to 
collaborate with NARS and farmers. And it 
influences the kinds of partnerships they can 
establish with the private sector and advanced 
research institutes. The CGIAR cannot ig-
nore or casually handle issues of intellectual 
property protection. They need informed 
strategies to adhere to the CBD, TRIPS, IT-
PGRFA, and related national laws. Some of 
the key issues that the CGIAR and Centers 
need to consider are:
Transaction costs of accessing genetic •	
material from farmers and communi-
ties are likely to rise as developing 
countries enact legislation and regula-
tions to implement Articles 8j and 15 
of the CBD. Centers will require legal 
expertise and guidelines to negotiate 
with communities and farmers for ac-
cess to locally improved or enhanced 
germplasm. Some Centers work with 
communities and appropriate and use 
local people’s knowledge and informa-
tion. They are required now to abide 
by Article 8j of the CBD. The extent 
to which the CGIAR and Centers 
in particular follow and implement 
provisions of the CBD will deter-
mine whether and how they forge 
partnerships with civil society and 
community- based organizations.
The germplasm collections held by •	
the Centers are now regulated by the 
ITPGRFA and the CBD. Centers 
cannot privatize them or make them 
freely available to private sector or 
other institutions that will privatize 
them. This consideration will influ-
ence how Centers and the CGIAR 
interact with the private sector. Cen-
ters’ partnerships with the private sec-
tor will need to be managed so that 
provisions of the treaties are not ig-
nored or violated.
The three treaties or regimes are com-•	
plex and under continuous negotia-
tions, giving rise to uncertainty in 
implementation and enforcement at 
national and institutional levels.
The CGIAR and the Centers’ work •	
also relates to other forms of intel-
lectual property rights such as copy-
right, trademarks, and trade secrets. 
The Centers’ work depends on access 
to and use of software and publica-
tions, and the Centers also generate 
intellectual property that needs to 
be appropriately protected. For ex-
ample, ILRI has a patent filed in the 
United States on an animal vaccine 
against theileria infection. CIAT 
has plant variety protection certifi-
cates filed in its name by Papalotla 
in Australia, Nicaragua, South Af-
rica, and the United States. All of 
the countries in which the Centers 
publish are members of the Berne 
Convention, so copyright is an im-
portant part of the Centers’ intellec-
tual property. 
The CGIAR and Centers address issues 
of intellectual property protection and gov-
ernance of genetic resources at both the Sys-
tem and the Center levels. At the System level, 
the Genetic Resources Policy Committee 
(GRPC) and the Central Advisory Service for 
Intellectual Property (CAS-IP) are the main 
institutional arrangements for addressing 
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There is a general view 
among most interviewees 
that Centers need to do 
more to effectively deal 
with issues of intellectual 
property protection at the 
Center level. The majority 
of the Centers do not have 
in-house staff responsible 
for intellectual property 
issues and tend to deal 
with intellectual property 
issues on an ad hoc basis
intellectual property and genetic resources 
policy and legal issues. 
The main role of the GRPC, established in 
1994, is to advise the CGIAR on policy and 
legal issues pertaining to genetic resources. 
It is expected to assist the CGIAR Chair in 
providing overall policy guidance and leader-
ship on how the CGIAR handles issues of ge-
netic resources. A 2002 external review of the 
GPRC concluded that it had fulfilled its man-
date in “a very satisfactory manner” and that 
“there is need to retain such an independent 
mechanism within the CGIAR.” Most Cen-
ters view the GRPC as an authoritative source 
of policy documents on genetic resources is-
sues. It is credited with enhancing the Cen-
ters’ awareness of policy issues. GRPC was 
instrumental in guiding the CGIAR’s par-
ticipation in the negotiation of the ITPGFA. 
According to one interviewee, “if such a com-
mittee had not been established in the 1990s, 
the CGIAR would now be in disorder insofar 
as handling of complex legal and policy issues 
on genetic material.”
The CAS-IP, established in 1999, focuses 
largely on supporting the CGIAR to effec-
tively manage intellectual property protec-
tion. It provides Centers with advice on such 
issues as material transfer agreements, stew-
ardship of intellectual property and technol-
ogy transfer, and proprietary technologies.
Centers need to do more to 
effectively deal with intellectual 
property protection
The Centers are experimenting with a wide 
range of institutional arrangements and pro-
cedures to handle issues of intellectual prop-
erty protection and genetic resources policy. 
All Centers have Intellectual Property Policy 
Statements. Six Centers have established in-
house units or offices on intellectual property 
management (Bioversity, CIAT, CIMMYT, 
ICRISAT, ILRI, and IRRI). All Centers 
have focal points and intellectual property 
committees. However, Centers have different 
capacities. Some Centers are more advanced, 
with relatively developed regimes, high lev-
els of awareness, and staff dealing with 
intellectual property issues. There is a general 
view among most interviewees that Centers 
need to do more to effectively deal with issues 
of intellectual property protection at the 
Center level. The majority of the Centers do 
not have in-house staff responsible for intel-
lectual property issues and tend to deal with 
intellectual property issues on an ad hoc basis, 
often reacting to crisis. A study conducted by 
CAS-IP in June 2004 concluded that intellec-
tual property management practice is uneven 
among Centers. “A few Centers have been 
able to establish stable [intellectual property] 
Management Units; a few more are in the pro-
cess of establishing units, while many Centers 
do their [intellectual property] management 
in an ad hoc manner backed by [intellectual 
property] committees that meet once a year 
or less.”22
Center scientists are gaining an under-
standing of why intellectual property man-
agement is crucial to their operations. Few, 
however, understand international and na-
tional laws on intellectual property. A 2006 
Science Council report noted that: “Much 
effort has been made by the System-wide Ge-
netic Resources Program (SGRP), CAS-IP 
and others to make sure that Center staff have 
a high level of understanding regarding the 
ITPGRFA. . . . So, while it is not surprising 
that Center staff feel that their level of aware-
ness of TRIPs or IP/IPR-related law is low, it 
is frustrating that the CBD and the Interna-
tional Treaty are not well-known. In addition, 
when this lack of awareness of these treaties 
is coupled with the fact that much of the 3rd 
party materials that the Centers use is infor-
mation and knowledge associated with ge-
netic resources or the use of genetic resources, 
we can see that more effort needs to be put 
into increasing awareness and understanding 
of these international agreements.”23
Most of the Centers do not have annual 
budgets dedicated to intellectual property 
management, though some have units and 
committees. According the Science Coun-
cil study, intellectual property “focal points 
have had to use funding from other projects’ 
to support attendance at intellectual property 
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Most of the Centers do 
not have annual budgets 
dedicated to intellectual 
property management, 
though some have units 
and committees
strategy meetings.24 Most of the Centers 
spend only $10,000–$15,000 a year, most of 
it on the work of CAS-IP.
Emerging issues 
The CGIAR is working to improve its man-
agement of intellectual property protection 
and related issues of genetic resources, but it 
is insufficient. Centers and the CGIAR Sys-
tem are becoming more aware of the impor-
tance of intellectual property management, 
and CAS-IP is supporting the Centers in 
their efforts. The GRPC has been instrumen-
tal in helping the Centers and the CGIAR 
to better understand genetic resources policy 
and legal issues. It played a major role in guid-
ing the CGIAR to participate in the forma-
tion of the ITPGRFA and some of the CBD 
negotiations. 
The GRPC and the CAS-IP and the 
Centers will need to do more to comply with 
provisions of the treaties. Some actions to be 
considered:
The CGIAR needs to commission or •	
undertake a comprehensive study of 
transaction costs arising from the ob-
ligations created by the three regimes 
(Article 27 of TRIPS and Articles 8j 
and 15 of the CBD).
The CGIAR and Centers need to re-•	
view and learn more about national 
laws and regulations to implement 
the treaties and agreements. They 
need to monitor national processes 
for access to genetic resources, shar-
ing of benefits arising from access and 
use of the resources, creation of spe-
cialized systems, and other develop-
ments in national intellectual prop-
erty management. Centers need to 
build capacity to manage third-party 
intellectual property and should have 
a better understanding of liabili-
ties associated with infringement or 
noncompliance.
The CGIAR and the Centers, through •	
CAS-IP and the GPRC, and through 
participation of individual Centers’ 
representatives should participate 
more in Conference of Parties to the 
CBD, particularly in the ongoing ne-
gotiations to develop guidelines on 
access to genetic resources and shar-
ing of benefits from the use of these 
resources. 
The CGIAR and Centers, though •	
having no status in the World Trade 
Organization, should establish a 
mechanism for monitoring develop-
ments in the organization, particu-
larly future negotiations on Article 
27 of TRIPS. CGIAR needs capacity 
to procure or generate evidence-based 
options on how best to address issues 
emerging with the implementation of 
the TRIPS.
Center scientists, leaders, and man-•	
agers must increase their awareness 
of the obligations raised by the re-
gimes, through workshops and guid-
ance from GRPC and CAS-IP. Cen-
ter leadership should be aware of the 
obligations and ensure that Centers 
are responsive and not reactionary 
to developments in intellectual prop-
erty protection pertaining to genetic 
resources and agricultural research.
Some general lessons on 
global public partnerships
On global public partnerships, the most 
extensive study to date has been the World 
Bank’s independent evaluation of its global 
partnerships.25 It involved close examination 
of 26 global partnership programs, including 
its partnership with the CGIAR. While the 
recommendations are directed to the World 
Bank, the broader lessons and their implica-
tions apply as well to the CGIAR:
A global strategy is an essential precon-•	
dition to partnerships. This must begin 
with an understanding of alternative 
sources of supply and a clear deter-
mination of comparative advantage. 
It would need to take full account of 
changes in the international architec-
ture for the production and delivery 
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Partnerships work well 
when they are purposive 
and situated within explicit 
results-based frameworks
of public goods and the comparative 
advantage of different institutions. 
Financing requirements for partner-•	
ships need to be tightly linked to pro-
grams and program priorities, and 
the means-end requirements must be 
clearly presented. This requires identi-
fying underfunded long-term global 
public goods programs that benefit 
the poor and indicating the financ-
ing required for their production, 
delivery, adaptation, and effective 
use. There is little point in proposing 
programs to bring about a production 
revolution in drought-resistant grains 
or in the sustainable management of a 
natural resource, for example, unless 
realistic financial means are linked to 
those ends.
Effective management is imperative. •	
This depends on attention to the 
details of approval, oversight, evalu-
ation, exit/reauthorization criteria, 
the subsidiarity principle, separation 
of oversight from implementation 
management, and clarity of roles, re-
sponsibilities, and accountabilities.
The application of universally accepted •	
standards of good governance. These 
standards should accord priority to 
transparency, results-based manage-
ment, independent evaluation, writ-
ten agreements and conflict of interest 
guidelines, assignment of evaluation 
and auditing functions to governing 
bodies, and the inclusion of clients in 
shaping and deciding strategies and 
programs. 
Measurement and evaluation need to •	
be explicitly negotiated and stipulated 
in advance, as a foundation for part-
nerships and to establish a schedule of 
independent evaluations. 
These five broad lessons are echoed in 
other studies on partnership.26 They fur-
nish a best practices framework against 
which the CGIAR may address deficiencies 
in its current partnership arrangements. The 
starting point is the formulation of a strate-
gic framework, with partnership as one of 
its key components. Partnership strategies 
do not function well on their own because 
they establish partnerships as ends in them-
selves. Partnerships work well when they 
are purposive and situated within explicit 
results-based frameworks. Thus, partnership 
strategies need to be carefully constructed 
as a means to ends that are worked out col-
lectively and that establish a “coincidence of 
objectives.” 
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Governance reform 
for the CGIAR is not 
optional. Without 
governance reform, it will 
be impossible to restore 
confidence in the system
When the CGIAR was founded in 1971 it 
was small and structurally simple, with only 
four Centers and a few donors (figure 7.1). 
The CGIAR’s informal decisionmaking gov-
ernance arrangements met its needs.
Since then, however, the CGIAR’s mem-
bership and operations have become so di-
verse and complex that they are difficult to 
understand—let alone explain (figure 7.2).
The CGIAR System today presents 
deep paradoxes. Its funding has stagnated 
even as total official development assistance 
funds have doubled since 2002. Much of the 
CGIAR’s financing also continues to become 
less and less stable and predictable, while other 
development entities (such as the African De-
velopment Fund and International Develop-
ment Association) get multiyear funding 
increases of up to 50 percent. In the face of 
climate change, new agricultural technolo-
gies have never been more needed, but there is 
little assurance that the CGIAR System will 
play a major role in meeting the challenge.
The CGIAR System has been largely ab-
sent from recent debates and forums to de-
fine international agendas on climate change 
and food security. Many donors and mem-
bers openly express a loss of confidence in the 
CGIAR System. Trust is fragile between the 
Centers and CGIAR donors and Members. 
And the Centers are having more and more 
difficulty attracting and retaining top scien-
tists. Attempts at reform have stalled or fallen 
far short of their objectives.
It has long been clear that the CGIAR’s 
current governance structures are ill suited 
to solving such problems. Successive reviews 
over the past 15 years have concluded that sys-
temwide governance arrangements are cum-
bersome, ineffective, and driven by inertial 
forces that do not allow for decisive decision-
making, strategy formulation, or presentation 
of a corporate identity. The whole is less than 
its parts. In the Centers and among CGIAR 
members there is widespread disquiet about 
the future.
Governance reform for the CGIAR is 
not optional. Without governance reform, 
it will be impossible to restore confidence in 
the system. Without governance reform, the 
CGIAR’s comparative advantage will con-
tinue to be eroded—and the CGIAR will 
become increasingly marginal to the interna-
tional response to new global challenges.
For illustrative purposes, five distinct 
stages in the evolution of the nature, context 
and challenges of CGIAR governance may be 
described (box 7.1).
Previous reform efforts: 
findings and lessons 
The main preoccupation of the CGIAR Sys-
tem since the mid-1990s has been to bring 
about successful reforms, with the twin aims 
of ensuring strategic relevance and securing 
adequate, stable, and predictable financing. 
There have been many initiatives, including 
a crisis summit (Lucerne, 1995), the Third 
System Review (1998), the Sub-Saharan 
Africa Task Forces (2003–05), the Techni-
cal Advisory Committee Visioning Exercise 
(2000), the Synthesis Group attempt (2000), 
the Change Design and Management Team 
(2000–01), an attempted merger of two Cen-
ters (2004), the transformation of the Tech-
nical Advisory Committee into the Science 
Council (2003–04), the establishment of the 
Executive Council (2001), and the launching 
of the Alliance of Centers (2006). 
Governance: the imperative 
for structural reformCh
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All of these efforts and reviews have shared 
three perspectives:
That the CGIAR is a unique, valu-•	
able partnership of donors and doers, 
with social capital accumulated over 
decades.
That the CGIAR, as a system, is not •	
working as it should.
That the CGIAR’s root problems are •	
structural.
For example, the Report of the Sub-Saha-
ran Africa Task Force found “no System vision 
for CGIAR in [Sub-Saharan Africa], a large 
portfolio of un-coordinated CGIAR efforts, 
over-burdening of NARS, overlap of some 
Center activities, lack of integration mecha-
nisms for Centers, a large number of proj-
ects that would have difficulty in qualifying 
as [global-public-good-producing] research, 
and inter-Center disputes on mandates.” The 
Report concluded that “the problem faced is 
less programmatic; the core of the problem is 
structural. Even if one looks at programmatic 
alignment, the key concern is how to achieve 
alignment within the CGIAR itself.”1
The Independent Review Panel has come 
to three similar conclusions:
The 37-year partnership between agri-•	
cultural scientists and CGIAR mem-
bers still has a unique comparative ad-
vantage for producing and delivering 
international public goods.
The CGIAR System is cumbersome •	
and underperforming. It is in a very 
crowded field with many new actors, 
including strong research universities 
The governance of the CGIAR has evolved in five stages, from 
the period before its foundation in 1971 to the present day.
Before 1971.•	  Before the CGIAR there were four Centers 
(CIAT, CIMMYT, IITA, and IRRI), financed by the Ford and 
Rockefeller Foundations and with boards appointed by the 
foundations. The boards were small, each with 9–12 mem-
bers—mainly leading international scientists, and all serv-
ing in personal capacities. Their sole governance task was 
to support scientists to do good science. The foundations 
directly handled finances and fiduciary matters. 
1971–90.•	  In the CGIAR’s golden age, its financial resources 
grew rapidly—mainly as unrestricted core funds. Board 
membership was decided by CGIAR nomination, board 
self-renewal, or both. The average number of board mem-
bers grew to 16. Those members were still mainly scien-
tists, and ensuring freedom in scientific research contin-
ued to be the main focus of board governance. There was 
little direct accountability to donors, with no systematic 
results measurement or reporting. The number of Centers 
increased from 4 to 18. Centers’ boards varied widely in 
their governance.
1990–98.•	  A sharp decline in funding led to a financial crisis in 
1994, with some Centers verging on insolvency. As donors 
became more concerned with results accountability, the 
share of all funding that was restricted rose to 40 percent. 
In 1993 an Oversight Committee was established—a signifi-
cant step toward centralized governance. The committee 
reported “uneven performance” across Centers’ boards. 
Yet in 1995 the Lucerne Summit rejected a proposal for uni-
fied governance and failed to reverse the CGIAR’s financial 
decline. By 1997 donors were increasingly pressing for cen-
tralized governance and controls—yet again, in 1998, the 
Centers rejected the Third System Review’s proposal for 
governance by an Executive Board of donors. 
1998–2007.•	  The CGIAR slid from crisis to crisis, as a grave 
decline in the quantity and quality of funding left several 
Centers near insolvency. Studies and reform efforts prolif-
erated—in 2000, the Visioning Exercise and the Synthesis 
Group; in 2000–01, the Change Design and Management 
Team; in 2003–05, the Sub-Saharan Africa Task Force; and, 
in 2004, a proposed merger of two Centers—but few results 
were seen. Reform efforts, including pressure from donors 
for mergers and a single governance structure (especially 
over 2004–07), aroused opposition and generated distrust 
between the Centers and the Secretariat. The Centers 
formed an Alliance as a defense mechanism. CGIAR donors 
sent contradictory messages—on the one hand pushing for 
integrated strategies and collective accountability, but on 
the other hand providing effective incentives that encour-
aged fragmentation. The CGIAR approved a written, but 
entirely nonbinding charter. 
2008.•	  An uncertain future presented major threats—but 
with them, new possibilities. A Change Management initia-
tive was launched to renew the CGIAR. Agriculture returned 
to the center of international political economy, creating a 
new opportunity. There was widespread agreement on the 
need for fundamental governance reform. Yet opinions on 
what that reform should look like differed greatly.
Source: Independent Review Panel.
Box 7.1 Five stages of CGIAR governance
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Previous diagnoses of 
the CGIAR have identified 
the same problems 
and the same barriers 
to moving forward that 
this Review does
and NARS, international nongovern-
mental organizations (now perform-
ing many of the tasks that were once 
the exclusive domain of the CGIAR), 
and national and multinational cor-
porations forging breakthroughs in 
agricultural science. Individual Cen-
ters have developed research strate-
gies, yet the CGIAR System has no 
strategic direction and is no longer in 
a position to exercise the leadership 
envisaged for it by its original archi-
tects. No integrated strategy exists 
to guide the CGIAR’s funding and 
work toward common objectives.
The main problems of the CGIAR are •	
structural. They cannot be resolved 
without major structural changes.
In other words, previous diagnoses of the 
CGIAR have identified the same problems 
and the same barriers to moving forward that 
this Review does. All those previous diag-
noses shared the broad goals of rejuvenating 
the partnership; “upping the game” through 
increasing the CGIAR’s strategic relevance 
to global challenges; achieving adequate, 
predictable, high-quality funding; building 
confidence and trust throughout the system; 
establishing a shared corporate identity; and 
making institutional arrangements for ef-
fective decisionmaking. Yet they all proved 
largely unsuccessful—as is apparent in the 
state of CGIAR finances today, and in the 
need to launch the present effort for compre-
hensive and systemwide reform.
Assessing recent reform 
efforts: the Change Design 
and Management Team 
The most ambitious and comprehensive pre-
vious reform effort was a package of changes 
launched in 2001, based on the work of the 
Change Design and Management Team 
(CDMT).2 The starting point for the 
CDMT’s recommendations had been that, 
while there was strong consensus on the need 
for a structural realignment of the Centers, 
there was no consensus on what that should 
entail. The CDMT’s report had proposed 
“transformation with renewal” around five 
main objectives: 
Establish a CGIAR strategy on a pro-•	
grammatic basis focused on major 
problems.
Achieve more and better financing.•	
Improve decisionmaking and increase •	
efficiencies across the system.
Improve partnerships, with empha-•	
sis on national agricultural research 
institutes.
Strengthen science in the CGIAR, as •	
the main foundation of its compara-
tive advantage.
Objective 1. Establish CGIAR 
strategy on a programmatic basis 
focused on major problems
The CDMT’s report found that CGIAR activ-
ities had become fragmented, with no strategic 
focus and many small undertakings that did 
not add up to the scientific and developmental 
impacts expected of the CGIAR. To sharpen 
the focus of the CGIAR, and to fix it more 
squarely on programmatic approaches and 
“global problems,” the report proposed a shift 
to Global Challenge Programs—intended as 
the catalyst to move Centers away from myr-
iad, small, and underfinanced projects toward 
a collective focus on major global challenges. 
The Challenge Programs were also intended 
to build new partnerships (especially with 
NARS), to generate significant new financ-
ing, and to become about 50 percent of the 
CGIAR research program by 2006. Time-
bound, independently governed, high-impact 
research programs were to give the CGIAR a 
strategic focus.
Despite some undoubted gains through 
the Challenge Programs, the CGIAR’s over-
all performance against the CDMT’s objec-
tives has been very disappointing. The Chal-
lenge Programs have not attracted worthy 
project concepts or proposals from external 
organizations. The process has been started, 
stopped, and started again, while more than 
80 submissions have led to only one new pro-
gram since 2003. Six of the seven concepts 
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Despite the low success 
rate in the process for 
developing new Challenge 
Programs, some of the 
programs now in place 
are promising and point 
to a future strategy for 
programmatic research
that have reached the full proposal stage 
have come from Center-led consortia—and, 
it might be argued, could have been gener-
ated through a less complex internal process, 
with incentives to involve external organiza-
tions. Three “lessons learned” reviews have 
been carried out, two by the Science Council 
and one by the Alliance.3 They found that 
the Challenge Programs have created ad-
ditional research infrastructures with new 
transaction costs. Such processes under-
mine the quality of proposals. By compel-
ling many centers to participate in propos-
als, they generate “overcrowded” proposals 
that lack focus and that fail to build strong 
external partnerships.
Although the Challenge Programs have 
brought in some new funding, much of that 
funding has not been incremental. Indeed, the 
World Bank has diverted funding that would 
otherwise have been mainly unrestricted 
funding to Centers—eroding the Centers’ 
confidence in the Challenge Programs. And 
the Challenge Programs have been slow to 
develop. The complex, multistage procedures 
for awarding new programs have created only 
limited incentives for new partnerships and 
have inhibited responses. Far from becoming 
50 percent of the CGIAR’s research program 
by 2006, the Challenge Programs were only 
about 9 percent of that year’s program, with 
only about half going to Centers.
The Panel is concerned that the develop-
ment of new Challenge Programs has not 
been well integrated with internal CGIAR 
strategic research planning (planning that is 
now associated with System Priorities). The 
Panel is also concerned about the consistency 
of financial arrangements, management, and 
associated risks. The Panel recommends an 
independent financial audit of the Challenge 
Programs. 
On the positive side, several pilots “fast 
tracked” through the Challenge Programs are 
excellent examples of innovative, high-impact 
research (see appendix 1 for a description of 
ongoing programs). These programs have 
added value to CGIAR research through ex-
ternal partnerships.4 Although they have yet 
to demonstrate “proof of concept,” they can 
potentially make outstanding contributions. 
These existing Challenge Programs demon-
strate the clear potential for inter-Center col-
laboration and for strategic partners’ engage-
ment in a new, programmatic approach to 
CGIAR research.
Recent assessments of the Systemwide 
and Ecoregional Programs suggest that many 
of them are strongly “downstream,” and are 
better managed by partner institutions.5 
But the assessments also suggest that some 
of these programs have—like the Challenge 
Programs—a strong complementary poten-
tial to contribute to research and to capacity 
building. The Systemwide and Ecoregional 
Programs deserve further development.
The Panel concludes that despite the low 
success rate in the process for developing new 
Challenge Programs, some of the programs 
now in place are promising and point to a fu-
ture strategy for programmatic research. Such 
a strategy would involve Center-led research 
consortia that are directed at key research 
challenges, committed to innovative external 
partnerships, and aligned with overall system 
strategy.
Objective 2. Achieve more 
and better financing
The CDMT underscored a principle that 
is apparent in the history of development: 
new money, and more money, flows to excit-
ing concepts targeted at current and relevant 
challenges. Arguing that the CGIAR would 
need to make this happen, the CDMT also 
indicated that the potential for significant 
increases in funding from the CGIAR’s tra-
ditional donors was limited—and that this 
would challenge the CGIAR leadership to 
bring in new sources of financing, includ-
ing donations in kind. Finally, the CDMT 
urged more attention to expanding multi-
year financing. The CDMT proposed the 
Challenge Programs as the main vehicle to 
bring about these changes and to bring more, 
higher-quality financing to the CGIAR. 
The CDMT’s report was also clear that the 
Challenge Programs should be financed from 
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The Independent Review 
Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders and interview 
results indicate that the 
Executive Council is 
widely considered a “lost 
opportunity” because 
it has not assumed 
enough qualities of a 
decisionmaking body
“incremental resources” and should not divert 
funds from existing activities.
Against all these goals, results have been 
disappointing. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation has provided some new financ-
ing, yet most Challenge Program financing 
does not involve newly added funds. Nor has 
the quality of financing increased. If any-
thing, it has decreased, with a steady trend 
toward year-by-year unpredictability, short-
term restricted finances, and numerous small 
projects. Finally, the goal of more diverse fi-
nancing has not been met.
Objective 3. Improve 
decisionmaking and increase 
efficiencies across the system
The CDMT recommended establishing two 
new CGIAR bodies, to improve decision-
making and to make the system more 
efficient.
To improve decisionmaking, the •	
CDMT proposed creating the Ex-
ecutive Council, a body delegated to 
perform functions and carry out ac-
tions following from Annual Gen-
eral Meetings. Comprising mainly 
shareholders, the council would also 
include the cosponsors and two ex of-
ficio representatives of the Centers.
To make the system more efficient, •	
the CDMT proposed integrating the 
existing CGIAR Secretariat and sev-
eral isolated support functions into a 
single new entity, the System Office. 
It would make overall services more 
efficient, reduce costly and conflict-
creating duplication, promote align-
ment across the System, assign clear 
roles and responsibilities, remove 
“nondecisionmaking committees,” 
and consolidate support for the entire 
CGIAR System. The System Office 
would also provide a single, integrated 
communications function “to drive a 
new System communication vision 
and strategy in cooperation with the 
Centers’ public awareness units.”6 
Through common management and 
delivery support services provided by 
the System Office, the Centers would 
become more efficient.
The Executive Council was established 
in 2001. It received no decisionmaking au-
thority, but only a mandate strictly limited 
to “co-ordinating, monitoring, overseeing, 
and recommending.” Since then the council 
has evolved somewhat. For example, the 2007 
Annual General Meeting gave it decision-
making authority on matters related to Ex-
ternal Program and Management Reviews. 
However, the Independent Review Panel sur-
vey of informed stakeholders and interview 
results indicate that the Executive Council 
is widely considered a “lost opportunity” be-
cause it has not assumed enough qualities of 
a decisionmaking body. Less than 1 percent 
of respondents to the survey called the coun-
cil “very effective”; over 70 percent assigned it 
ratings ranging from “not clearly effective” to 
“completely ineffective.” Meeting records con-
firm that the Executive Council has focused 
on processes, taking almost no decisions. True 
to its original framework, it has mainly ad-
vised and promoted continuity between An-
nual General Meetings. Issues or proposals to 
delegate decisionmaking authorities to the 
council have not been a regular part of An-
nual General Meeting agendas. 
The System Office was created in 2001. 
Ten units, until then operating separately, 
were brought under its umbrella (table 7.1). 
The units vary considerably in size and 
 character—from the CGIAR Secretariat, 
with its $4.15 million budget, to small units 
with few staff and budgets under $300,000.
The objectives of streamlining and re-
moving “nondecisionmaking committees” 
through the System Office seem to have been 
nullified by the CGIAR Charter approved in 
2004. According to the charter, the System 
Office “is a virtual office and is not a physical 
consolidation,” while “each unit will continue 
to be accountable in a fiduciary and perfor-
mance sense to its own governing authority” 
and also “in a broad sense to the [Executive 
Council] (with) accountability being coor-
dinated through the CGIAR Director.”7 
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In 2007, the System Office Steering Com-
mittee determined that the Science Council 
Secretariat should be removed from the Sys-
tem Office, to assure the independence of the 
secretariat’s science advisory role, and that the 
remaining units should be amalgamated into 
five (the Alliance Office, the CGIAR Secre-
tariat, the Internal Audit Unit, the Intellec-
tual Property Advisory Unit, and the Infor-
mation Office). The System Office Steering 
Committee also determined that the Alliance 
Office and all other units except the CGIAR 
Secretariat should have a program advisory 
committee.
These measures in the Charter and by 
the System Office Steering Committee sug-
gest a tendency toward creating complicated 
structures and committees. Within the Cen-
ters, the Panel found a high level of frustration 
with the System Office over what the Centers 
view as unnecessary demands for information 
and unrealistic time deadlines. Representative 
views of the System Office from the Centers 
include that the office is “distant and aloof,” 
that it is “concerned more with making work 
for us than with helping us to work,” and that 
it is “supply-side” (“they don’t take time to un-
derstand what we really need”). 
These negative assessments are highly cor-
related with failures of trust. All reports show 
that confidence between Centers and the Sys-
tem Office has declined in recent years. How-
ever, there is encouraging evidence that trust 
System Office unit Established Intended purpose
CGIAR Secretariat 1975 The hub of the CGIAR System. It is intended to have a 
significant integration and facilitation role—ensuring 
that collective action by many independent, but 
interdependent components is directed to the CGIAR
mission. The secretariat implements communication 
with the CGIAR System and with its partners.
Science Council Secretariat
(formerly the Technical 
Advisory Committee)
1975 Intended to provide technical and administrative
support by preparing strategic studies and
documents, preparing external reviews, organizing
Science Council meetings, backstopping the 
activities of four Science Council panels, and 
implementing Science Council decisions.
Alliance Office 2006 Established by Center Board Chairs and Center Directors General; 
conceived as an integral part of the CGIAR System Office. Intended 
to provide high-level strategic and operational support to CGIAR 
Centers, to ensure the alignment of the Centers’ work with the 
wider CGIAR activities and objectives, and to inform the collective 
work of the System Office with the Centers’ views and expertise.
Gender and Diversity 1999 Intended to provide and facilitate expert advice and 
enhance the exchange of knowledge and experiences.
Internal Audit 2000 Intended to provide a cost-effective internal audit service to improve 
operations and strengthen internal controls in participating Centers.
Central Advisory Service for 
intellectual Property (CAS-IP)
2002 Intended to provide and facilitate expert advice and intellectual 
property management and technology transfer.
Chief Information Officer 2002 Intended to help plan and coordinate information technology and 
information and knowledge management within the CGIAR System.
SAS-Human Resources 2003 Intended to help participating Centers define needs,
develop and implement sound people policies
through strategic approaches, and monitor the impact
and success of human resources policy and practice.
Media Unit 2006 Intended to develop and implement a media strategy that
secures positive coverage, in mainstream print and 
broadcast media outlets, of joint Center research
achievements and of the impacts of collective work.
Association of International Agricultural 
Research Centers (AIARC)
Withdrawn
Future Harvest Withdrawn
Table 7.1 CGIAR System Office structure (through the end of 2007)
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Through its Standing 
Panel on Impact 
Assessment the Science 
Council has undertaken 
work of high value on 
retrospective, systemwide 
assessments of CGIAR 
research, along with 
more focused research 
on project assessment
has begun to improve over the past year or 
so. 
Objective 4. Improve partnerships, 
with emphasis on national 
agricultural research institutes
The CDMT reported that the CGIAR would 
need to develop very different partnership 
arrangements—especially with the NARS, 
where the new arrangements were needed to 
reflect the institutes’ increased capacities. The 
new partnerships were to place greater emphasis 
on full partnerships in research, and on networks 
of partnerships as opposed to brick-and-mortar 
institutions (given advances in information and 
communications technology). 
The Panel found many effective partner-
ships at individual Centers. But it also found 
that most such partnerships are almost com-
pletely ad hoc. And it found that the Centers 
lack tools, including financial tools, to en-
gage in and manage partnerships. Ambitious 
strategies, with embedded partnerships that 
attract financing for promising major devel-
opment breakthroughs, are lacking.
The relationship between the CGIAR 
and the NARS has changed considerably over 
the past 35 years. On the whole, the CGIAR 
has co-evolved well with most of the NARS 
around the world. However, more than one 
Center has tense relations with the NARS. 
Many interactions are more competitive than 
collaborative. Several NARS representatives 
complained to the Panel that the CGIAR pa-
tronizes the NARS.
Competition for funding is an undercur-
rent in tensions both among CGIAR Centers 
and between Centers and their NARS part-
ners. In the Independent Review Panel survey 
of informed stakeholders, developing country 
respondents expressed a desire for Centers to 
devolve relevant activities to strong NARS 
and for the NARS to play a greater role in 
priority setting. Two key donors noted that 
the tensions between the NARS and the Cen-
ters have made it difficult for them to increase 
funding to the Centers, given that their man-
dates assign priority to country-level capacity 
building,
Objective 5. Strengthen science in 
the CGIAR as the main foundation 
of its comparative advantage
Concerned that CGIAR’s comparative 
advantage in strong science was weakening, 
the CDMT recommended transforming the 
Technical Advisory Committee into a Sci-
ence Council. This council was established in 
2004 with the objectives of:
Enhancing and promoting the qual-•	
ity, relevance, and impact of science in 
the CGIAR.
Advising the CGIAR on strategic sci-•	
entific issues important to its goals.
Mobilizing and harnessing the best •	
international science to address goals 
of the international agricultural re-
search community.
The Science Council pursued these objec-
tives through four specific activities of four 
Standing Panels—on Impact Assessment, on 
Monitoring and Evaluation, on Priorities and 
Strategies, and on Mobilizing Science.
Through its Standing Panel on Impact 
Assessment the Science Council has under-
taken work of high value on retrospective, 
systemwide assessments of CGIAR research, 
along with more focused research on project 
assessment. It has sought to help Centers with 
retrospective assessments and to build an “im-
pact culture” in the system. Much of its work 
has focused on crop genetic improvement 
impacts, but efforts are also being made to 
evaluate the impact of research in other areas, 
including natural resource management and 
policy-oriented research (which now consti-
tute a substantial proportion of CGIAR re-
search spending; see chapter 3). The Science 
Council is also aware of a growing need to 
expand beyond retrospective performance 
evaluations to prospective evaluations of po-
tential performance as a basis for strategic pri-
ority setting. Some Centers (such as IFPRI, 
with its Harvest Choice project) are making 
important advances in this area. The Science 
Council should play a major role in supporting 
prospective evaluations across the system.
Through its Standing Panel on Monitor-
ing and Evaluation the Science Council has 
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managed an impressive volume of Center 
evaluation and assessment on behalf of the 
CGIAR System—including, since its incep-
tion, the External Program and Management 
Reviews of 13 Centers (bringing this pro-
cess back on track) and external reviews of 
four new Challenge Programs. In addition, it 
has put in place a plan to simplify and stan-
dardize monitoring and evaluation, making 
performance measurement more and more 
integrated, common, and consistent across 
Centers.8 Such streamlining was intended to 
reduce the burden of assessment on Centers. 
Yet other changes, such as the CGIAR Secre-
tariat’s introduction of the Performance Mea-
surement System, have contributed to a view 
in many Centers that the burden of reporting 
has, if anything, grown—with little evidence 
of associated benefits, such as increased fund-
ing or fewer independent donor evaluations of 
Centers (box 7.2).
The Science Council’s Standing Panel 
on Priorities and Strategies has focused on 
completing and starting to put in place the 
System Priorities—a process that the Sci-
ence Council inherited at its establishment 
in 2004. The Science Council has also pro-
gressed with several studies in areas of stra-
tegic significance to the CGIAR System, in-
cluding biosafety and ethics. This effort has 
been valuable. It calls for more investment, 
and for close integration with Centers in de-
sign and execution to ensure that its outputs 
are relevant and used.
The most challenging task for the Science 
Council was that of its Standing Panel on 
Mobilizing Science. A new undertaking for 
the System, this Standing Panel required the 
Science Council to make a System-level con-
tribution that would add significant value to 
the existing work of Centers in engaging part-
ners from their research areas and regions. Ef-
forts included developing a database of Cen-
ter research partners, publishing a book in 
international agricultural research,9 and con-
tributing to World Development Report 2008 
The Panel surveys and consultations—with other recent stud-
ies—suggest how donors and Centers view the Science Coun-
cil. All view the council and its roles as important to the CGIAR 
System. The Executive Council and CGIAR members value the 
Science Council’s reporting on evaluations of Centers and re-
search initiatives as a major contribution to the business of the 
Executive Council.
Nevertheless, more than 80 percent of Center Board Chairs, 
Directors General, and Deputy Directors General believe that 
the Science Council has not been effective (see figure). The 
main reasons given are that the Science Council:
Focuses too much on its evaluation role, overburdening •	
Centers with reporting requirements without obvious ben-
efits to the Centers.
Does not do enough to help the Centers to explore future •	
opportunities and challenges and to mobilize the interna-
tional scientific community.
Does not engage or communicate effectively with the •	
Centers.
Imposes too narrow a view of science on the Centers.•	
Other studies also point to these concerns. And several 
donors share them—agreeing, in particular, that the Science 
Council should help the Centers with its work on strategy and 
on mobilizing science.
Box 7.2 The Science Council—perceptions of its importance and effectiveness
Source: Independent Review Panel survey of informed stakeholders.
Survey respondents who rate the Science 
Council “important” and “effective” 
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Both donors and Centers 
must relinquish old, 
dysfunctional patterns of 
governance to make the 
CGIAR more relevant and 
effective in responding 
to challenges because 
the stakes are so high—
reducing hunger and 
poverty in the world
on agriculture for development. A plan for a 
regular international conference was not fully 
realized, but has recently been revived.
In the view of CGIAR management, 
donors, and Centers, the Standing Panel on 
Mobilizing Science has not been very success-
ful. CGIAR, as a collective entity, was absent 
from important dialogues on climate change 
and the food crisis. It is very important for the 
CGIAR to develop this area in future.
Lessons learned 
The CDMT reform effort was the most com-
prehensive and ambitious of recent reform 
efforts. But in its diagnostic it was broadly 
similar to the others. Why have they all come 
to so little? The Sub-Saharan Africa Task 
Force suggested that the principal cause is the 
territoriality of the Centers. The Panel agrees 
that the suggestion has some validity, but also 
considers it a vast oversimplification.
CGIAR reform efforts have disappointed, 
not because of any one factor, but because of 
a collective failure. The Panel agrees with the 
Advisory Group to the World Bank 2003 
meta-evaluation of the CGIAR, which con-
cluded that the cause of failure in efforts to 
reform the CGIAR has been a tragedy of the 
commons. Each donor furthers its aims by 
providing funds restricted to those aims. Each 
Center goes its own way, partly to get such 
funds, partly because doing so frees it from 
pressures to work with the System as a whole. 
The results are lack of systemwide strategy, 
little sense of overall ownership, and loss of 
System efficiency.10
All the main parties to the CGIAR part-
nership are equally responsible for the failure 
of efforts to achieve effective governance. The 
parties participate in good faith and genuinely 
want to strengthen the CGIAR. Yet deep iner-
tias at the Centers have combined with a frac-
tured system of donor goals and incentives to 
create a continuing impasse. The parties de-
fault to their own immediate interests, and the 
result is indeed a tragedy of the commons. 
Any renewed attempts to reform the gov-
ernance of the CGIAR System would do well 
to start with lessons learned from past efforts. 
Five such lessons stand out:
Evolutionary approaches to restruc-•	
turing have not worked and are un-
likely to work if attempted again. 
This observation is not unique to the 
CGIAR. A main conclusion from 
the many restructuring attempts of 
UN development agencies is that 
their complicated multilateral gover-
nance structures are subject to change 
only through directive, top-down ap-
proaches with specified milestones.11
Most CGIAR reform efforts have •	
started by reaffirming three founding 
principles of the CGIAR—donor sov-
ereignty, Center independence, and 
consensus decisionmaking—which 
have been outdated since the Paris 
Declaration and which are root causes 
of dysfunctional CGIAR governance. 
Donor sovereignty must give way to 
more harmonization and coordina-
tion. Center independence must give 
way to more network collaboration. 
Both donors and Centers must re-
linquish old, dysfunctional patterns 
of governance to make the CGIAR 
more relevant and effective in re-
sponding to challenges because the 
stakes are so high—reducing hunger 
and poverty in the world. Decision-
making must be founded on clear au-
thority, with binding decisions.
Sound governance requires clearly as-•	
signed responsibilities, accountabilities, 
and effective authority. Past reform ef-
forts have explicitly recognized these 
factors, but have failed to resolve them. 
In the words of the CDMT: “At pres-
ent, most decisions default to mecha-
nisms (committees, TAC [Technical 
Advisory Committee], and Secre-
tariat) which either lack authority or 
comparative expertise. Multiple com-
mittees examine the same issues. De-
cisions are not strongly binding on 
either shareholders or the Centers . . . 
there is no mechanism for following 
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The Centers were 
encouraged to believe 
that their resources would 
increase if they supported 
the Challenge Programs, 
but the added resources 
failed to materialize
up decisions . . . and hence no clear 
accountability for success or failure.”12 
Past efforts have tended mainly to es-
tablish an ever-increasing array of 
structures, based on ad hoc relation-
ships that have further blurred lines 
of responsibility and accountability.
The incentives for change need to •	
be aligned with strategic objectives. 
Clearly established and adequate in-
centives have not been provided to 
support efforts to bring about signifi-
cant structural and governance re-
forms, including consolidations and 
mergers of individual Centers. The 
Centers were encouraged to believe 
that their resources would increase 
if they joined in and supported the 
Challenge Programs, but the added 
resources failed to materialize. There 
is no incentive for Centers to partici-
pate in Challenge Programs when 
they suffer loss of unrestricted funds 
as a result. Centers view some possible 
changes as fraught with risk—to rep-
utations, to brand recognition, and to 
jobs. Moreover, as the Sub-Saharan 
Africa Task Force correctly observed, 
several donors have directed incen-
tives toward individual projects, many 
of them short term and modest in 
their ambitions. Such incentives per-
versely reinforce the CGIAR’s basic 
problems: a lack of strategic focus and 
a lack of system coherence.
Since the core problem of CGIAR •	
governance is structural (as the Sub-
Saharan Africa Task Force rightly 
concluded), solving the problem will 
require changes to the CGIAR’s gov-
ernance structure. Past reform efforts 
have presumed that the CGIAR’s 
form—its structure—will follow its 
function. In the CGIAR’s case, how-
ever, structures for decisionmaking 
are not in place. Without such struc-
tures the decisions needed on strat-
egy, strategic objectives, aligned allo-
cations, and a results framework are 
denied. Although management the-
ory generally affirms that form should 
flow from function, it also shows that 
to decide about function, form must 
be in place. For the CGIAR, function 
will need to be preceded by form.
The World Bank’s role in 
CGIAR governance
The World Bank has helped drive the develop-
ment of the CGIAR from its inception. The 
Bank is a linchpin of the CGIAR’s finances, 
operations and governance. It houses the 
CGIAR Secretariat, provides it with a Chair 
and Director, and gives it major financial sup-
port. The Bank now pays all the costs of the 
CGIAR Secretariat, $4.2 million in 2007. 
The Panel has estimated the total costs of the 
CGIAR System Office (including the costs of 
the Annual General Meeting and the costs 
borne by the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion for the Science Council) at about $14 mil-
lion in 2006, of which the Bank paid about 
$10.2 million, or 73 percent. That does not 
meet the Bank’s own guidelines for its Devel-
opment Grant Facility, which state that the 
Bank should not fund more than 50 percent 
of the costs of an in-Bank secretariat “to avoid 
a program’s over-reliance on the Bank.”13
The multiple roles of the Bank in the 
CGIAR have strengthened the CGIAR Sys-
tem, but have also created problems and dis-
tortions. According to the Independent Eval-
uation Group of the World Bank (then the 
Operations Evaluation Department), writing 
in 2003, the multiplicity of roles the Bank has 
assumed has led to:
Excessive Bank involvement in the •	
day-to-day management of the Sys-
tem and dependence of the System 
on the Bank.
Little use by the CGIAR of the Bank’s •	
country assistance capability and only 
minor intellectual engagement be-
tween programs of the World Bank 
Agriculture and Rural Development 
Department and the Centers.
A disproportionate share/burden of •	
CGIAR management responsibility 
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The Bank’s convening 
power has been, and 
continues to be, essential 
to the CGIAR’s global role 
and the impact it can have
allocated to a Bank senior manager 
already burdened by other heavy 
managerial responsibilities.
Reporting relationships for both the 
CGIAR Secretariat and the Bank that [in-
volve] real or potential conflicts of interest. 
These features limit the capacity of the Bank 
to provide the objectivity and leadership 
needed. . . .”14
Responding to the evaluation, Bank 
management agreed on the importance of 
separating the Bank’s management and over-
sight functions and indicated that the Bank’s 
“Chief Economist would be responsible for 
the oversight function.”15 Bank management 
also announced that there would be indepen-
dent triennial evaluations of the CGIAR, 
with Bank Board approval, as a requirement 
for continuing Bank support. This Review—
five years following the announcement—is 
the first such exercise. The Office of the Chief 
Economist had some input into the terms of 
reference for this Review. But that office was 
not represented on the ad hoc committee of 
the CGIAR that drafted those terms, nor on 
the advisory and steering committee for the 
Panel. It is not clear to the Panel what other 
CGIAR oversight actions the Bank expected 
its Chief Economist to take.
The Panel concludes that although an ini-
tial step was taken to separate and strengthen 
oversight after the Bank’s evaluation of the 
CGIAR, nothing has changed the essential 
problem: that the Bank is both a major donor 
to the CGIAR and its dominant manager. 
The weaknesses identified in the evaluation 
remain basically unchanged after five years.
The World Bank provides the Chair of 
the CGIAR, and all but the first CGIAR 
Chair have been World Bank Vice Presidents 
responsible for agriculture. Respondents to 
the Independent Review Panel survey of in-
formed stakeholders agree that these appoint-
ments have served the CGIAR well. Almost 
two-thirds of respondents consider it impor-
tant or very important to the CGIAR that 
it have a World Bank Vice President as its 
Chair. The Panel concurs. The Bank’s con-
vening power has been, and continues to be, 
essential to the CGIAR’s global role and the 
impact it can have. 
The Panel, however, sees a need to distin-
guish between two views of this relationship. 
On the first view, a World Bank Vice Presi-
dent chairs a consultative body to mobilize 
resources, to encourage strategic allocation of 
those resources, and to coordinate agriculture 
investments to support the best use of agri-
cultural research—a highly appropriate and 
important role. On the second view, a World 
Bank Vice President chairs a joint organiza-
tion of Centers, taking substantial respon-
sibility for Center operations—a somewhat 
inappropriate role, and one without compara-
tive advantage. Given the limits on how much 
time a World Bank Vice President can spend 
working as the Chair of the CGIAR, chair-
ing a consultative body seems a better fit than 
chairing a joint organization of Centers.
The CGIAR Director, too, is a World 
Bank staff member. That gives the CGIAR 
system still more access to the Bank’s orga-
nizational and convening powers. But it also 
makes it difficult to distinguish where the 
CGIAR Secretariat ends and the Bank be-
gins. The Panel understands, for example, that 
the performance appraisal of the CGIAR Di-
rector is a sole prerogative of the Bank.
Respondents to the Independent Review 
Panel survey were polarized on the value of 
the CGIAR Director being a World Bank 
staff member. A majority thought it was im-
portant, yet a substantial minority dissented. 
Ambivalence over the position of the CGIAR 
Director arises (like ambivalence over the 
Chair’s position) partly from a lack of clear 
responsibilities and authorities. The Panel 
sees a major distinction between the role of 
the Director of a consolidated donor fund for 
the CGIAR, and that of the chief administra-
tor and manager of a collectivity of Centers. 
The Director of a consolidated donor fund 
requires deep knowledge of international 
development, but only modest management 
ability (the Secretariat of the Fund would not 
need to be large or complex). In contrast, the 
chief administrator and manager of the joint 
Centers would need to be a credible leader of 
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Criteria
Panel 
rating Comment
Oversight Medium The World Bank stated in 2003, after its Operations Evaluation Department did an independent evaluation of the CGIAR, that 
the Bank’s “Chief Economist would be responsible for the [CGIAR] oversight function.”a It is not clear to the Panel what the 
Bank expected its Chief Economist to do in that capacity. (The Office of the Chief Economist had some input into this Review’s 
terms of reference, but was not represented on the committee drafting the terms or on the Panel’s advisory and steering 
committee.) The roles in the CGIAR of the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural Development Department, and of its Sector Board, 
have also remained unchanged. The Panel finds that although an effort was made to separate and strengthen oversight after 
the 2003 evaluation, the Bank remains both a major donor to the CGIAR and its dominant manager. That is a problem.
Subsidiarity High The CGIAR and the network of Centers form a highly decentralized partnership. Most operational decisions are decentralized. 
Subsidiarity is not a significant problem.
Comparative advantage Medium The World Bank has relevant strengths, only partly replicated among CGIAR cosponsors. The CGIAR furthers the Bank’s 
development and resource mobilization objectives in fields basic to the CGIAR’s operations, but does not compete with regular 
Bank operations. However, some of the support the Bank could give to the CGIAR, and some of the benefits it could draw 
from its involvement, are not realized. At the country level, the Bank does not seriously engage the Centers for multisectoral 
views, development analysis, or country-level presence and knowledge. There are very few linkages between Bank country 
operations and the Centers. The Bank has a global mandate, reach, and convening power—but it has not fully exploited its 
capabilities to produce a global vision for the CGIAR.
Multicountry benefits High The CGIAR and its affiliated Centers produce global public goods and regional public goods (research findings, germplasm 
conservation) that would be more difficult to produce country by country.
Leverage (narrow) High Narrowly defined as the relationship of World Bank funding to total CGIAR funding, the amount of leverage is appropriate. The 
Bank’s contribution does not exceed the guideline 15 percent of total funding of the CGIAR and Centers. (Indeed, the Bank’s 
contribution is under 10 percent, and is falling as a share of total CGIAR funding.)
Leverage (broad) Medium In the CGIAR’s founding phase the Bank’s contribution was probably an essential lever to other donors. It is probably still 
important to ensure adequate funding to the Centers—but not as essential as it was, since agriculture and agricultural 
research have now reestablished their importance during the food price crisis. The Bank has not increased net funding since 
2001, but it has worked successfully to limit the effects of Japan’s reduced contributions. It encouraged two more donors 
and foundations to join the CGIAR. For most of the past two decades, the Bank has taken the lead in making agriculture an 
international development priority. The Bank could do more to support human resources for development, in the opinion of the 
Panel, by engaging the 3,200 scientific staff at Centers.
Managerial competence Medium The Panel generally finds the managerial competence of the System Office acceptable compared with the norm for global 
funds. Structural weaknesses exist, however. Unclear responsibilities and inadequate authorities make management difficult. 
For example, the System Office may monitor the financial situation of Centers, but has no authority to intervene—only to 
advise.
Arm’s length relationship Low The management of the CGIAR is not independent of the Bank Group. Over a long period the requirement for an arm’s length 
relationship has been waived.
Risks and risk 
management
Low Several risk areas are not adequately controlled—and probably cannot be within the present governance structure of the 
CGIAR and the Centers. Financial risk exposure tends to persist for a long time. When a crisis occurs, the Bank tends to be the 
funder of last resort. There is also some risk to the Bank’s reputation. The Centers’ compliance with Bank safeguard policies is 
not actively monitored, and ethical reviewing of research projects varies by Center.
Disengagement strategy Low The Bank has not yet faced the need to disengage from managing network aspects of the Centers. The key need is to 
disengage from operational involvement with the System Office, and to reorient the Bank’s involvement toward resource 
mobilization, strategic resource allocation, and investment coordination.
Promoting partnerships Medium The CGIAR’s main initiative for partnerships in the past five years has been the Challenge Programs. They have had mixed 
success. The CGIAR’s relationships with nongovernmental organizations are poor. Relationships with the private sector are 
minimal and are slighted.
Institutional capacity High The World Bank did much to establish and maintain the CGIAR as a major research and conservation institution with a focus 
on development. The Bank’s continued involvement in funding CGIAR Centers is very important. Also very important is the 
Bank’s leadership in promoting CGIAR governance reform.
Overall appropriateness 
of Bank involvement
High, 
but more 
selectivity 
needed.
The Panel thinks the World Bank’s involvement in the CGIAR is strong in some areas, relatively weak in others. The Panel rated 
the Bank in the CGIAR as high in four areas, medium in four, and low in four. Overall, the practical benefits of continuing a long 
tradition of Bank involvement are high. The Panel therefore thinks that the Bank should continue to play a leading role in the 
financial and funding side of the CGIAR, but that the Bank should disengage from a direct management role.
a. World Bank (2003), p. 177.
Table 7.2 Panel assessment of the World Bank’s role in the CGIAR
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such Centers (with scientific credentials), a 
thoughtful and persuasive strategist, and an 
effective manager of fairly large joint opera-
tions. The Panel concludes that the two roles 
should be separated. 
The World Bank Independent Evalua-
tion Group has formulated 12 criteria against 
which the Bank’s participation and perfor-
mance in global funds can be judged. The In-
dependent Review Panel has rated the Bank’s 
involvement in the CGIAR against those and 
similar criteria (table 7.2). The Bank’s involve-
ment in the CGIAR is assessed as strong in 
some areas, but relatively weak in others. The 
practical overall benefits of continuing a long 
tradition of involvement are high. The Panel 
concludes that the Bank should continue to 
play a leading role on the financial and fund-
ing side of the CGIAR, but should disengage 
from a direct management role.
In summary, previous reform attempts 
have not been successful in addressing the 
dysfunction that is recognized by most share-
holders, stakeholders, and the Centers alike. 
Taken together, the lessons of the CDMT 
reform and the Panel’s analysis suggest that 
there is confusion between the roles of gov-
ernance and the roles of management. The 
primary purpose of creating System-level 
governing bodies such as the Science Coun-
cil, Consultative Group Secretariat, Execu-
tive Council, and various System Office units 
was (or should have been) to provide strate-
gic direction for the CGIAR and the affili-
ated Centers. The individual Centers could 
not accomplish this individually without an 
overarching structure. 
The System-level governing units, how-
ever, have not provided strategic direction 
but, have focused instead on matters typically 
handled at the operational and management 
level of organizations. For example, the Sci-
ence Council takes responsibility for perfor-
mance monitoring, the CGIAR Secretariat 
takes on financial reporting and budgeting, 
and the Executive Council takes on respon-
sibilities for “doing things right” rather than 
focusing on whether the System was “doing 
the right things.” Governance responsibilities 
ensure that structures, functions, processes, 
and culture are aligned with the system’s stra-
tegic objectives and ensure that objectives are 
achieved effectively and transparently.
In the next and final chapter, the Panel 
lays out a model for a balanced partnership be-
tween the CGIAR and the affiliated Centers. 
The Panel recommends a new compact based 
on the separation of governance and manage-
ment. It aims to assist the CGIAR System to 
capture the implications of the Panel’s diag-
noses by addressing the structural impedi-
ments to bringing together the best of science 
and the best of agricultural development in a 
common cause. 
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(2008f). 
CGIAR (2001c), p. 8.6. 
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Project (2000a,b).
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In exceptional cases, where there is strong donor interest 
in maintaining an in-Bank secretariat after three years, 
then this secretariat should be financed 100 percent by 
partners.”
World Bank (2003), p. 27.14. 
World Bank (2003), p. 177.15. 
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The partnership between 
CGIAR Members and 
donors has become 
frayed. The CGIAR 
System needs to find its 
strategic direction. Its main 
funders have been losing 
confidence. Without a new 
compact to rebalance the 
partnership, the CGIAR’s 
decline will continue
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A central finding of this review is that the 
37-year partnership between CGIAR Mem-
bers and donors and CGIAR Centers is a 
strong comparative advantage of the CGIAR. 
No other international arrangement comes 
even close to bringing together development 
agencies and agricultural science in a common 
cause. 
However, the partnership has become 
frayed. The CGIAR System needs to find its 
strategic direction. Its main funders have been 
losing confidence. Without a new compact to 
rebalance the partnership, the CGIAR’s de-
cline will continue.
CGIAR Members and donors must strike 
a new balance among providing unrestricted 
resources to the Centers, achieving greater 
programmatic coherence in funding, and stra-
tegically targeting grants. And resource allo-
cation must be more heavily influenced by the 
Centers’ performance. In return, the Centers 
must take collective responsibility for their 
well-being, collaborate to make the network 
more coherent, act programmatically, make 
firm strategic and organizational decisions, 
and be cost-efficient.
The Panel has identified four actions that 
are most likely to equip the CGIAR to be a 
major institutional force in meeting the new 
agricultural challenges of the 21st century:
The CGIAR’s governance and man-•	
agement functions should be sepa-
rated to avoid conflicts of interest and 
confusion over mandates and author-
ities. Management responsibility for 
operations should be separated from 
oversight.
The donors should set up a new CGIAR •	
Fund for Agricultural  Research—as 
a new channel for predictable, 
unrestricted funding to Centers and 
for restricted funding to programs, 
and as a foundation for fundraising. 
Money should be allocated from the 
CGIAR Fund to Centers and to pro-
grams according to rules and partly 
according to performance. In decid-
ing how much grant funding to chan-
nel through the pooled CGIAR Fund, 
donors should keep in mind their Paris 
Declaration commitment to provide 
two-thirds of their development aid 
on a program basis by 2010.
The Centers should strengthen their •	
institutions for common action by 
consolidating common services, 
common policy and strategy, and 
program administration in a joint 
Consortium.
Both donors and Centers should es-•	
tablish decisionmaking with clear 
authorities. Nonbinding decision-
making no longer works for a col-
lective enterprise that expends half 
a billion public dollars annually—an 
amount that should be expected to 
increase substantially if the above ac-
tions are taken.
The Panel considers that, in addition to 
making the CGIAR generally more effective, 
the recommended governance approach will 
economize. The true costs of governance will 
drop when the dysfunctions of the present 
system are remedied.
The proposed structure 
of the partnership
The Panel envisages a continuing close partner-
ship between CGIAR Members and donors 
Doers and donors— 
a rebalanced partnership
 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt 93
The CGIAR Fund’s key 
responsibilities would be to 
lead funding negotiations, 
to maintain strong links 
with the development 
community and with 
research on poverty 
reduction, and to allocate 
money to programs or 
Centers according to 
agreed criteria and rules
and CGIAR Centers, with a dual structure 
that clarifies responsibilities and authorities. 
This balanced partnership structure will com-
prise the CGIAR Fund, a Consortium, and 
other bridging institutions (figure 8.1).
The CGIAR Fund 
A new instrument, the CGIAR Fund, will 
enable CGIAR donors to raise new funds—
preferably through multiyear replenishment, 
but allowing some donors to be accommo-
dated with a yearly appropriation supple-
mented by indicative figures for future years. 
The Fund would allocate the money strategi-
cally through a performance-based resource 
allocation system, somewhat similar to those 
of the World Bank’s International Develop-
ment Association or the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These 
practices enable agencies to allocate funds 
strategically, while leaving their specific uses 
unrestricted. Performance-based allocations 
would be made according to explicit criteria 
and with explicit weights.
The CGIAR Fund must 
break new ground
The Fund would be governed by a Council 
and would have a Chair, Director, and Secre-
tariat. The inaugural convention would draft 
the Council’s constitution. 
The CGIAR Fund’s decisionmaking 
body—a new Council of the CGIAR Fund—
would be principally a shareholder governing 
body made up of contributing members, in-
cluding foundations. The details of member-
ship would need to be worked out during the 
transition period proposed below. One share-
holder membership option would be to assign 
voting shares on the basis of groupings (con-
stituencies) to accommodate both larger and 
smaller shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The Chair of the CGIAR, traditionally ap-
pointed by the World Bank, would serve as 
the Chair of the Council. 
The CGIAR Fund’s key responsibilities 
would be to lead funding negotiations, to 
maintain strong links with the development 
community and with research on poverty re-
duction, and to allocate money to programs 
or Centers according to agreed criteria and 
rules. It would work to ensure follow-through 
on financial pledges, to receive and hold funds 
provided to it, and to make funds available 
to the Consortium of Centers. In making 
funds available, it would apply the conditions 
and schedules agreed in multiyear financing 
discussions, including agreeing to mutual 
expectations with the Consortium on per-
formance- and results-based reporting, mile-
stones, and benchmarks. It would decide on 
the evaluation work program proposed by an 
independent evaluation unit. It would likely 
need to meet quarterly, with additional fre-
quent meetings, as required, for multiyear fi-
nancing discussions.
The Panel thinks that consensus decision-
making is not appropriate to a body as large 
and complex as the CGIAR Fund. The Coun-
cil of the CGIAR Fund must have proper au-
thorities and clear, formal decisionmaking 
practices. It would look to the best practices 
of similar funds that provide concessionary 
financing for poverty reduction.
There are various options for secretar-
iat support of the CGIAR Fund. The cur-
rent CGIAR Director, and the parts of the 
CGIAR Secretariat and System that are not 
logically part of the operational management 
of the Consortium of Centers, would con-
tinue in support of the CGIAR Fund. The 
Secretariat would need new staff, especially 
for managing financial consultations, strate-
gic planning, and performance management. 
The Secretariat would also need strong capa-
bilities to review funding proposals for consis-
tency with approved three-year strategy and 
results frameworks and to prepare analytical 
assessments of program funding proposals for 
review by the Council of the CGIAR Fund. 
The CGIAR Director and Secretariat 
should provide leadership in securing fi-
nancing (including new sources of funding) 
to meet the complementary needs of inter-
national public goods—the complementary 
work by national agricultural research systems 
(NARS), government agencies, associations, 
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Acting as a catalyst 
to finance and to 
institutional and capacity 
strengthening for strong 
and effective partnerships 
among the CGIAR, 
NARS, and advanced 
research institutes, 
the CGIAR can again 
achieve the synergies 
that enabled the green 
revolution of the 1970s
private firms, and farmers needed to deliver 
those goods to the field. Acting as a catalyst 
to finance and to institutional and capacity 
strengthening for strong and effective part-
nerships among the CGIAR, NARS, and ad-
vanced research institutes, the CGIAR can 
again achieve the synergies that enabled the 
green revolution of the 1970s. 
New ways of allocating funds
Donors would keep appropriate control of 
funds and of their strategic allocation through 
a performance-based allocation system, using 
best practices developed in most major inter-
national financial institutions over the past 
decade. The Panel envisages four distinct win-
dows for funds.
Window 1—stable, long-term fund-•	
ing to guarantee the permanent pro-
vision of certain very high-priority in-
ternational public goods. For example, 
window 1 funding would ensure full 
financing of the Global Crop Diver-
sity Trust through an endowment. 
This would support the genebanks as 
a permanent service to humanity (a 
role assigned to the CGIAR and its 
Centers in the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture).1 
Window 2—multiyear, program-based, •	
pooled funding to programs and Cen-
ters, administered by the Consortium to 
encourage partnerships (as in the Global 
Challenge Programs). Grants from the 
CGIAR Fund to programs would be 
aligned with the CGIAR strategic 
objectives and would meet program-
management and fiduciary require-
ments. Funding partnerships would 
be integral to program approval. Pro-
grams not aligned with the CGIAR’s 
strategic objectives would not attract 
funding from the Resource Alloca-
tion Committee. Window 2 fund-
ing would give continuing support to 
successful programmatic initiatives 
associated with existing and future 
Challenge Programs and Systemwide 
and Ecoregional Programs through 
Center-led consortia. Providing Con-
sortium-level financial management 
for Challenge Programs would also 
address the Panel’s concerns about fi-
nancial oversight and accountability 
in those programs. 
The CGIAR Fund would also 
give performance-based, unrestricted 
grants to Centers. Over time, such 
grants could become the main flow of 
unrestricted funds to the Centers; un-
like today’s grants, they would be allo-
cated according to the CGIAR’s agreed 
results-based strategic framework, and 
would be affected by a Center’s perfor-
mance in the preceding period.
Window 3—grants from bilateral and •	
multilateral donors directly to Centers, 
now subject to greater transparency 
and policy guidance by the joint Con-
sortium. A long-established practice 
would thus, in part, continue. Full 
project-by-project cost recovery would 
be mandatory for all Centers wish-
ing to remain members of the Con-
sortium, and would be monitored by 
the Consortium. Centers would also 
agree to costing rules for services to 
third parties as a condition of Con-
sortium membership.
Window 4—contributions from non-•	
CGIAR members. Accepting such con-
tributions would be subject to the same 
rules set by the Consortium for accept-
ing grants from CGIAR members.
The foundation of this proposal with its 
four windows rests on the requirement that 
the Centers produce a collective strategy 
and results framework with inputs from the 
Fund, the Science Advisory Body, and global 
partners. The strategy must addresses global 
challenges; situate and clearly establish the 
CGIAR comparative advantage; stipulate per-
formance and measurement criteria standards 
and milestones, including those of cost-effec-
tiveness; address means-ends linkages; and 
demonstrate the fiduciary and due diligence 
requirements for accountability. It would set 
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The Consortium would 
enable the Centers to 
manage their common 
interests more coherently 
and strategically and 
provide an instrument 
for common services, 
program coordination 
and administration, and 
results-based management
out Member and donor commitments to fund 
the Consortium and to provide compemen-
tary programs
Assuming that the CGIAR Fund would 
be receiving financial resources each year that 
donors had committed in the previous replen-
ishment-type negotiations, the Fund would 
need to match its cash flows to its grant com-
mitments. It might do that by making unre-
stricted grants to Centers on a rolling three-
year basis, one year firm and two indicative. 
The grant amounts would depend on the size 
of replenishments. 
The aim should be to secure approximately 
66 percent of CGIAR financing on a program 
basis to the second window. This would be 
consistent with the Paris Declaration donor 
objective of assigning that percentage of total 
financing on a program basis (in other words, 
not as project assistance) by 2010.2 As donor 
practice is to report all contributions to multi-
lateral organizations as program financing, a 
66 percent target for the CGIAR would be 
consistent with current practice. Programs 
would be defined by the Fund every three 
years during replenishment-type consulta-
tions. The common “strategy and results 
framework,” developed jointly with the Con-
sortium of Centers, would provide the con-
text for program development.
All strategic programs should have a com-
mon administrative home in the Consortium 
of Centers in order to simplify and improve 
their financial management. A good approach 
might be to have a certain percentage of each 
program grant set aside for administrative, fi-
nancial, and audit support by the Consortium 
(to be paid directly from the fund to the Con-
sortium at the start of each program).
CGIAR donors and partners should take 
into consideration the financial resources re-
quired to ultimately make use of the results of 
CGIAR Centers’ work, the core component 
of the international public goods delivery sys-
tem. This implies responsibility for ensuring 
that there is financing for the complementary 
component of the international public goods 
delivery system, which links the Centers with 
the national and local institutions, agencies, 
firms, and farmers that put the results of Cen-
ters’ work in practice, and that have an impact 
in the field and on people’s lives.
The Consortium
The Centers would have a new, legally incor-
porated instrument, the Consortium. Cen-
ters have expertise in different areas and 
would continue to speak individually to 
those areas. But the Consortium would allow 
them to project a single voice in international 
policy forums, on broad agricultural research 
and development issues, and on global chal-
lenges. Centers would support the Consor-
tium and pay for common services with fees 
and levies.
The Consortium would enable the Cen-
ters to manage their common interests more 
coherently and strategically. It would provide 
an instrument for common services, program 
coordination and administration, and results-
based management. It would be governed by 
a board and would have a Chair and a Chief 
Executive Officer. It would eventually acquire 
enough staff for the Consortium to take over 
common management functions from the 
System Office.
The Consortium’s board would be elected 
by its owners in normal fashion. The Con-
sortium’s founding charter would decide 
questions of equal ownership or ownership 
shares in proportion to the size of Centers. 
The Consortium’s membership could change 
over time, with Centers joining or departing 
or with other entities becoming members. 
A possible set of Consortium Directors 
would include five eminent researchers not 
presently attached to a CGIAR Center, five 
eminent development professionals not pres-
ently attached to a CGIAR Member, and five 
other specialists from different partnership 
entities (such as the Global Forum on Agricul-
tural Research, farmer organizations, nongov-
ernmental organizations, or the private sec-
tor). The Chief Executive Officer, supported 
by staff, would manage the Consortium.
The Panel considers it essential that the 
Consortium be empowered to act on behalf 
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of the Centers under agreed delegations of 
authority incorporated into the Consor-
tium’s charter and bylaws. Such delegations 
would include differentiated requirements, 
with different voting majorities, for executive 
resolutions and for ordinary resolutions. And 
it would clarify what authorities remain with 
the individual Center boards. A task force 
would produce the legal incorporation docu-
ment establishing the framework for the Con-
sortium’s board and the Centers’ boards.
Joint institutions of 
the partnership
The Panel has considered what common 
institutions should be maintained as part of a 
strong partnership between the Centers (and 
their joint Consortium) and the proposed 
CGIAR Fund. It has concluded that there 
should be at least four:
A joint strategy and results frame-•	
work (see below), developed for the 
partnership’s inaugural conference, 
and revisited thereafter as part of 
multiyear financing replenishment-
type negotiations. 
An independent evaluation unit, re-•	
porting to the Council of the CGIAR 
Fund, but working closely with the 
Consortium’s board as well.
A committee of eminent advisors •	
(box 8.1) that might be called the Sci-
ence Council—as now—or, perhaps, 
the Science Advisory Board, to em-
phasize its role as advisor to the entire 
system. (The title might be even more 
broad if a decision were made to in-
clude anti-poverty expertise with sci-
ence expertise.)
A set of occasions for exchanging •	
views, ideas, findings, and informa-
tion among the CGIAR Fund, the 
Consortium, and other partners and 
stakeholders on key issues related to 
the CGIAR. These occasions would 
include a Triennial General Meet-
ing, specialized seminars, and pe-
riodic meetings of CGIAR system 
partners. 
The joint strategy and results framework for the Consortium and 
the CGIAR Fund will require careful monitoring by both parties, 
with regular evaluations focused on the quality and relevance 
of scientific outputs and on progress with partners toward de-
sired outcomes and impacts. For the CGIAR Fund, an indepen-
dent evaluation unit will monitor and evaluate the Consortium’s 
practice of the strategy and progress of Fund commitments. 
The Consortium will work with Center leadership to develop a 
performance management and measurement system to guide 
and monitor its performance against the strategy.
In addition, both the CGIAR Fund and the Consortium will 
need advice on key strategic issues in international agricultural 
research and on emerging threats and opportunities that the 
CGIAR should address with other international agricultural re-
search partners. Such advice will inform the evolution of the 
agreed strategy and the development of programmatic re-
search. For example, the Consortium would need advice on 
strategic issues (such as biosafety and nanotechnology) and 
on partnerships with organizations (such as the Food and Ag-
riculture Organization and the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change) that are relevant to all Centers. Individual Centers 
would organize the scientific advice and partnerships needed 
for their specific research activities. 
The Science Council now monitors, evaluates, assesses, 
and gives its advice on strategy and partnerships for the CGIAR 
System. The Panel believes that both the CGIAR Fund and the 
Consortium will need such a body (referred to as a Science Ad-
visory Board in figure 8.1), and notes that it would be economi-
cal and efficient for that body to support both the CGIAR Fund 
and the Consortium. Clearly the present Science Council could 
become that body. However, the Panel recommends that it do 
so only if three changes are made:
Separate advisory from monitoring and evaluation roles (as •	
proposed above). The Science Council will focus on strategic 
studies, mobilizing science, and impact assessment studies—
but not on monitoring and assessment for accountability.
Improve the Science Council’s advisory role for strategic •	
studies and mobilizing science, which has been compara-
tively neglected.
Establish a positive working relationship with both the Con-•	
sortium and the Fund, based on a shared vision, a commit-
ment to engagement and dialogue, and mutual trust.
Box 8.1 Science and evaluation in the balanced partnership
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CGIAR Members would 
be working within a 
governance structure more 
in accord with the spirit 
of the Paris and Monterey 
Declarations, which 
encourage harmonization 
and encourage Members to 
focus on strategy, resource 
allocation, and oversight 
rather than on ownership 
of projects and operations
Inaugural conference and 
a new reform compact
The Panel believes that no aspect of the new 
governance system can be decided with-
out serious discussions between CGIAR 
members and donors and CGIAR-affili-
ated Centers. Thus, the Panel recommends 
an inaugural conference to agree on a new 
reform compact for the rebalanced partner-
ship and on the requirements for putting it 
into practice. The compact would require 
stipulated changes, both to the Centers’ past 
decisionmaking approaches, and also to the 
Members’ and donors’ past decisionmaking 
approaches.
The Members’ perspective
Agreeing to the proposed rebalanced partner-
ship would bring members five benefits:
The CGIAR Fund would help mem-•	
bers secure the quantum funding ad-
vances for research in agriculture and 
natural resource management that are 
demanded by the food price crisis and 
by the challenges of climate change.
The strategic allocation of pooled •	
funds would enable a programmatic 
approach to investments in research 
on agriculture and natural resource 
management for development.
The balanced partnership structure •	
would clarify authorities and increase 
accountability.
The Centers’ joint Consortium would •	
relieve Members of management re-
sponsibilities. Members would thus 
regain time and energy to focus on 
joint development strategy, resource 
allocation, and  oversight—matters 
that are more important and much 
more appropriate to them than man-
aging Center network operations. 
The partnership could return to its 
earlier form as a forum to discuss ag-
ricultural policy and coordination.
The World Bank would cease to have a •	
real or perceived conflict of interest. 
In exchange for these more valuable gains, 
members would give up certain powers. They 
would:
Stop being the Centers’ quasi-•	
managers.
Face a stronger, more confident, •	
probably more assertive network of 
Centers.
Lose some sovereignty, as the finan-•	
cial contributions that members had 
been making directly to Centers 
would now be partly shared in the 
pooled CGIAR Fund. Nevertheless, 
members would still exercise strategic 
sovereignty through their agreed re-
source allocation framework.
To sum up, the members would be re-
lieved of management responsibilities and 
the conflicts of interest that attend them and 
would instead gain an appropriate instru-
ment for results-based resource allocation, the 
CGIAR Fund. The pooled fund would enable 
members to institute, with the Consortium, a 
results-based framework within which to do 
due diligence on development value for money 
from the Centers—while Centers could track 
progress toward, and lessons learned from, 
joint actions and partnerships for high-level 
outcomes. All would be working within a 
governance structure more in accord with the 
spirit of the Paris and Monterey declarations, 
which encourage harmonization and encour-
age Members to focus on strategy, resource al-
location, and oversight rather than on owner-
ship of projects and operations.
The Centers’ perspective
Agreeing to the proposed rebalanced partner-
ship would bring Centers five benefits:
The new focus on large regional and •	
global challenges would allow the 
Centers to “up their game,” increasing 
their stature and relevance in the eyes 
of the international community.
The new CGIAR Fund would give •	
Centers access to a major new source 
of unrestricted and restricted funds. 
One objective would be a substantial 
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The results-based strategy 
should take into account 
an analysis of developing 
countries’ needs, as well 
as the advantages of the 
Centers, Consortium, 
and fund over other 
agriculture research 
organizations providing 
international public goods
increase in total funding for the Cen-
ters and Programs within the first re-
plenishment period. 
The balanced partnership would im-•	
prove the Centers’ comparative stra-
tegic advantage, not just by bringing 
them substantially increased funds, 
but also by giving them a single entry 
point and a single voice in interna-
tional forums. It would “brand” the 
network of Centers and make its pres-
ence more coherent. 
The joint Consortium’s common ser-•	
vices would increase efficiency, reduc-
ing costs for the Centers.
The balanced partnership would give •	
Centers a strengthened role in the 
joint management of programs. 
These benefits of the balanced partner-
ship model for the common good and mission 
would come to the Centers only with certain 
tradeoffs. The Centers would: 
Cede important decisionmaking •	
powers to the joint Consortium. 
Accept that much of the flow of un-•	
restricted and restricted (program-
matic) funding would come through 
the CGIAR Fund, rather than di-
rectly from individual Members—
and that the Members would allocate 
such funds strategically, partly ac-
cording to Center performance and 
program performance.
Take more responsibility, individu-•	
ally and collectively, for financial risk 
management—if a Center met with 
serious financial difficulties, a bailout 
would be less likely.
Pay significant fees and levies to the •	
joint Consortium to cover its opera-
tions, including joint services to the 
Centers and program administration. 
The Centers might make up part or 
most of this money by recovering funds 
that they had been paying directly for 
System management; still, their costs 
might significantly increase.
Again: by clarifying and rebalancing 
authorities and responsibilities, the new 
governance model would bring long-term 
benefits to all parties.
A results orientation for 
managing implementation and 
monitoring performance
To apply the principles of management for 
results and international public goods in the 
CGIAR System, the CGIAR Fund and the 
Consortium will need to agree on a results-
based strategy—stating a vision, articulating a 
clear mission statement, and specifying a lim-
ited number of strategic goals for the system 
over 5–10 years. The results-based strategy 
should take into account an analysis of devel-
oping countries’ needs, as well as the advan-
tages of the Centers, Consortium, and fund 
over other agriculture research organizations 
providing international public goods.
From the new results-based strategy, a new 
results framework should articulate and quan-
tify key outcomes for funders, global partners, 
and Centers (at the global, regional, and na-
tional levels) to achieve jointly. The key out-
comes would be articulated at a high level of 
aggregation with measurable goals and stated 
targets. They would inform the new perfor-
mance contracts—between the Fund and the 
Consortium and between the Consortium 
and the Centers—for managing implementa-
tion and monitoring performance.
A good results system uses as few indica-
tors as possible—just enough for managing 
performance at a given level, to achieve objec-
tives one level up. A one-entry, multiple-use 
information system would support senior-
scientist performance management needs 
and underpin aggregation to high-level results 
reports for use by Center management and 
Board members. A few vital indicators would 
roll up from there, to report performance on 
progress toward CGIAR strategic objectives 
and crosscutting program objectives.
Considerable work will be needed to es-
tablish a systemwide CGIAR strategic frame-
work linked to international public goods 
delivery systems. But that work has good pros-
pects for yielding highly significant benefits. 
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The proposed strategic Performance Measure-
ment System (figure 8.2) would help donors 
align their funding and programs toward 
shared desired outcomes, and it would help 
them harmonize their processes. It would sup-
port strategic decisions, the replenishment of 
the CGIAR Fund, and allocations to specific 
programs—supporting the funding of larger 
program “buckets” through performance con-
tracts between the Consortium and Centers. 
An integrated system for collecting higher-
level results would build trust through evi-
dence, enabling donors to do their own re-
porting without returning repeatedly to the 
Centers for information.
The proposed system would guide the di-
verse work of various Centers toward com-
mon objectives. Having a results information 
system that cuts across Centers does not mean 
that the Centers will be doing the same work. 
Instead, different Centers—through their 
different outputs—will aim at shared strate-
gic objectives: for example, food productivity 
increases, better policies increase poor farm-
ers to trade internationally, or better evidence 
of health from higher nutrient foods.
Transition arrangements
There is now a window of opportunity for 
reforming the CGIAR. The world food price 
crisis demands immediate action. The Panel 
recommends making funds available to take 
advantage of existing programming and to 
advance program design—to make the most 
of past investments while engaging cutting-
edge science.
Should the CGIAR and the Centers 
choose to move to a partnership structure 
such as that outlined in this Review, the Panel 
recommends an eight-month transition with 
two six-person task forces. One task force, led 
by the World Bank, would propose the details 
of the CGIAR Fund. The other task force, led 
by a chairperson designated by the Centers, 
would formulate the details for legal incor-
poration in a jurisdiction that the task force 
would select in consultation with the Cen-
ters. The two task forces would present their 
proposals at the inaugural conference for the 
launch of the compact.
The World Bank would be expected to 
take a major leadership role, in and beyond 
the transition, by mobilizing support and in-
creased funding for the changed relationships 
and the renewed partnership. Agriculture 
has returned to the center of international 
political economy, and a revitalized CGIAR 
can play a major part in producing the new 
technologies that will be essential to food ad-
equacy and food security in the years ahead. 
But the CGIAR and others must do more 
Source: Independent Review Panel.
Figure 8.2 A strategic Performance Measurement System for the CGIAR 
Triennial Joint General Meeting
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than produce needed new technologies. There 
must also be the capacity for adapting and ap-
plying such technologies to local conditions. 
The international donor community should 
reflect on all the factors that were required 
for the green revolution of the 1970s. Those 
factors included strong Centers in a support-
ive CGIAR. They also included massive, com-
plementary investments in Asian countries to 
support agricultural development strategies, 
technology, and delivery systems, includ-
ing solid support to the NARS to adapt and 
spread the new technologies.
Absent a return to that 1970s vision that 
linked the CGIAR, NARS, and advanced 
research institutes in a functioning, mutu-
ally supportive partnership, a restructured 
CGIAR will turn out to be just one more 
missed opportunity and a source of further 
frustration. It will also be a tragedy for the 
world’s poor and vulnerable, especially in 
Africa.
Notes
The role of the CGIAR in genebanks is an explicit 1. 
component of the executive safeguarding of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Intended to ensure the 
use of plant genetic resources based on the principle 
of easy access and exchange, the treaty is consigned 
by international agreement to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization. The treaty assigns responsibility for 
the world’s most important gene bank collections, 
around 600,000 samples, to the CGIAR. However, the 
financing arrangements to safeguard the treaty and 
its components remain incomplete. The treaty has 
mechanism for funding genetic resource collections: 
the Global Crop Diversity Trust set up jointly by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the CGIAR. To 
date the trust has raised funding pledges of more than 
$140 million. Of this, more than $100 million is in an 
endowment, generating an annual income of about 
$4.5 million. The target for the endowment, however, 
was $260 million, leaving a large gap in the financing 
required to ensure the safeguarding and continuous 
development of this international public good. The result 
is that implementation of the treaty depends on annual 
donor contributions. This situation is at fundamental 
variance with the nature of international public goods. 
Financing for these international public goods should 
be guaranteed, based on a careful study of recurrent 
cost requirements, and considered independently of 
arrangements for other international public goods and 
activities the CGIAR performs. A possible approach to 
strengthen the Global Crop Diversity Trust and close 
the financing gap could be through an annual assessed 
contribution of all signatory countries to the Treaty. 
The CGIAR’s Systemwide Genetic Resources Program 
highlights the genebank’s financing gap in its July 
2008 paper “Mapping Our Future: Sustaining CGIAR’s 
Genebanks for greater Impact” (SGRP 2008).
OECD/DAC (n.d.) Indicators of Progress.2. 
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History
The Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was created 
in 1971 as an informal association of donors. 
Supporting four international agricultural 
research Centers that the Ford and Rocke-
feller Foundations had established previously, 
the CGIAR was to serve “both as a mecha-
nism for coordinating donor policies and 
actions and as an informal forum for discus-
sion.”1 Because the founding donors wanted 
the CGIAR to have an informal character, 
they created it without a charter, rules of 
procedure, or bylaws governing membership. 
Decisionmaking was to be by consensus.2
Since the CGIAR’s inception its member-
ship has grown (from 17 to 64), and there are 
now 15 CGIAR-supported Centers (down 
from a high of 18). The research agenda has 
become more complex, and attention to 
stakeholder input has increased. As a result, 
the CGIAR System has become more com-
plex than it was earlier, with multiple layers of 
committees and service units supporting it.
Mission
The current mission of the CGIAR is “to 
achieve sustainable food security and to reduce 
poverty in developing countries through sci-
entific research and research-related activities 
in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
policy, and environment.”3
Each Center has its own mission state-
ment that reflects its work.
Governing Principles
Six governing principles have formed the basis 
of the CGIAR since its founding: 
Member sovereignty.•	
Center autonomy.•	
Independent scientific advice.•	
Consensus decisionmaking.•	
Informal status (the only legal entities •	
are the 15 independent Centers).
Nonpolitical nature.•	
Membership
The CGIAR currently includes 64 Mem-
bers: 25 developing countries, 22 industri-
alized countries, 4 private foundations, and 
13 regional and international organizations 
(table A1.1).
After a significant expansion of Mem-
bers in the 1990s, notably from developing 
countries, membership has stabilized in re-
cent years. Since 2001, there have been only 
six new Members (Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Turkey, the Syngenta Foundation for Sustain-
able Agriculture, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council). Over the years, two Members (Le-
verhulme Foundation and Saudi Arabia) have 
officially left the CGIAR.
To be a Member, a Member must agree to:
Support the mission and objectives of •	
the CGIAR. 
Participate in the deliberations of the •	
CGIAR.
Serve on its committees. •	
Make a minimum yearly cash contri-•	
bution of $500,000 toward support-
ing CGIAR-approved research pro-
grams or CGIAR System governance 
mechanisms.
In 2006, 15 Members had the status of 
“Member-observers” because they had not paid 
their minimum contributions for the previ-
ous two calendar years. In 2007 there were 11 
Member-observers.4 Member-observers may 
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attend the Annual General Meeting and par-
ticipate in face-to-face and virtual discussions, 
but may not participate in decisionmaking nor 
sit on the Executive Council. As a result, in 
2006–07, 40 percent of developing country 
Members effectively could not participate in 
CGIAR governance. To recognize the impor-
tance of the voices of developing countries in 
CGIAR governance, the CGIAR’s Third Sys-
tem Review in 1998 recommended that the 
CGIAR officially recognize in-kind contri-
butions.5 So far, in-kind contributions are not 
counted toward membership contributions.
The President of the World Bank nomi-
nates the CGIAR’s Chair. Since 1974, the 
Chair has been a World Bank Vice President or 
Senior Vice President in charge of agriculture.
Among the CGIAR’s Members, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the World Bank are CGIAR 
cosponsors.6 
The CGIAR’s Charter states that 
 cosponsors provide the Chair with continu-
ity, strengthen the international character of 
the CGIAR System, and serve as an informal 
policy advisory group to the Chair. Cospon-
sors also are intended to “assist the CGIAR in 
crisis management, should the need arise.”7 
The System
The CGIAR does not exist as a formal 
organization. It is an informal network of 
independent institutions (Members and Cen-
ters) that have agreed to work together around 
a mutually accepted mission. 
The network refers to itself as the “CGIAR 
System” (box A1.1). Its chief parts are: 
The Consultative Group on Inter-•	
national Agricultural Research (the 
Members). 
The Science Council, which provides •	
independent scientific advice to the 
Consultative Group. 
The 15 independent international •	
agricultural research centers (the 
Centers). 
These independent parts of the system are 
supported by the Executive Council (ExCo), 
various standing committees, and the System 
Office (a group of service units).
The ExCo of the CGIAR is chiefly a com-
mittee of shareholders (Members), expanded 
to include stakeholders. Industrial and de-
veloping country Members are represented 
equally. The ExCo also includes a seat for the 
Science Council Chair, an Alliance represen-
tative, the Global Forum on Agricultural Re-
search, and one representative each from civil 
society and from the private sector (who serve 
as full members).
In 2005, the CGIAR Centers formed an 
Alliance to strengthen and guide their collec-
tive work.8 The Board Chairs of all 15 Centers 
sit on the Alliance Board, and the Centers’ Di-
rectors General form an Alliance Executive.
The CGIAR’s two advisory committees 
are the Science Council and the Genetic Re-
sources Policy Committee. Its two partnership 
Countries Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Peru, The Philippines, Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States
Foundations Ford Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture
Organizations African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Asian Development 
Bank, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Inter-American Development Bank, International Development Research 
Centre, International Fund for Agricultural Development, OPEC Fund for International Development, 
United Nations Development Program, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank
Source: CGIAR Secretariat.
Table A1.1 CGIAR Members
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committees have been the Private Sector Com-
mittee and the NGO Committee (though the 
latter was dissolved in 2006).9 The Group or 
the ExCo also create ad hoc committees on 
particular issues when needed.
In 1998 the Third System Review called 
for streamlining the CGIAR’s committee 
structure. Indeed, there are fewer standing 
committees today than there were in 1997 
(table A1.2). Since 1998 the only addition to 
the standing committee structure has been 
the ExCo.10 There are no longer standing com-
mittees on oversight, programs, or finance. A 
Science Council replaced the Technical Ad-
visory Committee. The NGO Committee, 
inactive since 2002, was dissolved in 2006. 
The Alliance Executive replaced the Center 
Directors’ Committee (CDC), and the Alli-
ance Board replaced the Committee of Board 
Chairs (CBC). The Impact Assessment and 
Evaluation Group (IAEG) is now part of 
the Science Council, as is the Standing Panel 
on Impact Assessment (SPIA). The Public 
Awareness and Resource Mobilization Com-
mittee (PARC) no longer exists. 
With the elimination of some CGIAR 
standing committees, important functions of 
the CGIAR cannot be carried out. Dissolv-
ing the ExCo Finance and Program Commit-
tees left the System without enough financial 
oversight. That is why, at the 2007 Annual 
General Meeting, the CGIAR decided to 
create an ad hoc Finance Committee of the 
ExCo.11 
Communications used to be a responsibil-
ity of the now defunct PARC. There has been 
a consolidation of communication functions 
within the CGIAR Secretariat over the past 
year. Outreach to media has been successful, 
but more strategic uses of communications 
Calling the CGIAR a “System” is somewhat misleading. It assumes that the different entities 
interact in organized or coherent ways—and that they are organized to heighten interactions, 
positive feedback, and production. It also implies that there is one identifiable central authority 
with some semblance of a legal personality. That is not the case with the CGIAR, which has no 
one cognitive structure or legal personality. Other defining features of systems include shared 
objectives and concrete performance measures—none of which the CGIAR has. The CGIAR is 
a group, not a system.
Box A1.1 Is the CGIAR a “System”?
Committee 1997 2003 2007
CGIAR Executive Executive Council (ExCo) ExCo
Oversight
Finance Committee ExCo Finance Committee
Oversight Committee ExCo Program Committee
Advisory
Technical Advisory Committee Science Council Science Council
Genetic Resources Policy Committee (GRPC) GRPC GRPC
Partnership
NGO Committee (NGOC) NGOC
Private Sector Committee (PSC) PSC PSC
Centers
Center Directors’ Committee (CDC) CDC Alliance Executive
Committee of Board Chairs (CBC) CBC Alliance Board
Other
Impact Assessment Evaluation Group (IAEG)
Public Awareness and Resource 
Mobilization Committee (PARC)
PARC
Source: Strong er al. 1998; World Bank 2003; www.cgiar.org.
Table A1.2 CGIAR System active standing committees, 1997–2007
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and social marketing throughout the CGIAR 
System are possible.
Following recommendations from the 
2001 Change Design and Management pro-
cess, the CGIAR established the CGIAR 
System Office in that year. The virtual office 
includes nine units:
The CGIAR Secretariat (hosted by •	
the World Bank).
The Science Council Secretariat •	
(hosted by the FAO).
The Alliance Office (currently hosted •	
by the IFAD).
The Central Advisory Service on Intel-•	
lectual Property (hosted by Bioversity).
The Chief Information Office/ •	
Information and Communication 
 Technology–Knowledge Manage-
ment (hosted by Bioversity).
The Gender and Diversity (hosted by •	
the World Agroforestry Centre).
The Strategic Advisory Service for •	
Human Resources (no host Center 
identified at the time of this writing; 
previously hosted by WorldFish).
The Internal Audit (hosted by •	
IRRI).
The Media Unit (hosted by ILRI).•	
Some of these units predate 2001. To en-
hance the efficiency, responsiveness, and over-
all performance of each unit, the CGIAR’s 
System Office brought them together.
At its 2007 Annual General Meeting, the 
CGIAR decided on the following changes to 
the System Office: 
Transform the Gender and Diversity •	
Program into a systemwide program.
Transfer the Human Resource unit’s •	
function to the CGIAR Secretariat.
Remove the Science Council Secre-•	
tariat from the System Office.
Transfer the Media Unit into the •	
Communications Team (CGIAR 
Secretariat).
Conducting business
The CGIAR conducts its business at an 
Annual General Meeting, usually in early 
December, and through the ExCo. The ExCo 
meets semi-annually and—when decision-
making authority has been delegated to 
the ExCo on specific  matters—acts for the 
CGIAR between meetings on matters del-
egated to it. 
Decisions taken at the Annual General 
Meeting and at ExCo meetings are nonbind-
ing. According to the Charter, “[d]ecisions 
reached by the CGIAR have the force of 
commitment to the mission and objectives of 
the Group, though the CGIAR has no legal 
status. The Group’s decisions do not preempt 
policymaking on the same issue by sovereign 
governments or other institutions whose rep-
resentatives form the CGIAR.”12
Overall CGIAR funding
In 2007, the overall research agenda of the 
CGIAR (Centers and Challenge Programs) 
received $495 million in funding. Other sources 
of revenue, such as interest, produced an addi-
tional $25 million, for a total of $520 million 
(figure A1.1). Of the $495 million in contribu-
tions, CGIAR Members contributed $437 mil-
lion (88.4 percent). Nonmembers contributed 
the remaining $57 million (11.6 percent).
While overall funding has continued to 
increase nominally over the years, the buying 
power of Centers has remained fairly flat when 
adjustments are made for inflation. Mean-
while the research agenda has expanded—for 
example, to Challenge Programs. Thus, the 
Centers (and their partners) are being asked 
to do more with less.
The quality and quantity of funds are 
in question. The share of all funding that is 
project-based (restricted) has risen in recent 
years. In 2007, 36 percent of total funds were 
considered unrestricted and the remaining 
64 percent were restricted. That is almost an 
exact inversion of the situation in 1995, when 
63 percent of funds were unrestricted and 37 
percent were restricted. 
The European Community, the United 
States, the World Bank, and the United King-
dom were the four largest contributors to the 
CGIAR in 2007, with Canada a somewhat 
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distant fifth.13 Together, these five donors ac-
counted for exactly half of all contributions to 
the CGIAR’s research agenda in 2007. Con-
tributions from developing country Members 
made up 3 percent of overall funding.
Contributions from nonmembers have 
risen steadily over the past few years. The $57 
million contributed by nonmembers in 2007 
is a marked increase over the $4.6 million in 
1992. For 2008 CGIAR Centers received 
$106 million in grants from the Bill & Me-
linda Gates Foundation, to be disbursed over 
three years. The foundation will rank among 
the top 10 contributors to the CGIAR despite 
not being a Member. This ranking will likely 
persist until the end of the grant period.14
Nonmember funding varies widely across 
Centers. At the extremes, 22 percent of 2007 
funds for CIMMYT came from non members, 
while nonmembers provided only 2.5 percent 
of funds for ICARDA (table A1.3).
The work of the CGIAR Centers 
The CGIAR currently supports 15 interna-
tional agricultural research Centers. Except 
for two, all are in developing countries. For 
analysis, they can be distinguished according 
to their mandates and so clustered into four 
groups: commodity Centers, ecoregional 
Centers, natural resource management Cen-
ters, and policy Centers (table A1.4).15
Locations of CGIAR regional 
and country offices
Collectively, the 15 Centers have some 203 
regional or country offices in 68 countries 
worldwide (table A1.5). Seventy-five percent 
of all regional or country offices are in Sub-
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports 1995–2007 adjusted for inflation index, 2007 base.
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Figure A1.1 Restricted and unrestricted funding for CGIAR
Center
Percent of total 
funding outcome
Africa Rice Centre 4.9
Bioversity 4.4
CIAT 11.5
CIFOR 7.1
CIMMYT 21.5
CIP 13.1
ICARDA 2.5
ICRISAT 11.2
IFPRI 15.9
IITA 12.6
ILRI 8.2
IRRI 5.2
IWMI 3.0
World Agroforestry 19.0
WorldFish 5.3
Source: 2007 CGIAR Financial Report.
Table A1.3 Nonmember funding 
by Center, 2007
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Saharan Africa (41 percent) and East Asia 
and the Pacific (34 percent). All Centers have 
offices in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 13 have 
offices in East Asia and the Pacific. Only six 
Centers are in either Latin America or Cen-
tral and West Asia and North Africa.
Of the 203 regional or country offices 
throughout the world, Centers indicate just 
over half share facilities, services, or resources 
with, or are hosted by, other CGIAR Centers 
or national research partners. 
CGIAR Center staff
In 2008, the Centers collectively employ 7,716 
staff, of whom 2 percent are managers and 13 
percent are scientists (table A1.7). Total scien-
tific and technical staff represent 43 percent 
Center Headquarters’ location
Year  
established
Year  
joined CGIAR
2007 funding 
outcome
(US$ millions) Mandate
Commodity Centers
Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) Cotonou, Benin 1970 1975 10.2 Rice production in West Africa
International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT)
Mexico City, Mexico 1966 1971 43.3 Wheat, maize, triticale
International Potato Center (CIP) Lima, Peru 1970 1973 26.0 Potato, sweet potato
International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI)
Nairobi, Kenya 1995a 1995 35.2 Livestock diseases, cattle, sheep, 
goats, feed and production systems 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) Los Banos, Philippines 1960 1971 32.5 Rice and rice-based ecosystems
Ecoregional Centers
International Center for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT)
Cali, Colombia 1967 1971 45.1 Beans, cassava, tropical forages, rice, 
hillsides, forest margins, savannas
International Center for Agricultural 
Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA)
Aleppo, Syria 1975 1975 27.7 Barley, lentils, fava beans, durum and 
bread wheats, chickpeas, pasture and 
forage legumes; small ruminants; on-
farm water management; rangelands
International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)
Patancheru, India 1972 1972 37.4 Sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet, 
chickpea, pigeon pea, groundnut; 
sustainable production systems 
for the semi-arid tropics
International Institute of 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA)
Ibadan, Nigeria 1967 1971 45.1 Soybean, maize, cassava, cowpea, banana, 
plantain, yams; sustainable production 
systems for the humid lowland tropics
Natural resource management Centers
Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR)
Bogor, Indonesia 1993 1993 18.2 Sustainable forestry management
International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI)b
Colombo, Sri Lanka 1984 1991 23.5 Irrigation and water resource management
World Agroforestryc Nairobi, Kenya 1977 1991 31.5 Agroforestry; multipurpose trees 
WorldFishd Penang, Malaysia 1977 1992 15.1 Sustainable aquatic resource management
Policy Centers
Bioversitye Rome, Italy 1974 1974 39.0 Plant genetic resources of crops 
and forages; collection and 
gene pool conservation
International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI)
Washington, DC, United States 1974 1980 46.4 Socioeconomic research related 
to agricultural development 
a. Created in 1995 through the merger of the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (established in 1973) and the International Livestock Center for Africa (established in 1974). 
b. Formerly the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI)
c. Formerly the International Centre for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF)
d. Formerly the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM)
e. Formerly the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), and previous to that, the International Board on Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR). 
Source: OED 2003; www.cgiar.org; CGIAR Secretariat.
Table 2.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centers
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Region
Centers with 
Regional 
Offices
Regional 
Offices Countries Locations
Sub-Saharan Africa 15 84 21 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
East Asia and the Pacific 13 69 19 Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, People’s Democratic 
Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
New Caledonia, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam
Central and West Asia and North Africa 6 27 16 Afghanistan, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen
Latin America 6 16 8 Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru
Europe and North America 3 7 4 Belgium, France, Italy, United States
Total 93 203 68
Source: Personal communication with Center staff.
Table A1.5 Numbers of CGIAR Centers, regional offices, and countries by region
Center Africa
East Asia and 
the Pacific
Central and 
West Asia and 
North Africa Latin America
Europe 
and North 
America Total
Africa Rice 5 0 0 0 0 5
Bioversity 4 4 2 2 3 15
CIAT 6 3 0 4 3 16
CIFOR 6 3 0 2 0 11
CIMMYT 3 4 5 2 0 14
CIP 5 9 1 3 0 18
ICARDA 1 1 16 0 0 18
ICRISAT 5 2 0 0 0 7
IFPRI 5 2 0 0 1 8
IITA 11 0 0 0 0 11
ILRI 6 5 0 0 0 11
IRRI 3 12 0 0 0 15
IWMI 4 9 2 0 0 15
World Agroforestry 16 7 0 3 0 26
WorldFish 4 8 1 0 0 13
Source: Personal communication with Center staff.
Table A1.6 Numbers of CGIAR regional and country offices, combined, by region
of all employees. Most staff are from Group 2 
countries (Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
The share of women in management posi-
tions has fallen since 2003; but the share of 
women in science positions has risen, and the 
total share of women in management and sci-
ence positions combined has risen. Similarly, 
diversity (staff from Group 2 countries) has 
fallen among managers, though it has risen 
among scientists. 
CGIAR Center public goods assets
Eleven CGIAR Centers collectively hold 
over 650,000 samples of crop, forage, and 
agro forestry genetic resources in the pub-
lic domain. These germplasm collections are 
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held in trust for humanity through the Inter-
national Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture. The Treaty recog-
nizes the CGIAR Centers’ collections as a 
central pillar of global conservation efforts. 
The collections, among the world’s largest, 
are arguably the most important anywhere 
for addressing global food security and pov-
erty alleviation. A global public good, they are 
available to all researchers.
The Centers’ germplasm collections are 
complemented by several networks and data-
bases operated by the Centers. They include, 
among others, the Systemwide Information 
Network for Genetic Resources (SINGER), 
the International Crop Information System 
(ICIS), and the Agricultural Science and 
Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative. 
Two other CGIAR-supported databases, re-
lated to fisheries and coral reefs, are FishBase 
and ReefBase.
CGIAR Center governance
Each Center is an independent legal entity 
with its own governing board. In 2006, there 
were 188 board members across the 15 Cen-
ters. Of those, 59 percent came from develop-
ing countries, and 34 percent were women.16 
The Boards of Trustees of the individual Cen-
ters meet independently on a schedule set in 
each Center’s bylaws. 
The Alliance of CGIAR Centers conducts 
business through biannual meetings of the 
Alliance Board and the Alliance Executive. 
The Board and Executive meet both sepa-
rately and together. Decisions of the Alli-
ance are made by consensus where possible, 
by vote when necessary. Alliance decisions 
are binding.17
CGIAR Center funding
In 2007, IFPRI had the largest budget of any 
of the CGIAR’s 15 Centers ($46.4 million); 
Africa Rice had the smallest ($10.2 million). 
Table A1.8 shows how overall funds were 
distributed among the Centers. In 2007 the 
ecoregional Centers accounted for the largest 
share (32.7 percent) of total funds. 
Collectively, however, the commod-
ity Centers have seen their share of overall 
funds fall since 2001, while the other three 
groups of Centers have seen their shares rise. 
Eight Centers saw their individual shares 
(percentages) of overall funds rise between 
2001 and 2007: Bioversity, CIAT, CIFOR, 
ICRISAT, IFPRI, ILRI, IWMI, and World 
Agroforestry.
Center research and the 
CGIAR research agenda
In 2005, after an in-depth consultative pro-
cess, the Science Council presented 20 sys-
tem priorities for the CGIAR System for 
2005–15. The 20 priorities are clustered in 
five major areas:
Priority Area 1, sustaining biodiversity •	
for current and future generations.
Grouping
Total Managers Scientists
2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008
Total 7,651 7,716 146 136 925 1,020
Women 2,057 (27%) 2,225 (29%) 13 (9%) 25 (18%) 182 (20%) 267 (26%)
Group 2 countries 6,843 (89%) 7,095 (92%) 67 (46%) 48 (35%) 533 (58%) 675 (66%)
Note: The human resources survey conducted by the Gender and Diversity Program used the following definitions: management is the level of manage-
ment immediately below Director General. It includes Deputy Directors General, Challenge Program Leaders, Directors of major programs, research 
program heads, and heads of administration; scientists are those who initiate, develop, lead and carry out science projects, and who initiate, develop 
and sustain partnerships with their Center’s partners. It includes scientists ranging in rank from Post-Doctoral Fellow to Principal Scientist; Region 2 
refers to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. We have paraphrased this definition to call it developing countries. 
Source: Gender and Diversity Program, 2008, Report on the CGIAR human resources survey 2008.
Table A1.7 Gender and diversity in CGIAR Centers’ staffing, 2003 and 2008
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Priority Area 2, producing more and •	
better food at lower costs through ge-
netic improvement.
Priority Area 3, reducing rural pov-•	
erty through agricultural diversi-
fication and emerging opportuni-
ties for high-value commodities and 
products.
Priority Area 4, promoting poverty •	
alleviation and sustainable man-
agement of water, land, and forest 
resources.
Priority Area 5, improving policies •	
and facilitating institutional innova-
tion to support sustainable reduction 
of poverty and hunger.
The Science Council also stated, how-
ever, that up to 20 percent of Center research 
should be in frontier research, stand-alone 
training, and development activities (all of 
which are outside the five priority areas).
The System Priorities are now being sup-
planted by a small set of broader, more re-
sults-oriented strategic objectives as part of 
the CGIAR’s Change Management initia-
tive. Still, the older System Priorities use-
fully represent the Centers’ collective core 
competencies.
In 2007, the Centers’ Medium Term Plans 
collectively showed 137 major project areas, 
including individual Center projects, Chal-
lenge Programs and systemwide programs.18
In 2007 genetic improvement represented 
the largest percentage of overall Center ex-
penditures (24 percent), followed by policies 
and institutional innovation (23 percent), in-
tegrated natural resource management (22 
percent), sustaining biodiversity (12 percent), 
and diversification and high-value commodi-
ties (11 percent; table A1.9). Nonpriority areas 
accounted for only about 7 percent of total ex-
penditures. The accuracy of this representation 
Center 1992 2001 2007
Commodity Centers 41.1 36.7 30.9
Africa Rice 3.0 2.7 2.1
CIMMYT 9.8 11.9 9.1
CIP 6.5 5.7 5.5
ILRI 8.9 7.3 7.4
IRRI 12.9 9.2 6.8
Ecoregional Centers 37.8 30.4 32.7
CIAT 10.1 8.3 9.5
ICARDA 5.7 6.4 5.8
ICRISAT 10.8 6.2 7.9
IITA 11.2 9.6 9.5
Natural resource management Centers 9.8 17.2 18.5
CIFOR 1.0 3.7 3.8
IWMI 2.8 3.3 4.9
World Agroforestry 3.9 6.5 6.6
WorldFish 2.1 3.7 3.2
Policy Centers 11.2 15.7 17.9
Bioversity 3.9 6.7 8.2
IFPRI 4.1 6.6 9.7
ISNAR 3.3 2.4 n/a
n/a is not applicable. 
Source: World Bank 2003; CGIAR Financial Reports.
Table A1.8 Funding by Center in 1992, 2001, and 2007 as a percentage of CGIAR’s total funding
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of Centers’ work is unclear. Also unclear is 
whether Centers have been reluctant to char-
acterize expenditures as nonpriority.
In 2007, 77 percent of total CGIAR in-
vestments were directed at Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and Asia (table A1.10). Investments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have grown steadily, from 
39 percent of the total in 1992 to 48 percent 
in 2007. 
Systemwide and 
ecoregional programs
Besides research undertaken by individual 
Centers, CGIAR research also includes inter-
Center and systemwide programs. There are 
now 17 such programs (table A1.11).
Besides these, the Centers also collaborate 
on a handful of other initiatives such as the 
Systemwide Information Network for Ge-
netic Resources and the Consortium for Spa-
tial Information.
CGIAR Challenge Programs
Following a recommendation from the 
2001 Change Design and Management 
Team, the CGIAR created Challenge Pro-
grams for collaborative research in 2003. 
A CGIAR Challenge Program is a “time-
bound, independently- governed program 
of high-impact research that targets the 
CGIAR goals in relation to complex issues 
of overwhelming global and/or regional sig-
nificance, and requires partnerships among a 
wide range of institutions in order to deliver 
its products.”19 Challenge Programs were 
added to the existing work and financing of 
the Centers. The Change Design and Man-
agement Team envisioned that within five 
years, CGIAR financing would expand sig-
nificantly and Challenge Programs would 
account for 50 percent of overall CGIAR 
financing.20
Initially, the CGIAR launched three 
Challenge Programs: Water and Food, Gen-
eration, and HarvestPlus. At its 2004 An-
nual General Meeting, the CGIAR approved 
a fourth Challenge Program, Sub-Saharan 
Africa. All four are now under way (table 
A1.12). In May 2008 ExCo approved a fifth 
System priority area
US$ 
millions
Percent 
of total
Sustaining biodiversity 60 12.3
Genetic improvement 118 24.1
Diversification and 
high-value commodities 54 11.0
Integrated natural 
resource management 109 22.3
Policies and institutional 
innovation 112 22.9
Subtotal 453 92.6
Development activities 14 2.9
Standalone training 9 1.8
New research areas 13 2.7
Subtotal 36 7.4
Total 489 100
Source: 2008 Financing Plan.
Table A1.9 Centers’ expenditure by 
priority area, 2007
Percent of total
Region 1992 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sub-Saharan Africa 39 43 43 45 45 47 46 48
Asia 33 31 33 32 32 32 30 29
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 16 17 15 14 14 12 14 13
Central and West Asia 
and North Africa 12 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Note: Percentages restated in 2007 to exclude Challenge Program partner expenses.
Source: 2007 CGIAR Annual Report; CGIAR Secretariat; World Bank 2003.
Table A1.10 CGIAR investments by region
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Challenge Program, on Climate Change, for 
development.
With the exception of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa Challenge Program, which is convened 
by the Forum for Agricultural Research in 
Africa (FARA), a different CGIAR Center 
convenes each program. Each Challenge Pro-
gram has an independent governing board.
The CGIAR reports that revenues for the 
Challenge Programs totaled $48 million in 
Program Convening Center
Alternatives to Slash and Burn World Agroforestry Centre
Global Mountain Program CIP
African Highlands Initiative World Agroforestry Centre
Collaborative Research Program for Sustainable Agricultural 
Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus
ICARDA
Desert Margins Program ICRISAT
Rice-Wheat Consortium for the Indo-Gangetic Plains CIMMYT
Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion (CONDESAN) CIP
Systemwide Initiative on Urban and Periurban Agriculture CIP
Consortium for the Sustainable Use of Inland Valley Agroecosystems in Sub-Saharan Africa Africa Rice Centre
Participatory Research and Gender Analysis CIAT
Systemwide Initiative on HIV/AIDS Africa Rice Centre
Systemwide Initiative on Water Management IWMI
Systemwide Genetic Resources Program Bioversity
Systemwide Livestock Program ILRI
Systemwide Program on IPM CIP
Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights IFPRI
Systemwide Program on Malaria and Agriculture IWMI
Source: http://www.cgiar.org.
Table A1.11 Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs
Challenge Program
Convening Center/
organization Year established Focus
Generation CIMMYT 2003 To use plant genetic diversity, advanced 
genomic science, and comparative biology to 
develop tools and technologies that help plant 
breeders in the developing world produce better 
crop varieties for resource-poor farmers.
HarvestPlus CIAT, IFPRI 2003 To improve human nutrition by breeding, through 
a process called biofortification, new varieties 
of staple food crops consumed by the poor 
that have higher levels of micronutrients.
Sub-Saharan Africa FARA 2003 To address the most significant constraints 
to reviving agriculture in Africa—failures of 
agricultural markets, inappropriate policies, 
and natural resource degradation—with 
a new paradigm, Integrated Agricultural 
Research for Development.
Water and Food IWMI 2004 To improve the productivity of water in river 
basins in ways that are pro-poor, gender 
equitable and environmentally sustainable
Source: http://www.cgiar.org.
Table A1.12 Challenge Program project summaries
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2007. (CGIAR practice is to count revenue 
only when the funds have been spent.) Such 
revenues over the history of the Challenge 
Programs are shown in table A1.13. Chal-
lenge Program financing can also be viewed 
based on cash receipts recorded in total by 
the convening Center each year. In this way, 
table A1.14 reflects actual funding available 
to the individual programs from 2004–07. 
The Challenge Programs have certainly 
brought new funding to the CGIAR. But 
how much is unclear—indeed it is nearly im-
possible to see. For example, although fund-
ing to the Challenge Programs by the Gates 
Foundation is clearly new funding, some do-
nors (for example, the World Bank) appear 
to have shifted at least part of their contri-
butions away from Centers to Challenge 
Programs.
The character of the CGIAR
The CGIAR is characterized by complexity, 
with many institutions in different countries 
of different ages and with different cultures, 
purposes, and focuses. This complex institu-
tional arrangement has evolved over 37 years. 
Another characteristic of the CGIAR is 
uncertainty—especially about funding and, 
hence, about the reform agenda of the past 
decade. These uncertainties are further asso-
ciated with major changes in the CGIAR’s 
external context. With the continuous search 
for change, an aura of uncertainty surrounds 
the future of the CGIAR. 
On the whole, the CGIAR today is char-
acterized by increasing complexity, both 
cognitive and structural; by diversity in its 
membership, its funding, and its organiza-
tion; and by an increasing uncertainty associ-
ated with changes in its internal and external 
environments.
Notes
CGIAR Secretariat (2007b), p. 2.1. 
CGIAR Secretariat (2007b).2. 
The current mission statement was adopted at the 3. 
CGIAR’s Mid-Term Meeting in Dresden in 2000.
In 2006, the following Members were not in good 4. 
standing: African Development Bank, Bangladesh, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gulf Cooperation Council, Indonesia, 
Inter-American Development Bank, Kellogg Foundation, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Thailand, and Uganda. In 2007, all 
but four (African Development Bank, Gulf Cooperation 
$ millions
2004 2005 2006 2007
CGIAR 14 25 29 31
Partners 5 10 11 17
Total 19 35 40 48
Note: Total revenue and expenditures are not reported in aggregate for 2003 (only-cash basis receipts are reported). 
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports, 2004–2007.
Table A1.13 Revenue reported by the CGIAR, for all Challenge Programs
Percentage of total
2004 2005 2006 2007
Generation 19.1 13.6 9.5 23.5
HarvestPlus 3.9 15.5 12.1 19.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 0 3.5 7.8
Water and Food 9.4 9.3 8.4 17.1
Total 37.1 38.4 33.6 68.0
Source: CGIAR Financial Reports, 2004–2007.
Table A1.14 Funding available to Challenge Programs, 2003–07
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Council, Portugal, and Uganda) were still in arrears and 
remained in Member-observer status. Source: CGIAR 
Secretariat.
Strong et al. (1998).5. 
The World Bank, FAO, and UNDP were founding 6. 
cosponsors. From 1994–2000, the United Nations 
Environment Programme was also a cosponsor. IFAD 
became a cosponsor in 2001.
CGIAR Secretariat (2007b), p. 37.7. 
In 1998, the Centers created the Future Harvest 8. 
Foundation as a nonprofit corporation in an effort to 
reach out to new constituencies and increase the funding 
base of the Centers and their strategic work. The Future 
Harvest Foundation was dissolved in 2004.
Engagement with civil society now takes place through 9. 
dialogue processes and ad hoc representation at CGIAR 
meetings.
There have been a small number of new committees 10. 
added at various times, that were then eliminated. 
For example, the Consultative Council, following the 
Third System Review, and the Science Partnership 
Committee.
The ad hoc Committee on Finance was created at the 11. 
2007 Annual General Meeting, with the agreement that it 
would exist until December 31, 2008.
CGIAR (2007b), p. 20.12. 
Note that the EC contribution is somewhat distorted, in 13. 
that a large part of its 2006 contribution was disbursed 
and recorded in 2007.
Note that the CGIAR reports funding during the year it 14. 
is expensed, so it appears that the Gates Foundation 
contributed $23 million in 2007. However, the Gates 
Foundation actually made cash contributions to the 
Centers in the amount of $43 million. 
We have chosen here to use the same classification as 15. 
the 2003 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department’s 
Meta-Evaluation. This will facilitate analysis of trends in 
programming and financing over time.
CGIAR (2007a).16. 
Future Harvest (2006). 17. 
CGIAR Secretariat. (2007c). 18. 
Interim Executive Council (2001a). 19. 
Change Design and Management Team.20. 
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Since 2001, the CGIAR has invested sub-
stantially in assessing its impact through the 
Science Council’s Standing Panel on Impact 
Assessment (SPIA). SPIA has commissioned 
three studies over the past five years that have 
quantified the impacts of the CGIAR at the 
global and regional levels. These studies find 
that the benefits from past investments in 
CGIAR research have exceeded the costs of 
that research—usually by a large margin.
Raitzer (2003) provides the only com-
prehensive assessment of the relative benefits 
and costs of CGIAR research investments 
over the System’s lifetime. This meta-analysis 
reviewed all available ex post impact assess-
ments from peer-reviewed journal articles, 
books, and Center publications, to estimate 
the total benefits attributable to the CGIAR. 
Only studies that were published after 1989, 
covering middle- or low-income countries 
and generating total benefits exceeding $50 
million, were considered. A rating scale was 
developed—based on the transparency of 
analytical methods, the extent to which cau-
sality was demonstrated, the plausibility of 
counterfactuals, and the degree to which es-
timated impacts were projected beyond the 
time frame analyzed—to establish a range of 
estimated benefits. Benefit scenarios ranged 
from the most conservative (“substantially 
demonstrated and empirically attributed”) 
to the least conservative (“plausible, extrap-
olated to 2011”). For each of these five sce-
narios, benefits were compared with total sys-
temwide expenditures ($7.1 billion in 1990 
dollars) dating back to 1960.1
Estimated systemwide benefits ranged 
from nearly $14 billion to more than $120 
billion. The benefit-cost ratios suggest that 
investments in the CGIAR have paid for 
themselves by a wide margin: even by the 
most conservative criteria, overall benefits 
from CGIAR research were roughly double 
the costs of that research (figure A2.1). 
Of note is the fact that the meta-analysis 
included only existing impact assessments. 
The small number of impact assessments of 
natural resource management and policy-
oriented research means that the benefits of 
CGIAR research were understated, insofar as 
later evidence suggests that this research also 
had a positive impact. Coupled with the fact 
that all systemwide expenditures were con-
sidered, the reported benefit-cost ratios were 
similarly understated.
Interesting is the high proportion of ben-
efits associated with just a few of the CGIAR’s 
many programs. Roughly half (47 percent) of 
total benefits were attributed to rice breeding, 
Impact of CGIAr researchAp
p
e
n
D
Ix
2
Source: Raitzer (2003). 
Figure A2.1 Aggregate benefit–cost ratios of 
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and an additional 31 percent to breeding of 
spring bread wheat. Biocontrol research re-
sulting in reduced crop damage from the cas-
sava mealybug accounted for most of the re-
maining benefits (15 percent). 
Two recent regional studies on Sub-Saha-
ran Africa and South Asia reveal very differ-
ent levels of impact of CGIAR research. No 
such study has been made for Latin America, 
though many specific studies show substantial 
impact, for instance, in the uptake of rice2 and 
maize3 varieties.
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Since its founding in 1971, the CGIAR has 
invested approximately $4.3 billion in Sub-
Saharan Africa.4 This represents 41 percent 
of total CGIAR expenditures, the largest 
share allocated to any geographical region. 
With the continent’s relative lack of suc-
cess in achieving agricultural development 
and poverty alleviation goals, the scale of 
resources devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa has 
inevitably raised questions about the returns 
on those investments. For this reason, in 
2005, the SPIA commissioned a regional 
study to assess whether documented benefits 
from these investments have exceeded their 
costs.
Following similar methods to those de-
scribed for the systemwide evaluation, Mare-
dia and Raitzer (2006) undertook a meta-
analysis of 22 impact assessment studies 
conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. The final 
set of studies considered was culled from a 
much larger group of 367 studies that were 
initially reviewed. Primary criteria for inclu-
sion of a study in the meta-analysis included a 
sufficiently large geographic scale of adoption 
(eliminating many small-scale adoption stud-
ies), quantification of research benefits, and 
having undergone a peer review. Nearly every 
study that emerged from this screening pro-
cess evaluated crop genetic improvement or 
biological control technologies. Roughly two-
thirds of these were conducted since 2001 (the 
earliest since 1994). Estimates of benefits were 
calculated based on varying levels of conser-
vatism and whether ex ante projections were 
considered. 
Figure A2.2 presents the key findings.5 
Benefits exceeded costs for all scenarios that 
included ex ante projections beyond the study 
period, with benefit-cost ratios ranging from 
1.12 to 1.64. When only ex post benefits were 
Source: Maredia and Raitzer (2006).
Figure A2.2 Comparison of calculated costs and estimated benefits of joint CGIAR–national
 agricultural research systems investments in Sub-Saharan Africa
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considered, benefits and costs were more bal-
anced; for the most conservative scenario, 
costs slightly outweighed benefits. The au-
thors point out that many studies considered 
only one year of research benefits, even though 
such benefits would almost certainly extend 
for a number of years. Yet, even if benefit-cost 
ratios rose to the level of the least conservative 
scenarios, they would still be well below those 
found in the systemwide meta-analysis. Thus, 
while benefits from CGIAR investments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have certainly exceeded 
their costs, the returns to research investment 
have been considerably lower in Sub-Saharan 
Africa than in other parts of the world.
The geographic scale of measured im-
pacts is also relatively small. At the end of 
the 20th century, only about 11 million hect-
ares (of about 100 million) were planted with 
CGIAR-derived improved germplasm in Sub-
Saharan Africa.6 In addition, adoption of spe-
cific CGIAR technology products has been 
fairly small scale (in the tens of thousands of 
hectares).
But the distribution of benefits from 
CGIAR research is noteworthy. Biological 
control activities—particularly for the cas-
sava mealybug—account for approximately 
80 percent of documented benefits, with crop 
genetic improvement accounting for nearly all 
of the remainder. This is roughly the opposite 
of what has been found systemwide, a finding 
that is squarely in line with conventional wis-
dom that crop genetic improvement has been 
less successful in Africa than elsewhere. 
South Asia
Hazell recently undertook a critical review of 
agricultural investments by the CGIAR and 
its partners in South Asia in the post-Green 
Revolution period (since the early 1980s).7 
The study takes a markedly less structured 
approach to impact assessment than the two 
meta-analyses just described, reviewing exist-
ing peer-reviewed studies of productivity, 
social, environmental, and policy impacts.
Evidence indicates that agricultural re-
search in South Asia has been instrumental 
in maintaining impressive rates of agricul-
tural productivity growth in the region 
since the green revolution. These productiv-
ity improvements have also yielded substan-
tial indirect impacts on food security and 
poverty alleviation through price effects. 
Hazell finds that economic returns to these 
research investments have been consistently 
higher than national discount rates and 
that there is little evidence that these rates 
of return have declined over time. CGIAR 
Centers have made particularly impressive 
contributions to overall well-being through 
crop genetic improvement. Based on existing 
impact assessments, Hazell finds average an-
nual benefits of more than $1 billion from 
crop genetic improvement work, far in ex-
cess of the estimated $65 million of annual 
expenditures of the CGIAR in South Asia. 
A survey of specific commodity and coun-
try studies further supports substantial rates 
of return to CGIAR crop improvement re-
search. Many such studies tend to be rather 
dated, however.
Alternative approaches to agricultural de-
velopment, such as organic farming and low 
external input technologies, though found to 
be unviable in the more favored agroecologi-
cal areas, are more promising in less favored 
areas where natural resource and crop man-
agement regimes are central to the success of 
agricultural development strategies vis-à-vis 
seed varietal adoption. In addition, Hazell 
does find evidence of significant net benefits 
arising from work on efficient water and fer-
tilizer use, on integrated pest management, 
and on zero tillage.
Hazell finds that there is a dearth of im-
pact studies linking agricultural research in-
vestments to environmental or poverty out-
comes. While assertions that agricultural 
intensification strategies have had undesirable 
environmental impacts are commonplace, 
there are few empirical studies to quantify 
these impacts. Likewise, there is little in the 
way of impact studies that include environ-
mental costs and benefits or poverty reduc-
tion in measures of rates of return to research 
investments. 
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Crop genetic improvement research
Crop genetic improvement (CGI) has histori-
cally been the bread and butter of the CGIAR 
System. Improved germplasm for use by 
national programs, for direct release or as par-
ent materials, is a classic international public 
good that demonstrated high spillovers across 
regions and countries for wheat and rice in the 
early years of the CGIAR. Nonetheless, over 
time CGI has received a sharply declining 
share of CGIAR resources, estimated at only 
16 percent by 2005.8
Since the 1980s impacts of CGI have 
been fairly consistently tracked at the global 
level by IRRI for rice and by CIMMYT for 
wheat. A number of studies have analyzed 
use of CGIAR germplasm in released va-
rieties, yield impacts, and global economic 
benefits. They consistently find high rates of 
return to the CGIAR investment in these 
crops—echoing the findings of the meta-
analysis of total (system wide) benefits and 
costs noted above.9 This is not surprising, 
given the broad geographic scale of the dif-
fusion of improved varieties. That the ben-
efits have been so well chronicled reflects the 
relatively straightforward nature of quanti-
fying benefits associated with productivity 
increases and attributing those benefits to 
specific CGIAR research investments. In 
addition, methods for evaluation of impacts 
of CGI are well established in the literature, 
notwithstanding some questions of parti-
tioning benefits between the CGIAR and 
national systems.10
The first comprehensive global evalua-
tion of the impacts of the CGIAR in CGI 
was undertaken by SPIA around 2000. This 
study covered research carried out on 10 crops 
during 1965–98 at 8 Centers (Africa Rice 
Centre, CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, ICARDA, 
ICRISAT, IITA, and IRRI).11 
The impact of CGI generally, and the cen-
tral role of the CGIAR specifically, is clear for 
almost all crops. As expected, impacts have 
been greatest in rice, wheat, and maize in 
both area influenced and adoption. For these 
three crops, CGI has had the largest impacts 
on yield growth, contributing from 0.7–1.0 
percent annually. But impacts for “orphan” 
crops—crops other than rice, wheat, and 
maize—accelerated toward the end of the pe-
riod. The use of CGIAR germplasm products 
has been even higher in released varieties of 
those crops (although areas under cultivation 
remain comparatively lower globally). Pota-
toes are the only crop where CGIAR germ-
plasm plays a minor role.
Overall, 65 percent of the area’s 10 impor-
tant food crops (wheat, rice, maize, sorghum, 
millet, barley, lentils, beans, cassava, and po-
tatoes) are improved varieties. Sixty percent 
of the area is sown to varieties with CGIAR 
ancestry, and half of these are derived from 
crosses made at a CGIAR Center (direct re-
leases by national systems). 
Among regions, impacts have been highest 
in Asia (both in relative and absolute terms) 
and lowest in Africa. This partly reflects the 
distribution of crops between the regions—
orphan crops are more important in Africa. 
But even for the same crop, impacts have gen-
erally been lower in Africa. This reflects the 
late start to breeding work in that region. For 
example, CIMMYT established its first se-
rious maize breeding program for Africa (in 
Harare) in the late 1980s. 
The benefits of CGIAR’s contribution to 
CGI are extraordinarily large—in the billions 
of dollars. Most of these benefits are produced 
by the three main cereals. Raitzer summarizes 
average annual benefits for CGIAR research: 
$2.5 billion for spring bread wheat, $10.8 bil-
lion for rice (Asia only), and $0.6–0.8 bil-
lion for maize (CIMMYT only).12 Evenson 
and Gollin estimate rates of return to the 
CGIAR’s investment in CGI research rang-
ing from 39 percent in Latin America to more 
than 100 percent in Asia and Middle East and 
North Africa.13
Using a global model of food supply and 
demand, Evenson and Rosegrant also esti-
mated the counterfactual of what would have 
happened to world food production without 
CGIAR contributions to CGI:14
World food production would have •	
been 4–5 percent less, and developing 
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countries would have produced 7–8 
percent less.
World grain prices would have been •	
18–21 percent more—adversely af-
fecting poor consumers.
Area planted with crops would have •	
been significantly higher for all food 
crops, as cultivated area in develop-
ing countries would have expanded 
by 11–13 million hectares (and 5–6 
million in industrialized countries), 
at the expense of primary forests and 
fragile lands with high biodiversity.
In developing countries, per capita •	
food consumption would have been 
5 percent less on average, and up to 7 
percent less in the poorest regions 
Some 13–15 million more children •	
would have been malnourished, pre-
dominantly in South Asia, where in-
cidence of hunger is highest.
An important question for this review 
is whether there is evidence that historical 
benefits from CGI have been maintained in 
the 20th century. The answer is constrained 
by the paucity of global evidence since the 
Evenson and Gollin study was completed.15 
At a global and regional level, CIMMYT 
continued conducting impact studies until 
2005 for wheat (with data ending in 2002). 
These studies indicated similar if not higher 
benefits.
Other studies at the local level point to 
progress in other crops and environments. 
ICRISAT has achieved successes with chick-
peas in India, including in poor and marginal 
environments.16 The net present value of the 
investment in the genetically improved dual-
purpose cowpea research and extension in 
West Africa over 20 years was estimated in 
the range of $299–$1,085 million.17 Depend-
ing on different assumptions, internal rates of 
return of 50–103 percent and a benefit-cost 
ratio of 32–127 were estimated. Deb et al. 
chronicle substantial geographic spillovers 
throughout Africa of ICRISAT sorghum 
varieties developed with Indian national ag-
ricultural research systems (NARS).18 And a 
series of recent adoption studies estimates that 
new varieties of the common bean (phaseolus 
vulgaris) developed by the CIAT have been 
adopted in about half of the total bean area 
in East, Central, and Southern Africa, encom-
passing some 5 million households and reach-
ing 35 million people over 17 years. 
In marginal regions with low and uncer-
tain rainfall, participatory approaches that di-
rectly involve farmers in varietal breeding and 
selection are also yielding positive impacts. 
Between 1997 and 2004, ICARDA’s Barley 
Research Program in Syria transformed its 
operation from 8,000 plots planted and eval-
uated on the research station to 8,000 plots 
planted in farmers’ fields and evaluated by 
farmers.19 Participatory plant breeding and 
varietal selection speeds varietal development 
and dissemination up 5–7 years, half the years 
in a conventional plant-breeding program. 
But impacts on farmer adoption have been 
modest to date.
Participatory variety selection has been 
used for more than 10 years for selection of 
so-called New Rice for Africa (NERICA) 
upland rice varieties in Africa, especially with 
participation of female farmers. NERICA 
rice combines the high productivity of Asian 
rice and the stress tolerance of African rice 
varieties. NERICA lines have been tested 
in 31 countries, with 16 lines released in 15 
countries, and adoption on about 200,000 
hectares.20 
Ex ante impact studies have favorably 
evaluated NERICA. But except in Guinea, 
adoption of NERICA has been slow. Partici-
patory variety selection has been important in 
exposing farmers to the new varieties; of the 
farmers exposed to the new varieties, 38 per-
cent have adopted NERICA rice. Initial as-
sessments suggested high yield gains from 
NERICA would facilitate farmer-to-farmer 
transfers of seed and knowledge—as has been 
demonstrated in many areas, including many 
marginal areas of Asia. But more recent assess-
ments have found much more modest yield 
gains, suggesting that an intensive and pos-
sibly costly program of participatory variety 
selection would be needed over many years to 
scale up adoption of NERICA rice.
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Yield stability
Yield stability is important for all farmers, 
but especially for poor farmers whose food 
security and livelihood are vulnerable to pest 
and disease outbreaks, droughts, and other 
stresses. While early studies suggested that 
yields of improved varieties might be more 
variable than those they replaced,21 recent 
evidence suggests that later generations of 
improved varieties have stabilized yields.22 
For example, Gollin concluded that the vari-
ability of maize and wheat yields measured 
by the coefficient of variation around trends 
over the past 40 years has fallen in developing 
countries.23 This decline is statistically asso-
ciated with the spread of improved varieties, 
even after controlling for more irrigation and 
other inputs. The annual value of benefits 
from improved yield stability in maize and 
wheat alone is estimated at $149 million and 
$143 million,  respectively—more than the 
total annual spending on maize- and wheat-
breeding research in developing countries. 
Yield stability of improved varieties largely 
reflects long-standing efforts in breeding for 
disease and pest resistance. A third to a half 
of current research and development invest-
ments in crop breeding in the CGIAR may 
be for varietal maintenance. The only study 
to have attempted to capture this “hidden 
impact” of CGI, Marassas estimates that 
CIMMYT’s work on maintaining leaf rust 
resistance alone has generated $5.4 billion in 
net present value from 1973–2007.24
Since large areas are now being used each 
year for major food crops in relatively few im-
proved varieties, genetic uniformity can make 
crops vulnerable to major yield losses. Some 
evidence suggests that genetic uniformity in-
creases yield risk, even though it can also pro-
duce higher yields.25 In recent decades, the 
world has largely avoided major disasters from 
genetic uniformity, partly because more fre-
quent turnover of varieties has brought new 
sources of resistance. 
But a new race of stem rust in wheat 
after more than 50 years has left CIMMYT, 
ICARDA, and their partners scrambling to 
find and release a new generation of resistant 
varieties.26 Likewise, IITA has successfully 
tackled a severe outbreak of cassava mosaic 
disease in western Kenya through rapid iden-
tification and release of resistant varieties.27
Research in developing varieties that per-
form well under drought, heat, flood, and sa-
linity is particularly relevant to threats posed 
by climate change. Progress has been slower 
than for disease and pest resistance. After 
more than 30 years of research to produce 
drought-tolerant maize varieties and hybrids, 
CIMMYT is now seeing results in East and 
Southern Africa. Compared with existing hy-
brids, new hybrids yield 20 percent more on 
average under drought conditions.28 In ad-
dition, recent evidence points to significant 
yield gains in breeding wheat in drought and 
heat-stressed environments.29 New varieties 
of rice that survive flooding have also been 
identified.30 
Genetic improvement of fish
WorldFish has developed genetically improved 
strains of Nile tilapia for on-farm produc-
tion and extended these to farmers in six 
Asian countries, including Bangladesh. An 
assessment of on-farm trials by Deb and Dey 
shows yield gains of 78 percent in Bangladesh 
achieved without any increase in production 
costs.31 Using economic surplus methods, 
Deb and Dey quantified the benefits from 
and costs of research and dissemination by 
WorldFish and its partners in all six coun-
tries and obtained an internal return rate of 
70 percent.32
Biofortification
Although not strictly impact assessment, 
recent evaluation of biofortified crops is inter-
esting because it is one of the first examples 
within the CGIAR of using experimental 
approaches to evaluate interventions—spe-
cifically, comparing a biofortified treatment 
with a conventional variety in randomly 
selected households. 
Quality protein maize, now grown on 
about 600,000 hectares, has been subject to 
such evaluations—though all with method-
ological problems. In a meta-analysis of eight 
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such studies, Gunaratna finds a 7 percent av-
erage effect of quality protein maize on chil-
dren’s rate of height gain and 9 percent on 
weight.33 A recent study at two sites in Ethi-
opia finds mixed results. Significant height 
and weight gains (21 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively) were found at one site; but at 
another site no significant anthro pometric 
effects were found.34  In Mozambique, 850 
households participated in an experiment 
with orange-fleshed sweet potatoes from 
CIP. A significant increase of vitamin A in-
take was measured among young children liv-
ing in households receiving the orange-fleshed 
treatment combined with extension advice on 
nutrition.35 
These studies are not strictly impact 
studies, since they do not consider aggregate 
adoption and long-run use. Still, this type 
of work is likely to accelerate with the scal-
ing up of biofortification research under the 
HarvestPlus program. Ex ante impact work is 
also under way—for example, the evaluation 
of the potential impacts on disability adjusted 
life years of Vitamin A rice in India.36 
CGI has long been the staple activity of 
the CGIAR, one whose net benefits have been 
large and well chronicled. Overall, the avail-
able evidence does not indicate a slowdown in 
the benefits of CGIAR efforts in CGI in re-
cent years, even with ever-tighter funding. Re-
cent research in a range of crops, both cereals 
and noncereals, and traits (such as drought re-
sistance and nutritional content) are generat-
ing very promising outputs and outcomes for 
future impact. But the long delays between 
initial funding and the development of such 
CGI products makes continued funding for 
CGI research difficult. Between the 1990s 
and the present, research to increase produc-
tivity has declined in real terms and as a per-
centage of CGIAR research expenditure (see 
chapter 5). 
Another concern is the paucity of evalua-
tive evidence on the adoption and impacts of 
some promising CGI outputs for which dif-
fusion appears poised to take off (for example, 
NERICAs, biofortified products like quality 
protein maize); while other successes, such as 
improved chickpeas and cowpeas have, been 
found to produce impressive gains in local 
and regional analyses, they have not yet been 
evaluated in the quantitatively rigorous way 
that other crops were in the landmark Even-
son-Gollin volume. Thus, there is a continu-
ing need for the CGIAR Centers and SPIA 
to regularly update global assessments of the 
impacts for all crops (once every five years).
Natural resource 
management research
Natural resource management (NRM) 
research within the CGIAR has evolved over 
time. In the 1960s and 1970s, NRM research 
focused mainly on agronomic issues, such as 
efficient use of nutrients and fertilizers, pesti-
cide use, and water distribution and manage-
ment. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the NRM 
research agenda took on more of a farming 
systems perspective and emphasized farmer 
participatory methods. Productivity-related 
work broadened to include whole farm sys-
tems (as opposed to crop-specific impacts), 
and the focus of much water management 
research shifted from the farm-level to the 
watershed- or district-level.37 
The decision in 1990 to expand the 
CGIAR to include four new Centers—with 
mandates in forestry (CIFOR), agroforestry 
(World Agroforestry Centre), water manage-
ment (IIMI), and fisheries (ICLARM)—
marked a turning point in the position of 
NRM research within the System. Invest-
ments in those four Centers grew steadily 
throughout the 1990s and into the 21st cen-
tury—largely at the expense of commodity 
and ecoregional Centers with a stronger pro-
ductivity-enhancement orientation.38 This 
was also the case for allocating resources to 
NRM research programs through other pro-
grams in the other Centers. 
CGIAR research on pest management 
has been a particular aspect of its NRM re-
search involving conservation and use of 
natural enemies of crop pests and diseases. It 
complements CGI research on breeding resis-
tance to pests and diseases and has played an 
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important role in yield stability in a range of 
crops. Pest management research at Centers 
has focused on biological control, integrated 
pest management, and resistant varieties. 
Biological control of alien pests and weeds 
has been a particular success story for the 
CGIAR, particularly in Africa. The capac-
ity of CGIAR Centers to work effectively at 
an intercontinental level, to identify biologi-
cal control agents, and at a regional level with 
national programs, to distribute agents effec-
tively, has contributed to this success. One of 
the best known cases is the control of the cas-
sava mealybug in 20 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.39 The biological control provided by 
an introduced wasp was so effective that the 
cassava mealybug is now largely controlled. 
Even when using the most conservative as-
sumptions, the return on this research invest-
ment has been extremely high (net present 
value estimated at $9 billion). 
CGIAR Centers and partners have since 
extended biological control in West Africa 
to cassava green mite, mango mealybug, and 
water hyacinth. Evaluations consistently show 
very high returns to the investments in these 
programs. Indeed, biological control makes up 
a large share of the demonstrated benefits of 
the CGIAR’s research portfolio in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa.40 Coulibaly estimates investments 
in biological control of cassava green mite to 
have generated net present values of $1.7 bil-
lion for Nigeria, $383 million for Ghana, 
and $74 million for Benin.41 And even these 
impressive benefits are likely understated be-
cause the analyses did not account for ecologi-
cal benefits.
Integrated pest management research 
arose from a need to find alternatives to reli-
ance on chemical pesticides to protect yield 
improvements in rice. Since this work in the 
1980s many Centers have contributed to a 
global effort by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, national agricultural research 
systems, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions to develop integrated pest management 
approaches, including development of bio-
logical pesticides and farmer field schools to 
train farmers in integrated pest management. 
Farmer field schools have brought signifi-
cant benefits to farmers.42 A study that as-
sessed CIP’s pilot field school program in 
Peru found a 14 percentage point increase in 
knowledge score for participants and an esti-
mated 32 percent gain in productivity.43 And 
a project in Vietnam, Three Reductions—
Three Gains, begun by IRRI in 2003 shows 
promise in using mass media to disseminate 
information on the benefits of reducing pes-
ticide use (as well as lowering seeding rates 
and fertilizer use). This project uses radio and 
television dramas, in addition to more tradi-
tional extension channels, and has enjoyed 
some early successes, though these have yet to 
be rigorously evaluated. 
Longer-term and larger-scale impact of 
integrated pest management training may 
be less certain,44 in part because, unlike im-
proved crop varieties, the spread of knowledge 
intensive integrated pest management meth-
ods requires considerable and maintained in-
vestment in training.45
Policy-oriented research by Templeton 
and Jamora provides evidence of large impacts 
of IRRI research on reducing the health costs 
of pesticide use.46 The value of private health 
savings from that research—attributable 
to regulation of highly toxic insecticides in 
rice production, labeling requirements, and 
training of rural health officers—has been 
estimated to have a net present value of $117 
million.
Growing evidence suggests positive re-
turns on investments in a variety of NRM 
research activities in the System. As methods 
for measuring impacts of NRM research be-
come better developed—due in large part to 
SPIA’s efforts to promote that line of impact 
assessment—documentation of net benefits 
to NRM research should accelerate. 
But much NRM research occurs at a rela-
tively limited geographic scale through other 
types of CGIAR research—often because 
local collective action and delineation of prop-
erty rights are central to adopting NRM tech-
nologies (CIMMYT’s zero-tillage work in 
South Asia is a notable exception). This likely 
limits the potential for spatial spillovers of 
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management methods and biophysical pack-
ages, particularly in comparison with spill-
overs associated with seed varieties. 
In addition, NRM research impact as-
sessments to date have focused largely on pro-
ductivity benefits. Environmental benefits are 
largely ignored—presumably because of the 
methodological difficulties in quantifying 
them. Such quantification would require non-
market valuation techniques, which are still 
rare in developing countries. An unfortunate 
consequence of this is that there is little evi-
dence on CGIAR’s success in meeting its goal 
of promoting environmental sustainability.
Policy-oriented research
Policy analysis is the basic mandate of four 
Centers (Bioversity, CIFOR, IFPRI, and 
IWMI) and is a major focus of the others. 
CGIAR expenditures on policy-oriented 
research have grown substantially, in absolute 
terms and as a proportion of the systemwide 
research portfolio.47 Conservative estimates 
place the total value of such investments at 
$800 million (in real 2004 terms), and more 
than triple that number using a broader defi-
nition of policy research.48 
As with NRM research, the World Bank’s 
meta-evaluation of the CGIAR49 found a 
striking lack of credible studies analyzing 
impacts of the large historical investments in 
policy-oriented research. In response, SPIA 
conducted a scoping study in 2006 that iden-
tified and reviewed 24 ex post assessments 
from CGIAR policy-oriented research proj-
ects.50 Only three studies yielded empirical 
estimates of economic impacts. About half of 
the others (10 of 21) documented “influences” 
(or outcomes, in the nomenclature adopted in 
this Review), generally relying on interviews 
of relevant stakeholders as “data.” The re-
maining 11 assessment studies went only so 
far as to document outputs, primarily through 
biblio metric and webmetric citations analy-
sis. The 21 more qualitative studies spanned 
a range of policy domains: property rights, 
plant genetic resources, and gender, in addi-
tion to the NRM policy studies in chapter 3. 
These provide substantial qualitative evidence 
on how and why policy-oriented research and 
the research recommendations it generates 
find their way into the real-world policy for-
mulation and implementation. But the stud-
ies stop short of quantifying impacts on core 
CGIAR missions of food security, poverty 
alleviation, and environmental sustainability, 
though they do represent an essential comple-
ment to quantitative research. 
The dearth of empirical impact assess-
ments is attributable to the difficult challenges 
facing analysts of policy-oriented research in 
the quantification of ideas and knowledge—
the fundamental product of policy-oriented 
research—and their attribution to specific 
producers of that knowledge. Even so, the 
authors of the scoping study conclude that 
the “the level of measured and documented 
impact and influence attributed to CGIAR 
policy-oriented research by rigorous analysis 
is probably insufficient at present to justify the 
associated total investment made to date.”51 
As a follow-up to the scoping study, seven 
impact assessments of policy-oriented re-
search were commissioned in 2007 through 
a competitive selection process among the 
Centers. The project was overseen by the late 
Bruce Gardner until his death in early 2008, 
by which time the case studies had been pre-
sented at a final workshop. The seven studies 
are currently in preparation for publication in 
an edited volume.
All of these studies found substantial re-
turns to policy-oriented research investments 
in the form of high internal rates of return 
and large benefit-cost ratios.52 In addition, the 
overall measured benefits of the projects were 
large—in the tens or hundreds of millions of 
dollars in net present value terms. However, a 
few qualifications to these positive results are 
in order:
The studies employed different means •	
of attributing behavioral changes 
to policy changes and what was the 
contribution of the relevant CGIAR 
Center to the policy change. All stud-
ies indicated that “conservative” as-
sumptions were made in this regard, 
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although defining what constitutes 
conservatism in this context is in-
evitably random. But taking as given 
that the studies’ authors have erred on 
the side of caution, then the true net 
benefits of policy-oriented research 
are larger—perhaps substantially 
so—than what is reported.
Identifying the appropriate counter-•	
factual—what would have occurred 
in the absence of the research that was 
conducted—is a challenge for assess-
ing policy-oriented research impacts. 
In most cases, the counterfactual re-
lated to earlier implementation of a 
policy or set of activities than would 
have occurred without the Center’s 
involvement. Again, the impact assess-
ment literature provides little guid-
ance to assist in making these choices. 
As with attribution issues, the analysts 
tended to simply adopt “conservative” 
assumptions, in the hope that any 
bias in the benefits estimation would 
be downward. This does not intend to 
call into question the accuracy of the 
studies’ findings but rather to point 
out the inevitable lack of precision in 
the point estimates of impact (internal 
rates of return, benefit-cost ratios). 
All five impact assessments were coun-
try studies conducted in a particular policy 
environment, but all produced knowledge 
relevant to policy domains in other coun-
tries. Such spillovers, if and when they occur, 
represent potent international public goods. 
Only the PROGRESA study quantified these 
spillovers, finding that they were in fact nearly 
five times greater than the entire cost of IF-
PRI’s contribution to the research activity. 
Ryan’s earlier analysis of IFPRI’s contribution 
to policy change in Vietnam’s rice sector also 
finds that the benefits from spillovers greatly 
outweigh the project’s costs.53 
Other recent policy-oriented 
research assessments
Two other recent qualitative impact assess-
ments conducted under the auspices of IFPRI 
provide interesting insights into the effective-
ness with which policy-oriented research 
translates into actual policy influence. A 
review of the Ethiopian Strategy Support Pro-
gram’s activities and impacts over 2004–07 
indicates substantial success in the generation 
of research-based policy recommendations, 
development of policy-analysis tools (out-
puts), and capacity-building within the nexus 
of Ethiopia’s government and research sec-
tors.54 Central to the program’s successes was 
IFPRI’s strong on-the-ground presence (spear-
headed by the program director, an Ethiopian 
national). In contrast, a review of IFPRI’s 
Global Research Project on the Sustainable 
Development of Less-Favored Lands over 
1998–2004 found significantly less success in 
translating a large body of outstanding pol-
icy-oriented research generated by the project 
investigators into sustained policy influence 
in the countries of emphasis—Ethiopia, Hon-
duras, and Uganda.55 This lack was attributed 
to limited on-site representation, which inter-
rupted the process whereby research findings 
can be transformed into policy.
CGIAR’s impact on poverty 
Poverty alleviation is a core mission of the 
CGIAR, and throughout its 37-year his-
tory much research has been oriented toward 
enhancing the welfare of the poor. The litera-
ture on economics provides substantial evi-
dence of pro-poor impacts of international 
agricultural research and development. 
Thirtle, Lin, and Piesse conclude, for exam-
ple, that “public sector national agricultural 
research systems, with the assistance of the 
CGIAR, can justly claim to have reduced 
poverty, probably more than any other single 
policy initiative.”56 In a recent work, how-
ever, Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey contend 
that the broadening of CGIAR objectives 
over time—termed mission creep—has actu-
ally eroded the System’s effectiveness in ful-
filling its various missions (including poverty 
alleviation).57
Between 1998 and 2006, systematic as-
sessment of the extent to which CGIAR 
 126 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
research has led to poverty reduction was im-
plemented under IFPRI leadership. This ef-
fort culminated in seven poverty impact stud-
ies.58 Table A2.1 provides a summary of five 
of these studies.59 Two studies assessing the 
poverty impacts of modern variety rice adop-
tion in Bangladesh, China, and India were na-
tional in their coverage, while the studies of 
fishpond and vegetable technologies in Ban-
gladesh, soil fertility replacement due to agro-
forestry in Kenya, and creolized and recycled 
maize varieties in Mexico had a more limited 
geographic focus.
In general, the studies described in 
table A2.1 were unable to establish firm em-
pirical links between the technology prod-
ucts and packages and poverty reduction. The 
Bangladesh modern variety rice study found 
that the statistical significance of the positive 
relationship between area under modern va-
rieties and incomes of the poor disappeared 
between 1987 and 2002. ICRAF’s analysis 
of agroforestry-related soil fertility replen-
ishment technologies in Kenya appears to 
suggest that poorer households with smaller 
landholdings were less able to benefit from 
those technologies. Similarly, the analysis of 
fishpond and vegetable technologies in Ban-
gladesh indicated that landholdings were a 
limiting factor in adoption of fishponds for 
the poorest households and that fishponds 
also may have raised the vulnerability of the 
poor to income shocks. The study of creolized 
and recycled maize in Mexico raised interest-
ing issues about informal breeding by poor 
farmers and the links to CIMMYT germ-
plasm but fell short of quantifying its impact 
on the poverty status.
Institution
(timing)
Location
(scale)a
Program 
assessed Impacts on poverty status
IRRI
(1988, 2001)
Bangladesh
(National sample: 
1,888 hectares, 
64 villages) 
IRRI rice 
improvement 
research
Lower consumer prices. •	
Modern variety rice adoption freed up labor resources •	
for participation in nonagricultural labor markets.
Positive, significant direct impact from area with modern •	
variety on income of the poor in 1987 but not in 2002.
IFPRI
(1996, 2001)
Bangladesh
(Three districts: 
321 hectares, 
27 villages)
Polyculture 
fishponds 
and improved 
vegetablesb
Social empowerment (particularly women).•	
Positive impact on vulnerability clearer for •	
vegetables, ambiguous for polyculture.
Some coercive transfer of gains.•	
ICRAF
(1999–2002)
Kenya
(Two districts: 
120 hectares, 
17 villages)
Soil fertility 
replenishment
Social networks crucial to the poor attaining •	
benefits of soil fertility replenishment.
Households with little land, labor less likely to benefit.•	
Positive impact on asset accumulation, •	
but not on expenditure or nutrition.
CIMMYT Mexico
(Two states: 
325 hectares, 
12 communities) 
Creolized 
varieties and 
recycled hybrids
Popularity with poor farmers because of the •	
cost savings from improved varieties and the 
superior production traits from landraces.
IFPRI
(1981–1999)
China, India
(National: district-
level data)
IRRI rice 
improvement 
research
China: 6.77 million people moved out of poverty •	
due to IRRI research (but steady decline from 
1 million in 1981 to 30,000 in 1999)
India: 14 million people moved out of poverty •	
due to IRRI research during 1990s (but 
declining in latter half of decade)
Decline over time in individuals who moved out •	
of poverty per $1,000 of IRRI spending 
a. Excludes nonadopting control villages or households used for purposes of comparison.
b. Technologies developed by ICLARM and Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, respectively. 
Source: Hossain et al. for IRRI; Hallman, Lewis, and Begum for IFPRI 1996 and 2001; Place et al. for ICRAF; Bellon et al. for CIMMYT; and Fan et al. for 
IFPRI 1981–99.
Table A2.1 Summary of poverty impact studies
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In contrast, the studies of modern vari-
ety rice in China and India provide stark em-
pirical evidence of impact. They find that be-
tween 1981 and 1999 more than 6.75 million 
Chinese moved out of poverty due to IRRI’s 
research. In India the numbers are even more 
impressive: 14 million people moving out of 
poverty between 1991 and 1999. According 
to these studies, lower food prices from in-
creased aggregate production were the main 
pathway by which modern variety rice reduced 
poverty in China and India.60 But even here, 
there is one sour element to the story. The 
bulk of these impressive poverty reduction ac-
complishments occurred in the early part of 
the time period analyzed, with the marginal 
contribution to poverty reduction declining 
rather precipitously over time. The study’s 
authors attribute this to the diminished mar-
ginal yield improvements from investment in 
rice research over time and budgetary limits 
for IRRI research, along with the inevitable 
decrease in the marginal contribution of rice 
research to poverty reduction in the face of 
rapidly falling poverty levels.61
Capacity building with partners
Capacity building is not, strictly speak-
ing, CGIAR research that generates specific 
outputs. But it is an essential element of the 
CGIAR’s capacity to support the delivery of 
impact, through empowering national agri-
cultural research system partners and others 
involved in the impact pathway. The CGIAR 
invests about 20 percent of its resources in 
capacity building to strengthen national 
agricultural research systems, a share that 
has remained relatively steady over time.62 
Capacity building covers a range of activities 
classified into formal short-term and gradu-
ate training, networking activities, support 
to specific countries that integrates training, 
and technical assistance and institutional and 
infrastructural development. In addition, 
capacity building involves various informal 
activities, such as mentoring of scientists.
Despite the substantial resources de-
voted to this activity, there are few studies on 
impact; and those few have had to confront 
a number of methodological challenges in 
terms of attribution of benefits to CGIAR 
Centers, establishment of meaningful coun-
terfactuals, and assessment of spillovers.63 A 
few of these studies have already been men-
tioned in the context of policy-oriented re-
search. Institutional capacity building lies at 
the heart of CIFOR’s establishment of crite-
ria and indicators of sustainable forest man-
agement in forest policymaking.64 Likewise, 
IFPRI’s Ethiopian Strategy Support Program 
has generated significant qualitative evidence 
of impact on capacity building within Ethi-
opia’s government and research sectors.65 In 
addition, many of the activities surrounding 
the Alternatives to Slash and Burn SWEP re-
volved around institutional capacity building 
in countries with large tracts of tropical forest 
land.66 
Another study conducted under the aus-
pices of SPIA’s initiative on policy-oriented 
research deserves mention here. Gotor, Car-
acciolo, and Watts document Bioversity’s 
pivotal role in the establishment of in-trust 
agreements governing CGIAR germplasm.67 
These agreements formally maintained the in-
ternational legal status of germplasm that the 
CGIAR held in ex situ genebanks. This was 
truly a landmark achievement: Without these 
agreements , multilateral exchange of genetic 
resources would have been subject to signifi-
cant disruption, as states would have had the 
authority to restrict access to CGIAR’s very 
sizeable germplasm holdings. 
Training is one of the major capacity-
building activities of nearly all CGIAR Cen-
ters. A systemwide evaluation of training com-
missioned by the Science Council found that 
Center training is broadly relevant to national 
agricultural research systems’ capacity needs, 
training quality is generally of high quality, 
and trainees’ perceptions confirm that sig-
nificant synergies exist between training and 
positive research outcomes.68 That review also 
found substantial regional differences in the 
effectiveness of training within the CGIAR, 
with particular deficits associated with poorer 
countries. 
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Graduate training has been favorably as-
sessed by ILRI in contribution to skills and 
by inference to institutional development.69 
CIMMYT has conducted four evaluations of 
its in-service short courses since 1971. Most 
recently, Cooksy and Arellano favorably 
evaluated these short courses for instigating 
new knowledge and skills, accessing new re-
search methods, changing research priorities, 
and building social capital among wheat and 
maize scientists from around the world.70 
Neither studies provide rigorous quantitative 
measures of impact, however. Alternatively, 
Jackson finds that impacts on training and ca-
pacity building of IFPRI’s research on gender 
and intrahousehold allocation were “rather 
lower than hoped,” due to lack of demand on 
the part of policymakers.71
Networking is also a major capacity-build-
ing activity of all Centers. These networks in-
volve various forms of exchange of knowledge 
and materials and research collaboration, and 
many also provide equipment and training. 
However, the role of the CGIAR Centers and 
the organization of networks vary widely.72 
There are very few recent evaluations of 
impacts of these networks. One is a recent 
evaluation by Pray of the Asian Maize Bio-
technology Network organized by CIMMYT 
in six Asian countries.73 This network was 
successful in developing new skills in molec-
ular-assisted selection focused on specific dis-
ease problems. The study also measured in-
creased expenditure on maize research, more 
exchanges within the region, and a sharply 
increased rate of journal publication, espe-
cially in international journals (from 4 inter-
national articles before the network was es-
tablished to 24 after). This study goes beyond 
direct effects on network participants to look 
at spillover effects and potential economic 
impacts from faster progress in achieving dis-
ease resistance (even though products of the 
network have yet to reach farmers’ fields). A 
similar study by Longmore et al. reviewed a 
capacity-building effort in biotechnology for 
insect resistant Bt sorghum in India.74 They 
also estimated a benefit-cost ratio of at least 
24, again based on assumptions about future 
adoption of expected and yet-to-be-realized 
outputs.
Finally, several Centers have undertaken 
long-term support to build country-specific 
research capacity, especially for weak national 
agricultural research systems or countries 
emerging from civil conflict. IRRI has evalu-
ated the impacts of these programs in Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Myanmar for programs that 
ran over a decade.75 While all three studies 
show rapid increases in rice production and 
incomes, they fail to show attribution or con-
sider the counterfactual, although in all prob-
ability, IRRI’s contribution was critical to the 
success.
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Terms of reference
In the last several years the CGIAR has wit-
nessed considerable changes as part of its 
internal reforms, including establishing an 
Executive Council, creation of the Science 
Council, and the launching of the Challenge 
Programs. The 15 Centers have also created an 
alliance to more effectively facilitate and coor-
dinate their collective activities. Even though 
all CGIAR Centers and programs undergo 
external reviews regularly, there has been no 
review at the system level to assess the impact 
and effectiveness of changes initiated during 
the reform program except for one of the com-
ponents of the reform (the System Office).1
The last CGIAR System review was con-
ducted nine years ago, and it has been four 
years since the last independent meta-evalu-
ation commissioned by the World Bank was 
released. Therefore, this external evaluation 
will take stock of the efficacy of the CGIAR 
partnership and address issues of governance, 
management, alignment, and other changes 
required at the System level.2 The review will 
also assess the achievements and effectiveness 
of the CGIAR research through an analysis 
and synthesis (of existing reviews and im-
pact assessments of the Center programs and 
Challenge Programs) and assess if the system 
is well positioned to address the emerging 
future food security and agriculture-related 
problems of developing countries.3
Introduction
The Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), created in 
1971, is an informal association of 64 inde-
pendent public and private sector members, 
from South and North, with the World Bank, 
FAO, IFAD, and UNDP as cosponsors. The 
CGIAR provides 15 international agricul-
tural research centers with strategic guid-
ance, financial assistance, and a forum for 
interaction with donors. A loosely connected 
network of several components forms the 
CGIAR System. The pillars of the CGIAR 
System are: the Consultative Group, its Exec-
utive Council (ExCo), and partners that pro-
vide funding and strategic guidance; the Sci-
ence Council that helps to maintain a high 
quality of science in the CGIAR System; 15 
legally independent international agricultural 
research Centers, and the Alliance they have 
formed for their collective action, which are 
the implementing agencies and research arm 
of the CGIAR system. 
These are supported by the CGIAR Sys-
tem Office (SO),4 which has a pivotal facilitat-
ing role in the integration and administration 
of the System.
Each part of the System is expected to per-
form a distinct set of functions, based on its 
roles and responsibilities. These functions are 
meant to be mutually supportive and comple-
mentary: the components are interdependent, 
and the whole is far greater than the sum of 
the parts, thereby providing the CGIAR with 
its systemic character. The CGIAR System 
collaborates in research and research-related 
activities with many partners, to support, con-
duct, and disseminate international agricul-
tural research of the highest quality, in order 
to ensure that agricultural science and tech-
nology contribute significantly to sustainable 
development and the attainment of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals.
The mission of the CGIAR is to achieve 
sustainable food security and reduce poverty 
in developing countries through scientific 
Terms of reference and 
review panel membersAp
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research and research-related activities in 
the fields of agriculture, livestock, forestry, 
fisheries, policy, and natural resource 
management.
These terms of reference (TOR) describe 
the following: objectives of the external re-
view, scope of the review, methodology, re-
ports, budget, review panel, ExCo Ad Hoc 
Advisory Group, tentative timeline, and key 
next steps; an ExCo ad hoc advisory group has 
been established to guide finalization of the 
TOR for the external review and panel com-
position. The group is composed of one alli-
ance representative, two CGIAR Members, 
and one Science Council (SC)/Standing Panel 
on Impact Assessment (SPIA) member. 
Objectives of this Review. The Review will 
have the following objectives, with a special 
emphasis on (but not limited to) the impact 
of the recent reform program:
To take stock and assess the efficacy •	
of the CGIAR partnership.
To assess the effectiveness of CGIAR •	
research.
To make recommendations for •	
changes in the CGIAR System that 
will improve its efficacy and effective-
ness in view of emerging challenges 
for food security, agriculture, and 
natural resource management of the 
poor.
Scope of the Review. The Review would have 
two concurrent, closely linked, and equally 
important parts. Part one: the review of the 
efficacy of the CGIAR System operating as 
an international partnership building on 
three pillars—the Consultative Group, the 
Science Council, and the 15 research centers 
and their Alliance. Part two: the review of 
the effectiveness of research supported by the 
CGIAR based on analysis and synthesis of the 
existing external evaluations such as center 
External Program and Management Reviews 
(EPMRs), the ongoing external reviews of 
Challenge Programs, reviews of the System-
wide and Ecoregional Programs (SWEPs), 
impact assessment studies, the CGIAR 
Member-commissioned reviews of centers/
projects, and other external reviews of the 
CGIAR programs. Findings from both parts 
will be consolidated in a final report that will 
also highlight linkages between the two com-
ponents of the review. 
Part I. Efficacy of partnership: 
governance, management, and 
alignment in the System 
The Consultative Group, its Executive Council, 
and partners
What are the strengths and weaknesses 1. 
of the partnership as a whole? Is the gov-
ernance structure effective and enhanc-
ing the system? What have been the key 
changes in the governance and manage-
ment processes/procedures in recent years, 
and how did that impact the partnership? 
Are there key constraints/limitations to 
the partnership, and if so, what are they? 
How effective is the partnership approach 2. 
taken by the CGIAR in forming an in-
formal international association? Are 
there any lessons for/from other global 
partnerships?
How effective is the CGIAR in serving 3. 
as a platform and catalyst in supporting 
and delivering international agricultural 
research for development? 
In terms of the governance of the Sys-4. 
tem, what has been the performance of 
the Executive Council since its inception 
in 2001 as one of the important compo-
nents of the reform program? Has the 
Executive Council made decisionmaking 
more effective and efficient within the 
CGIAR partnership? Are the role, size, 
and composition of ExCo appropriate 
for its mandate? How effective are the 
CGIAR Annual General Meetings, in-
cluding the Stakeholder Meeting and 
Business Meeting?
Does the partnership operate in a trans-5. 
parent manner? How are the members 
of the partnership accountable to the 
partnership? 
How effective is the CGIAR in establish-6. 
ing and facilitating partnerships among 
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CGIAR Centers and between CGIAR 
Centers and external partners (both pub-
lic and private sector)? 
Is the current financing structure for the 7. 
system appropriate? Is it efficient and 
suited to the development and dissemi-
nation of international public goods? Is 
the CGIAR constricting or creating syn-
ergies for aligning the funding? What is 
the role of unrestricted resources in sup-
porting the system, including the reform 
program? How has the decline in unre-
stricted funding affected the system as 
a whole, particularly its governance and 
its ability to deliver research products 
that contribute to the fulfillment of the 
CGIAR mission? How effectively does 
the system deal with financial risks? 
What is the role of the World Bank, as 8. 
the largest contributor of unrestricted 
resources, in facilitating the operation 
of the system? How is the World Bank 
contribution (which is not only mon-
etary) assisting to leverage other CGIAR 
Members’ funding into the CGIAR and 
impacting reform of the system, its gov-
ernance, mode of operation, etc.? What 
is the role of the other cosponsors?
How do CGIAR Members view their 9. 
involvement and change of involvement 
over the past few years? And the role 
played by the cosponsors?
The Science Council 
How does the SC fulfill its role within 1. 
the system? How is their performance 
perceived by internal and external stake-
holders? Has the SC effectively fulfilled 
the three main objectives for which it was 
set up: 
Enhancing and promoting the qual-•	
ity, relevance, and impact of science 
in the CGIAR.
Advising the group on strategic scien-•	
tific issues of importance to its goals.
Mobilizing and harnessing the best •	
of international science for address-
ing the goals of the international ag-
ricultural research community? 
How has the process for setting system 2. 
priorities, led by the SC, contributed to 
the CGIAR strategic alignment?
Is the size, composition, and structure of 3. 
the Science Council suitable for the key 
functions it performs within the CGIAR 
system?
How is the SC perceived by CGIAR 4. 
Members and Centers?
The Centers
How well does the Alliance of the 1. 
CGIAR Centers perform collectively? 
Is the Alliance a cost-effective mecha-
nism for collective action? How is it per-
ceived by Centers, Members and other 
partners?
How does system governance (ExCo 2. 
and the CGIAR) relate to Center gover-
nance? How does System governance re-
late to the governance of the Alliance of 
the CGIAR Centers? 
How does the autonomy of the 15 re-3. 
search Centers and of the 64 Members 
balance with the need for accountability 
and collective action at the System level? 
What are the challenges of keeping the 
system aligned while also respecting this 
autonomy? 
How effective is the oversight and gov-4. 
ernance of the individual Centers? How 
well equipped are the Center Boards in 
playing this oversight role at the center 
level? 
How effective is the partnering of 5. 
CGIAR Centers outside the system?
The System Office
How effective is the System Office, as a 1. 
virtual structure, in helping to increase 
coordination, capture synergies, and in-
crease overall performance of central ser-
vice units that support the Centers and 
the CGIAR System as a whole?
How well do three units of the System 2. 
Office, namely the CGIAR Secretariat, 
Science Council Secretariat, and the Al-
liance Office, perform their functions? 
Are their structure, size, and composition 
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appropriate for the key functions they 
perform? Are accountability mechanisms 
and processes for increasing efficiency ap-
propriate given their respective roles? Is 
there a potential conflict of interest in 
the CGIAR Secretariat’s involvement in 
administration of the allocation of the 
funds from the World Bank and other 
donors?
What are CGIAR Members and Centers 3. 
perceptions about the three units?
Relations and synergies across the three pillars 
of the CGIAR System
Are the levels of responsibility and ac-1. 
countability among the three pillars ap-
propriate? Are the voices of the three pil-
lars appropriately represented in System 
governance? 
What are the costs, including transac-2. 
tion costs, and benefits of the governance 
structure? Is the distribution of these 
costs and benefits among the three pillars 
appropriate to enhance the implementa-
tion of the mission of the CGIAR?
What are CGIAR Members’ perceptions 3. 
about the issues of relative autonomy and 
accountability and about the current lay-
ers of governance in the System
Part II. Achievements and 
effectiveness of CGIAR research
To assess the achievements (outputs, out-
comes, and impact) and the effectiveness 
of the CGIAR research, the evaluation will 
rely mainly on analysis and synthesis of the 
EPMRs, the Challenge Program External 
Reviews (CPERs), external reviews of system-
wide programs, the CGIAR Member–com-
missioned reviews of centers, projects, and 
other external reviews of the CGIAR pro-
grams, Center- or SC-commissioned impact 
assessment studies, general Center reports 
as well as pertinent development literature. 
The evaluation should address the following 
issues:
Given the level of investment, how do 1. 
CGIAR funds contribute to enhanc-
ing agricultural productivity, natural 
resource management, and food security? 
What is the evidence of the relationship 
between achieving these and economic 
growth and poverty alleviation?
What evidence is there that CGIAR-2. 
generated technology and policy options 
are international public goods that are 
utilized by partners, with the former ul-
timately adopted by poor smallholders 
and the latter implemented by develop-
ment agencies?
Does the CGIAR contribute to poverty 3. 
reduction objectives of international de-
velopment agencies (including the World 
Bank), and how are CGIAR outputs 
being utilized by them? 
How effective are the Challenge Pro-4. 
grams, both in terms of partnership mod-
els they use and also in terms of the pro-
ductivity of the research?
What pressing issues should be consid-5. 
ered for new and expanded CGIAR ef-
forts? Are there areas where CGIAR re-
search could be reduced?
How does investment in agricultural 6. 
research and development relate to agri-
cultural GDP (for example, Sub-Saharan 
Africa), and what is the share of the total 
CGIAR investment in total agricultural 
research and development (for the same 
region)? What is the trend and would an 
increase in international agricultural re-
search investments (such as the CGIAR) 
affect agricultural GDP significantly? 
For example, given the small share of the 
total investment in agricultural research 
and development that is represented by 
the CGIAR investment, and given the re-
turns on this investment so far, would an 
increased investment in CGIAR research 
bring about more than proportional re-
turns in terms of impacts on the CGIAR 
mission? 
Has the CGIAR system maintained its 7. 
focus on international public goods? 
How well do the system priorities posi-
tion the CGIAR with respect to its mis-
sion? What forces are affecting programs 
and decisionmaking in this regard? Is 
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this the most effective focus to alleviate 
poverty?
How effective are current approaches to 8. 
collaborative research with partners? Do 
the respective partnership roles properly 
exploit the comparative and comple-
mentary advantages of those involved? 
Are linkages with national agricultural 
research systems, civil society organiza-
tions, advanced research institutes, and 
the private sector effectively supporting 
the achievements of CGIAR research ob-
jectives as well as meeting partner needs 
and expectations, e.g., how effective have 
Centers been in capacity building of 
NARS?
Methodology 
The methodology for the Review will include 
the following components: 
Interviews with Members, partners, Cen-1. 
ter staff, Center Board members, SO Unit 
staff, and other stakeholders.
Review of core CGIAR documents, such 2. 
as the Charter, CGIAR/ExCo decisions, 
available reviews (e.g., System Office, 
Stripe Review of Corporate Governance 
of CGIAR Centers), and so on. Specific 
issues to look at are the programmatic and 
structural alignment efforts (for example, 
the Centers in Africa), and the system-
wide management of financial risks. 
Analyses and syntheses: 3. 
Reviews of Centers’ External a. 
Program Management Reviews 
(EPMRs) together with the exter-
nal reviews of the Challenge Pro-
grams (CPs) and Systemwide and 
Eco regional Programs (SWEPs). In 
addition, the evaluations of impact 
studies, and other CGIAR evalu-
ations including evaluations done 
by Centers can serve to assess the 
impact of the CGIAR on poverty 
reduction at large. Also the annual 
Performance Measurement System 
(PMS) can provide information on 
the system including accountability 
and transparency. 
Review of evaluations conducted by b. 
other CGIAR Members, including 
the independent World Bank Opera-
tions Evaluation Department Meta-
evaluation of the CGIAR.
Evaluations of other Global c. 
Programs.
Pertinent development literature d. 
(including independent academic 
research on the CGIAR).
Center reports.e. 
Assessment of CGIAR financial and 4. 
funding information to better under-
stand the use of unrestricted funding.
The Review Panel could also commis-5. 
sion studies to address some of the spe-
cific issues that would be outlined during 
the inception consultation (as described 
later). 
The Review Panel would also use quan-6. 
titative indicators in their assessment, 
where possible.
Reports
The evaluation panel is expected to prepare 
three reports:
Inception consultation and work plan. 1. The 
panel will have two inception consulta-
tions with the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group: (i) at the outset of the work to 
seek overall guidance and briefing from 
the Advisory Group; (ii) two to three 
weeks later the evaluation panel will pres-
ent a work plan to the ExCo Ad Hoc Ad-
visory Group seeking their feedback and 
suggestions.
The work plan will provide an oppor-
tunity to 
Further specify methodological and a. 
organizational aspects of the evalu-
ation, including any provisions for 
needed meetings, interviews, site 
visit travel, new data collection, etc. 
Further specify the deliverables avail-b. 
able for the interim report (please see 
below)
The panel will explore the feasibility 
of developing quantitative indicators that 
could possibly be used in the evaluation. 
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Interim Report. 3. An interim report is ex-
pected by March 10, 2008.
Final Report.4. 
The final full report should be sub-
mitted by July 2008 and will highlight 
clear and actionable recommendations. 
A draft final report should be sent by the 
panel for comments. 
Budget 
While the World Bank has agreed to defray 
a major part of the review cost, it would be 
important for other CGIAR Members to 
share the costs. The CGIAR Secretariat would 
be approaching other Members on this issue 
of sharing costs of the Review. Estimates are 
being generated. 
Review panel
Composition
The Review Panel will be composed of a core 
team of five members: 
A panel chair with extensive expertise •	
in evaluation, preferably of interna-
tional research for development net-
works or global partnerships.
A member with extensive experience •	
on institutional governance issues and 
expertise in organizational structure 
issues in the public/private sector.
A member with an understanding of •	
networks or partnerships of multi-
lateral organizations.
Two members with extensive exper-•	
tise in international agricultural re-
search for development leading the 
program review through part 2 of the 
Review.
It would be desirable to have one to two 
members of the panel with significant CGIAR 
System knowledge.
Support and backstopping
One or two consultants will support the panel 
and report to the panel chair. The CGIAR 
Secretariat, the SC Secretariat, and the Alli-
ance Office will help with providing neces-
sary background documentation supporting 
the Review. 
Process for Panel
The CGIAR Membership will be invited to 
nominate firms/institutions or individuals 
for Panel membership according to the above 
specified profiles. The TOR of the External 
Review will be posted on the CGIAR website 
inviting nominations and applications. The 
TOR will also be circulated on listserves 
of professional evaluation associations. A 
long list of all nominations and applications 
received will be prepared and presented to the 
ExCo Ad Hoc Group. The proposed final list 
identified by the ExCo Ad Hoc Group will be 
sent to ExCo/CGIAR for approval. 
Executive Council (ExCo) 
ad hoc advisory group
ExCo established an “ExCo ad hoc advisory 
group to guide finalization of the TOR for 
the external review and panel composition. 
The group should be composed of 1 Alli-
ance representative, 2 CGIAR Members, and 
1 SC/SPIA member.” (Summary Record of 
Proceeding of the 12th Meeting of the CGIAR 
Executive Council May 2007).
As such the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group will guide the finalization of the TOR 
and the selection of the Review Panel and will 
advise the review panel during the review, in 
particular during the inception consultation. 
At the same time, the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group will maintain an adequate distance 
from the panel to ensure the independence of 
the review.
Tentative timeline and key next steps
ExCo Ad Hoc Group formed—June 29, 1. 
2007.
ExCo Ad Hoc Group meeting to finalize 2. 
TOR and discuss panel composition and 
next steps—July 17, 2007.
Invite nominations for panel composition 3. 
from July 17 to August 2, 2007, including 
nominations from CGIAR Membership, 
the ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory Group, open 
call for nominations and applications on 
the CGIAR website, wide dissemina-
tion of TOR to professional evaluation 
associations.
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Long list of nominations and applications 4. 
compiled and sent to ExCo Ad Hoc Ad-
visory group—August 3, 2007.
Virtual meeting of the ExCo Ad Hoc Ad-5. 
visory Group on the selection of a short 
list of the panelists for consideration by 
ExCo/CGIAR—August 7, 2007.
TOR and panel composition approved 6. 
by ExCo/CGIAR before September 30, 
2007.
Inception consultation/work plan dis-7. 
cussed with ExCo Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group by November 16, 2007.
Final Inception Report by December 14, 8. 
2007.
Interim Report on part 1 and part 2 by 9. 
March 10, 2008.
Final report submitted by July 30, 2008.10. 
Panel Members, secretaries, 
and advisors
Elizabeth J. McAllister, Panel Chair
Elizabeth McAllister has held leadership 
positions in international development for 25 
years. She served in a number of senior posi-
tions at the World Bank including Director 
of the Operations Evaluation Department 
(OED; now the Independent Evaluation 
Group) where she directed a work program 
of 400 products a year to provide an indepen-
dent assessment of World Bank/ International 
Development Association operations, poli-
cies, and practices to satisfy the require-
ments of accountability to member countries. 
While leading the department, she was deeply 
involved with her staff in a number of major 
evaluations, including Forestry, Aid Coordi-
nation, Gender, the Special Partnership for 
African Development, and several Country 
Assistance Evaluations. Ms. McAllister led 
OED through a change process that funda-
mentally altered how the department oper-
ated. During her tenure, OED linked its work 
plan to the Bank’s policy agenda and scaled up 
its products to country, thematic/sector, and 
global reviews from a previous focus on project 
evaluation, and developed a results framework 
to measure its own outcomes reported to the 
Board in the Annual Report on Operations 
Evaluation. While at the Bank, Ms. McAllis-
ter also held positions as Director of External 
Affairs and United Nations Relations, Direc-
tor of Special Projects, Strategy and Resource 
Management Vice Presidency; and Special 
Advisor to the Vice President on managing for 
results in the East Asia and Pacific Region. 
Prior to joining the World Bank, Ms. 
McAllister held executive positions in the 
Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) in operations and policy, 
including Director General, Performance 
Review (Evaluation, Internal Audit, and Re-
sults Based Management); Director General, 
Latin American and the Caribbean Region; 
Director of the China Country Program; 
Counselor, Development in Indonesia; and 
Director of Women in Development. During 
her career, Ms. McAllister represented CIDA 
and the World Bank in leadership positions 
in a wide variety of high level international 
forums, including OECD–DAC, the United 
Nations, the Organization of American 
States, and country coordination meetings. 
Her education includes a Masters of Pub-
lic Administration from Harvard University 
and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science 
from the University of New Brunswick. She 
has taken courses in law and program evalua-
tion and benefited from the World Bank’s in-
tensive Executive Development Program with 
Harvard University, INSEAD, and Stanford 
University. 
Ms. McAllister is a recipient of a number 
of awards for community service and leader-
ship, including a 1994 Governor General’s 
Commemorative Medal in recognition of 
significant contribution to Canada.
Her recent clients include various pro-
grams within the World Bank, the European 
Commission, the Canadian Task Force on 
Afghanistan, the International Federation of 
the Red Cross Red Crescent, and the Carib-
bean Development Bank. In addition to her 
professional contributions, Ms. McAllister 
works pro bono for a number of organizations 
focused on disability, international relations, 
development, and international evaluation. 
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Keith Bezanson, Panel Member
Keith Bezanson holds degrees from Carle-
ton University (BA) and Stanford University 
(PhD), as well as the degree of Doctor of Sci-
ence (Honoris Causa) from the University of 
Sussex. His career has involved over 35 con-
secutive years of scholarship and leadership in 
international development. 
Dr. Bezanson has taught, researched, and 
published on a wide range of development 
subjects, including African education, sus-
tainable development, science and technology, 
poverty reduction, development effectiveness, 
the multilateral development system, the fi-
nancing of development, institutional trans-
formation, the East Asian financial crisis, and 
the provision and financing of international 
public goods. 
In addition, Dr. Bezanson has held a 
number of senior leadership positions in in-
ternational organizations, including Direc-
tor of the Institute of Development Studies, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the 
International Development Research Centre, 
Ambassador of Canada to Peru and Bolivia, 
Vice-President of the Canadian International 
Development Agency, and Vice-President of 
the Inter-American Development Bank. He 
recently (2006–07) served as Team Leader 
and Principal Author of the largest indepen-
dent evaluation of a United Nations agency 
(the Food and Agriculture Organization) ever 
carried out. 
He serves as Senior Advisor to the Presi-
dent of the International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development and to the Executive Di-
rector of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. He also serves as a 
trustee to a number of international develop-
ment institutions. 
Gopal K. Chadha, Panel Member
G.K. Chadha has a 38-year distinguished 
career in teaching and research. He is a Pro-
fessor Emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-
versity, New Delhi from where he recently 
retired as Vice-Chancellor. He is also a Uni-
versity Grants Commission Emeritus Fellow 
for Economics and serves as a Member of the 
Economic Advisory Council to the Prime 
Minister of India. Recently, he has taken over 
as the Chief Executive Officer of the newly 
created South Asian University located in 
New Delhi. His teaching career includes 
international experience as a Visiting Fellow 
at the Institute of Development Studies, Uni-
versity of Sussex, England; a Visiting Research 
Fellow at the Institute of Developing Econo-
mies, Tokyo; and a Visiting Professor at the 
University of Mauritius. Professor Chadha 
is currently an Honorary Professor at Shen-
zhen University, China, and Nihon Fuku-
shi University, Nagoya-Japan. Additionally, 
Professor Chadha serves as a member of the 
International Advisory Board of the Centre 
for Development Research, Colombo. 
Professor Chadha is a recipient of numer-
ous awards and distinctions for his contribu-
tions in the field of economics. He has recently 
been elected as the President of the Indian 
Economic Association. In prior years, he had 
been the President of the Indian Society of 
Agricultural Economics as well the Indian 
Society of Labour Economics. He is an author 
of 16 books and a contributor to 85 research 
papers in national and international research 
journals on a wide range of development issues 
relating to India and other developing coun-
tries of Asia, notably Indonesia and China. 
In addition to teaching, Professor Chadha 
worked as a consultant to several international 
development organizations, including such 
United Nations agencies as the Food and Ag-
riculture Organization, the International La-
bour Organization, the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development, and the 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific, and served on numerous in-
ternational and national expert committees. 
John Ouma Mugabe, Panel Member
John Ouma Mugabe is the Regional Director 
of the Eastern and Southern African Office 
of the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN). Prior to joining IUCN, 
he was the Science and Technology Advisor 
to the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop-
ment and Secretary of the African Ministerial 
 138 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
Council on Science and Technology based in 
Pretoria, South Africa. He is an Associate Pro-
fessor at the Institute of Technological Inno-
vation University of Pretoria. In 2002, he was 
elected Fellow of the World Academy of Art 
and Science. He also serves on boards of sev-
eral research and development institutes.
Dr. Mugabe holds a doctorate degree in 
political economy of science and technol-
ogy from the University of Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, and has published widely. He is 
the author of more than 20 monographs, edi-
tor of several books, and author of numerous 
research and conference papers on science, 
technology, and environmental policy issues. 
Jeff Waage, Panel Member
Jeff Waage, OBE, is the Director of the Lon-
don International Development Centre, a col-
laboration between six Colleges of the Uni-
versity of London.
Professor Waage was trained as an ento-
mologist and ecologist and has made a sub-
stantial research contribution to the theory 
and practice of biological control and inte-
grated pest management. 
His international research management ca-
reer began when he joined CAB International, 
where he was sequentially Director of the In-
ternational Institute of Biological Control and 
Chief Executive Officer of CABI Bioscience. 
During this period he developed and managed 
a range of donor-funded collaborations with 
CGIAR and national agricultural research sys-
tems partners, including the successful biologi-
cal control of insect pests on tropical crops and 
development of a biopesticide for the desert lo-
cust (the LUBILOSA programme with IITA). 
While at CABI, he cofounded, with the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and World Bank 
colleagues, the Global Integrated Pest Manage-
ment Facility; advised the United Nations and 
World Bank on integrated pest management; 
and was the President of the International Or-
ganization of Biological Control. 
Professor Waage cofounded, and subse-
quently chaired, the Global Invasive Species 
Programme, a project of the Global Environ-
ment Facility linked to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. In 2001 he became Head 
of the Department of Agricultural Sciences at 
Imperial College (formerly Wye College) and 
subsequently restructured this and environ-
mental research at Imperial College. During 
this period he was also Chair of the Sustain-
able Agricultural Panel of the Biological and 
Biotechnological Science Research Council 
in the United Kingdom and a member of the 
Science Advisory Council for the UK De-
partment of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs.
Karin Perkins, Panel Secretary
Karin Perkins has extensive knowledge of the 
CGIAR. She was an analyst in the Review 
Secretariat of the Third System Review, and 
she coordinated the World Bank Opera-
tions Evaluation Department’s (OED) 2003 
Meta-evaluation of the CGIAR, in which 
she also evaluated the system’s governance 
and financing mechanisms. While work-
ing with the Foreign Agricultural Service of 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
she coordinated CGIAR-related programs 
between the USDA and the US Agency for 
International Development. 
Ms. Perkins’s other evaluation experience 
includes participating in OED’s evaluation of 
the World Bank’s Forest Policy, in which she 
was coauthor of a country case study on Brazil, 
and conducting an assessment of the results of 
World Bank agriculture projects in the Africa 
Region for the Bank’s Agriculture and Rural 
Development Department. Among other pro-
fessional positions, she managed a multistake-
holder research program on protected-area 
management in the Dominican Republic for 
Cornell University’s International Institute 
for Food, Agriculture, and Development; 
analyzed land-use changes in Ecuador at the 
Agricultural Policy Institute in Quito; and re-
searched high-value food crop production in 
Latin America at World Resources Institute. 
Most recently, Ms. Perkins has worked as 
a consultant in the World Bank’s Agriculture 
and Rural Development and Environment 
Departments, outlining the Bank’s strategy 
for forest law enforcement and governance. 
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Ms. Perkins has lived and worked in Latin 
America and Indonesia and has a master’s 
degree in Development Policy from Cornell 
University, with a background in agricultural 
and resource economics.
Kenneth Watson, Panel Secretary
Kenneth Watson is a professional evalua-
tor and evaluation methodologist. He has 
supported several major evaluation research 
efforts and has led assignments in the agricul-
tural research sector. 
Dr. Watson was the principal econo-
mist for the evaluation of the Eco-Research 
Program, a joint program of the three main 
Granting Councils of the Government of 
Canada (The Canadian Institutes of Medical 
Research, the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council, and the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council), involv-
ing an assessment of research carried out at 27 
universities and research institutions and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the network 
itself. In addition, Dr. Watson was a principal 
in a multicomponent evaluation of the Asian 
Development Fund V–VIII for which he de-
signed the evaluation, coordinated inputs from 
a large team of consultants, and wrote substan-
tial parts of the draft of the synthesis report. 
In 2007 he played a similar role for the Ca-
ribbean Development Bank, leading a team of 
five consultants to evaluate the Special Devel-
opment Fund, Cycle 6. Dr. Watson has suc-
cessfully completed three assignments for the 
International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment, in the area of concessionary resource 
allocation models. He has also monitored or 
evaluated agricultural extension projects for 
the Asian Development Bank and the Carib-
bean Development Bank. 
Dr. Watson is a member of the Institute for 
Risk Research (Canada) and has undertaken 
assignments related to food inspection (Audi-
tor General of Canada), randomized field tri-
als for veterinary biologics (Auditor General of 
Canada), the strategic plan of the Central Ex-
perimental Farm (Agriculture and Agrifood 
Canada), regional research facilities (Agricul-
ture and Agrifood Canada), and international 
programs to facilitate Canada’s agriculture 
exports. He has led several evaluation studies 
on agriculture programs (including evalua-
tion of seasonal storage facilities and related 
research). He has also undertaken evaluations 
of research facilities, including an assessment 
of salmon stock management research facili-
ties (Fisheries and Oceans Canada).
Previously, Dr. Watson held a position of 
Full Professor (fixed term) at the Australian 
National University, Managing Business in 
Asia Program. He is the author of the Cana-
dian Treasury Board Secretariat Guide to Ben-
efit Cost Analysis and the Canadian Treasury 
Board Guide to Evaluation Methods. He is a 
recipient of the 2002 Contribution to Evalu-
ation Award of the Canadian Evaluation So-
ciety, presented annually to a person who has 
made a significant contribution to the theory 
and practice of evaluation in Canada. In ad-
dition to professional publications, he has 
12 peer-reviewed articles on evaluation. He 
is a member of the Campbell Collaboration 
for meta-evaluations and the development 
of systematic reviews across countries and 
disciplines.
Dr. Watson holds a doctorate from 
Harvard University in economics and public 
finance.
Joan Barclay, Panel Senior Advisor
Joan Barclay has over 20 years of executive level 
experience in the development, growth, and 
leadership of nonprofit and for-profit organi-
zations. Her expertise focuses on developing 
actionable strategies that align organizational 
vision and mission with daily operations. Ms. 
Barclay has a successful track record working 
with senior executives to identify core com-
petencies and to capitalize on opportunities 
that grow and strengthen the organization’s 
key programs and services. As an independent 
consultant and President of Barclay Associ-
ates, she has provided financial analysis and 
strategic direction to the senior management 
and nonprofit Board of Directors of National 
Geographic, the US Naval Institute, Public 
Radio International, and the Community 
Services for Autistic Adults and Children. 
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During her tenure with Booz Allen Ham-
ilton’s Change Management Division, Ms. 
Barclay lead a team of analysts in a $30 bil-
lion restructuring of a US federal healthcare 
organization, including the evaluation of key 
operating functions and processes. She was 
also instrumental in developing the strate-
gic plan for Booz Allen’s Global Healthcare 
Business spearheading the industry analysis 
of growth markets, competitors, trends, and 
opportunities. 
Prior to starting Barclay Associates, she 
was a Vice President and Chief Financial Of-
ficer with Time Life, Inc., where she managed 
the financial operations of a $250 million di-
vision and was instrumental in the successful 
launch of new products and services. 
Ms. Barclay holds a BS in Economics and 
an MBA from the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania. She has been a 
Chartered Financial Analyst since 1990.
Francisco Sagasti, Panel Senior Advisor
Francisco Sagasti is Senior Associate at FORO 
Nacional/Internacional, Chair of the Board 
of the Science and Technology Program at the 
Office of the Prime Minister in Peru, member 
of the Board of Governors of the Canadian 
International Development Research Cen-
tre, and member of the international advi-
sory board of The Lemelson Foundation. He 
advises and consults with international orga-
nizations, private foundations, and public sec-
tor agencies in a variety of subjects, including 
development financing, social policies, devel-
opment strategies, science and technology 
policies, international relations and develop-
ment cooperation. 
Previously, Dr. Sagasti has been Direc-
tor of the Agenda PERÚ program at FORO 
 Nacional/Internacional; Chief of Strategic 
Planning and senior advisor at the World 
Bank; visiting professor at the Wharton 
School of Finance, University of Pennsyl-
vania; and chairman of the United Nations 
Advisory Committee on Science and Tech-
nology for Development. Dr. Sagasti was a 
founder and executive director of GRADE, a 
policy-oriented think tank in Peru; advisor to 
the ministers of foreign affairs, education, in-
dustry and the prime minister; advisor to the 
Chief of the National Planning Institute and 
the National Council for Science and Tech-
nology; Vice-Chairman of the Board of the 
Industrial Technology Institute in Perú, and 
consultant to numerous private, public and 
civil society organizations. He has also taught 
at the Universidad del Pacífico and the Pon-
tificia Universidad Católica del Perú and has 
been a visiting lecturer at several universities 
in the United States, Europe, and developing 
regions. 
Dr. Sagasti holds a Ph.D. in operations 
research and social systems sciences from the 
University of Pennsylvania and engineering 
degrees from the National Engineering Uni-
versity in Lima, Peru and Pennsylvania State 
University. He is the author of more than 20 
books and monographs of about 200 papers 
and is a frequent contributor to Peruvian 
newspapers and magazines. 
Notes
This System Office External Review focused on assessing 1. 
the synergies and added value of operating as a System 
Office, but it did not review the individual units composing 
the System Office, as those are reviewed individually.
The term 2. alignment has been used in the CGIAR to 
encompass (i) alignment among Centers in terms 
of program, governance and corporate services, 
(ii) alignment at system level among Members, and 
(iii) alignment between the different components 
constituting the CGIAR System (i.e. Members, Science 
Council, Centers, and System Office). Alignment in this 
context refers to the capacity to work more effectively 
together toward the accomplishment of the mission of 
the CGIAR.
In addition, the review would also help CGIAR meet 3. 
requirements of the World Bank Development Grant 
Facility whereby grant recipients need to be evaluated 
every three to five years. The World Bank has contributed 
$50 million a year in the several past years to the CGIAR, 
and is the largest provider of unrestricted funds to the 
system. It provides the system with its Chair and Director, 
and houses the CGIAR Secretariat. The strategy used by 
the World Bank in the past several years is to support the 
Centers with unrestricted resources (general support) and 
the reform program initiated in 2001.
The SO includes a list of nine units—Central Advisory 4. 
Service for Intellectual Property, CGIAR Secretariat, 
Chief Information Office, Alliance Office, Gender and 
Diversity Program, Strategic Advisory Service on Human 
Resources, Internal Audit Unit, Media Unit, and Science 
Council Secretariat.
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Shareholder and stakeholder 
consultations
This appendix covers shareholder and stake-
holder consultations, a list of people consulted, 
and a summary of the Independent Review 
Panel survey of informed stakeholders.
Center visits
Because time and resource constraints made it 
impossible for Panel members to visit all Cen-
ters during the Review, Panel members vis-
ited selected Centers. These Centers included 
Bioversity, ICRISAT, IFPRI, IITA, ILRI, 
IWMI, and World Agroforestry. 
The visits were not intended to evaluate 
Centers individually. They were intended to 
enable the Panel members to develop an un-
derstanding of the Centers collectively—with 
a reasonably large sample—and to go into 
Review questions in depth with the Centers. 
This was vital to a successful Review.
Each Center visit included interviews with 
the Director General, the Board Chair (where 
possible), senior scientists and young scientists, 
CGIAR member representatives (where possi-
ble), the national agricultural research systems, 
and stakeholder organizations. Key topics ad-
dressed during each visit included:
The Center’s focus (strategy, scenarios).•	
The Center’s funding (restricted •	
and unrestricted, other resource 
mobilization).
The Center’s stability profile and fi-•	
nancial performance.
The Center’s productivity (outputs).•	
The Center’s impact (outcomes).•	
The strength of the Center’s part-•	
nerships (specific links within the 
CGIAR and outside).
Perceptions at the Center of the value •	
added by the CGIAR (incremental 
funding, scientific priorities advice, 
integration of gender perspectives, 
Challenge Programs, and adminis-
trative support).
Willingness at the Center to em-•	
brace possible reforms to the CGIAR 
System.
Surveys and interviews
The Independent Review Panel survey of 
informed stakeholders was not sample-based. 
Instead, the Panel surveyed all the people—
about 240—who had held certain positions 
in the CGIAR or the Centers during the five 
years preceding the survey. These included:
Directors General of the Centers.•	
Deputy Directors General (Research).•	
Chairs of Center Boards.•	
Members of the Science Council.•	
System Office professional and execu-•	
tive staff.
Challenge Program staff.•	
Representatives of CGIAR members.•	
With an overall response rate of 85 per-
cent, the Survey gave the Panel significant 
input from knowledgeable System stakehold-
ers across a broad spectrum of issues relevant 
to the Review’s objectives. 
Methodology and 
sources of informationAp
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Persons consulted (continued)
CGIAR members
Peter Core Director, Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR), Australia 
Jos Kalders Directorate General for Development Cooperation 
(DGDC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belguim
Alexandre Cardoso Office of International Relations, EMPRAPA, Brazil
Elisio Contini Agricultural Economist, EMBRAPA, Brazil
Francisco Reifschneider Past CGIAR Director, Brazil
Charles Haines Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), Canada
John Jackson Director, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada
Iain MacGillivray Senior Program Officer, Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), Canada
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Summary of results of 
Independent Review Panel survey 
of informed stakeholders
The survey was conducted in early 2008 as 
part of the work of the Independent Review 
Panel. The results were intended to comple-
ment visits to the Centers and personal inter-
views that were undertaken by members of 
the Review Panel during the same period. 
It was sent to 237 individuals in five tar-
get groups: the Executive Council and other 
member representatives, Board Chairs and 
Center Executives, Challenge Program rep-
resentatives, the Science Council, and profes-
sional staff. Some 201 individuals answered 
the questionnaire, for a response rate of 85 
percent for the target groups together. 
The intent of the survey sample was to ex-
amine how well those knowledgeable about 
or directly involved in managing the CGIAR 
network think it is being managed and what 
corrective steps might be taken to improve 
this. Others involved in the network—such as 
the large number of scientists doing Centers’ 
work, their partners (national agricultural re-
search systems, advanced research institutes), 
or the direct beneficiaries of their efforts 
(farmers, fishers)—were not asked to respond. 
But Panel members did interview the Centers’ 
scientists, partner representatives, and others 
during their overseas visits. It is interesting 
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that their opinions did not differ substantially 
from those of survey respondents. 
Survey questions focused on a number of 
areas, including the development and imple-
mentation of center research priorities; the roles 
of the World Bank (financial and other), gen-
der, and diversity; the roles and effectiveness of 
the Science Council, of CGIAR partnerships, 
and of CGIAR members and cosponsors; the 
Challenge Programs; funding and financial 
management; and governance reform. Several 
questions compared the importance of an issue 
with the effectiveness or adequacy with which 
it is being addressed. Over a third asked respon-
dents to select possible actions that might deal 
with the issues identified and invited them to 
comment on these and related concerns. 
General findings
The effectiveness deficit—a most pressing 1. 
challenge
Although respondents judged most CGIAR 
system actors, functions, or activities as 
important or very important, they were 
almost always rated significantly lower with 
respect to effectiveness. One clear exception 
was the World Bank in its cosponsorship role, 
with 64 percent importance and 54 percent 
effectiveness ratings.
Roles, responsibilities, and authorities2. 
The survey revealed clearly that responsibili-
ties and authorities are not well balanced. 
Throughout, respondents pointed to the 
need to clarify, strengthen, change, and re-
distribute roles, responsibilities, and authori-
ties with respect to CGIAR System actors, 
defined broadly to include state and organi-
zational donors, cosponsors, and partners. It 
was also apparent that many respondents did 
not know who had responsibility and author-
ity to make decisions or get things done.
The need for better communication 3. 
A significant number of respondents pointed 
to problems with trust and communication 
between the Centers, the CGIAR, the Sci-
ence Council, and external stakeholders. 
The need to manage partners and the part-4. 
nering process well
Throughout the survey, and especially in those 
questions that focused specifically on partner-
ships, respondents stressed the importance 
of healthy partnerships within the CGIAR 
System and with sponsors and other outside 
partners. They also offered several suggestions 
on how these partnerships might be managed 
more effectively.
Opinions—some shared, others polarized5. 
There was a surprising level of agreement about 
the importance or effectiveness of a particular 
CGIAR actor or activity. Differences of opin-
ion tended to be much more polarized in the 
respondents’ more open-ended comments, 
especially where there was already some dis-
agreement (for example, the importance and 
effectiveness of Challenge Programs). There 
was also a great deal of consistency between 
groups on the relative priority of the options 
offered for discussion in the questions on how 
to improve a given situation (80–100 percent 
agreement on relative priority of options for 
15 of the 18 “how to improve” questions). 
At the same time, there were some very 
significant disagreements—between respon-
dent groups and individual respondents. 
These were particularly evident, for example, 
in comments about the kind of organization 
respondents want to see the CGIAR become 
(more centralized or more decentralized with 
respect to decisionmaking) or how resources 
should be allocated (more or less performance 
based).
Findings by topic
Center research priorities1. 
Respondents generally agreed that the CGIAR 
and Centers are highly effective in the sustain-
ing biodiversity and genetic improvements 
research areas. Effectiveness ratings were rela-
tively low for agricultural diversification and 
polices and institutions, and in the midrange 
for sustainable resources. Respondents identi-
fied some reasons why these priorities are not 
being met as effectively as they might be.
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Roles of the World Bank2. 
Nonfinancial roles. Between 44 and 69 percent 
of respondents thought that having the World 
Bank provide the Chair of Executive Com-
mittee, the Director of the Secretariat, and 
secretariat offices was important. The Bank’s 
exercise of its convening power received an 
importance rating of 82 percent (very impor-
tant). However, a number of respondents 
were concerned that these functions should 
be more independent from the Bank. 
Financial roles. The World Bank is a donor 
and cosponsor, a mobilizer of contributions 
from other donors, and the manager of the 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Sixty-four percent 
indicated that it is appropriate for the World 
Bank to perform all these. And 54 percent 
believe it is performing these roles effectively. 
There were some concerns about whether the 
Bank is in a conflict of interest by fulfilling 
both financial and governance roles, about 
the lack of openness and transparency, and 
related issues. 
Gender and diversity3. 
Respondents identified a need for more work 
to make the gender and diversity perspective 
an integral part of CGIAR and Center culture, 
despite some potentially difficult challenges.
Science Council 4. 
The Science Council’s roles, responsibilities, 
and relationships with other CGIAR System 
actors were frequently questioned. Respon-
dents focused on (a) the nature, quality, and 
quantity of Council personnel and other 
resources; (b) the degree of creativity, inno-
vation, and appropriate risk-taking needed 
to support ground-breaking research; and (c) 
ways to improve performance. 
Partnerships5. 
The vast majority of respondents believe 
that partnerships with national agricultural 
research systems, advanced research institutes, 
the private sector, and between Centers are 
important or very important, and most were 
judged to be effective. Suggestions were also 
made about how to make them more effective. 
It is interesting that partnerships with the pri-
vate sector were generally devalued in com-
parison with the other partnerships.
Cosponsors in addition to the World Bank6. 
In addition to the World Bank, there are three 
other cosponsors: the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development. Respondents 
questioned (a) whether the concept of “cospon-
sor” is useful and should be continued; (b) 
what additional powers and responsibilities 
they should have; and (c) whether they should 
become more involved in the CGIAR, the Cen-
ters, and Challenge Programs and, if so, how.
Challenge Programs 7. 
The Challenge Programs were not highly rated, 
and there was general uncertainty whether they 
should stay or go. Many feel they are poorly 
managed, costly, and competing against the 
Centers for financial and other resources 
Funding and financial management8. 
The key issues with respect to unrestricted 
funding were the need to: (a) reverse declining 
levels of unrestricted funds; (b) improve man-
agement to build trust and thereby attract more 
unrestricted funds from donors; and (c) man-
age the relationship with donors better. Some 
key issues identified on financial management 
were: (a) a concern that there is a general lack 
of appreciation for the importance of risk man-
agement; and (b) the need to have qualified 
people in place across the system who under-
stand finances, audit, and risk management.
Governance reform9. 
The general consensus was that reform efforts 
since 2002 have, at best, been moderately 
effective—though they have been costly, 
both in terms of money and administrative 
burden. Many respondents suggested changes 
that would improve governance in the future, 
some of which were discussed with other 
issues. Respondents also identified some key 
barriers to reform and provided ideas on how 
they might be overcome. 
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Commentary by Margaret 
Catley Carlson
The Independent Review Panel has considered 
the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability 
of the CGIAR in order to make recommenda-
tions on how the CGIAR can be better posi-
tioned to address emerging issues of food and 
agriculture of developing countries.1 
Five overarching contributions 
of the Independent Review
The amount of information supplied is 1. 
extraordinary—probably far beyond the 
capacity to absorb it. The chapter on gov-
ernance is an exceptional document in the 
history and analysis which should be read 
by all in the System, and used rather than 
repeated or redone in future analyses.
The Independent Review has gone fur-2. 
ther than earlier reviews in pointing out 
some of the reasons for the dysfunction-
alities in the current system. It is very 
candid about causes and symptoms of the 
malaise—diversion of effort, too many 
layers of inconclusive decisionmaking, 
lack of clarity in the decisions taken. This 
gives Members a real opportunity to ask 
themselves whether suggested solutions 
in either the Independent Review or the 
Working Group reports would actually 
address the real problems in the system 
as set out in the Independent Review. 
There are sensible recommendations 3. 
which draw a strong and necessary link 
between program impact deficiencies 
and the absence of a more professional 
gender approach (more emphasis on 
programmatic dimensions using proven 
methodologies, rather than the current 
focus on personnel and staffing as the 
principal measure of good gender input) 
and partnership (should grow organi-
cally and relate to the need to fulfill the 
system mandate and promote implemen-
tation and dissemination). These need 
to be adopted. The existing rhetoric on 
private sector collaboration needs to be 
subject to serious exploration of actual 
 possibilities—as suggested.
The report recommendation for declared 4. 
and specific transitional arrangements 
and the call for “directive, top down 
approaches with specified milestones” 
should be heeded—no matter which se-
ries of structural changes is adopted, In-
dependent Review or Working Groups.
The report notes that the combination of 5. 
donor sovereignty, center independence, 
and consensus decisionmaking has over 
time gotten the system where it is, and—
unless modified—will nourish the cur-
rent problems, not provide solutions. 
Ten inconvenient deficiencies 
and how the Independent 
Review recommendations would 
address some of these 
No consensus on change direction. 1. All agree 
on the urgent need for change, but there 
is no consensus on the direction such 
change must take. In particular, how can 
we engineer the essential consensus bar-
gain of an assured increase in the flow 
of unrestricted resources in return for 
guaranteed (but unspecified) output and 
changes in behavior? 
The Independent Review does not a. 
suggest how to get to consensus. 
Once again, the recommendation 
expert commentaries on 
the Technical reportAp
p
e
n
D
Ix
5
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is for structural change in the (un-
proven) hope that such change will 
provide new structures within which 
it will be possible to engineer the 
needed consensus.
The suggestions of my coreviewer, b. 
Uma Lele, should be read with great 
care—it may now be essential to 
hammer out agreement on how to 
get on with it now among a small core 
group which is capable and willing to 
support an accord with resources. 
Considerable work effort misplaced. 2. The 
current system exacts an extraordinary 
price in focusing of the time and effort 
of managers on system issues, rather than 
those issues related to the agricultural 
improvement and poverty-reduction 
mandate—and this has continued and 
intensified over the past half-decade. At 
the same time those charged with gover-
nance, such as the Executive Council, are 
overburdened with reports and analysis 
and spend much time on issues best left 
to management purview.
The Independent Review report has a. 
documented and described this well. 
The report suggests and offers con-
crete steps on the separation of gov-
ernance management. 
The report suggests removing the b. 
Science Council from some manage-
ment and system issues, which could 
reduce part of the distortion caused 
by too many entities giving manage-
ment advice. 
The complex of issues surrounding c. 
the Secretariat are set out but not 
resolved.
Duplication and churn in the system (a re-3. 
lated but not identical issue). It is symp-
tomatic of severe problems in the system 
that this Independent Review has been 
undertaken at the same time as a paral-
lel exercise of Working Groups has been 
considering a number of the same issues. 
It is not the first time that one mega-exer-
cise has begun while another is finishing 
or mooted. The result is perpetual churn 
in the system. And yet neither review 
really suggests how to get to a position 
where someone has the authority and the 
accountability to make decisions that do 
not impose such duplication and heavy 
costs on the system. Someone or some 
group must have the authority to pull 
the major players into a small room and 
emerge with a compromise that cuts into 
this cycle and creates reasonable, cost-
conscious decisions.  
There is an accelerating mountain of a. 
requests and demands on the Cen-
ters for reports, workplan analyses, 
evaluations, appraisals, statements, 
and restatements of their activities. 
There is also an accelerating mass of 
material for the Executive Council 
to work through. This is noted in 
the Change Reform panels and in 
the Independent Review—but nei-
ther report states what will be put in 
place to stop this. 
Nobody can say “no” in the system b. 
and get the workload focused on the 
essentials. (Instead of concentrating 
on defining the core, central, tough-
est issues, the definitional meetings 
for this Independent Review ex-
panded the scope to the point where 
the excellent final product stands a 
real chance of never being read). 
The Independent Review rec-i. 
ommendations would help out 
somewhat in that they reduce 
the mandate of at least one 
player, the Science Council, to 
intervene and demand work be 
done on a number of system and 
management issues. 
The system needs to adopt a UN c. 
habit and impose strict limits on 
page length of documents (e.g., 10 
pages with annexes, etc., put on the 
web). The current documentation 
flow is absurd. 
Lack of international “voice” on agricul-4. 
tural issues. The Independent Review re-
port notes that the CGIAR System lacks 
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the way to channel its best advice to in-
ternational conferences on key issues of 
climate change and food security. This is 
puzzling given that the products are often 
at hand: the massive and well packaged 
Comprehensive Assessment on water, the 
IFPRI work on subjects from the impact 
of rural roads on agriculture to biofuels 
to alternative investment patterns, the 
very compelling ILRI work on threats to 
biodiversity in livestock, etc. Much of this 
work has been made clear and accessible. 
Some effort might be devoted to working 
out what specific effort is needed to im-
prove the CGIAR voice in the clamor—
perhaps more important than, or at least 
an essential adjunct to, further structural 
reworking. 
There is also a difference between a. 
coordinating and facilitative mecha-
nisms, such as one that might exist 
between the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and Alliance to avoid 
the need to conclude seven agree-
ments with seven Centers in order 
to have program cooperation. Coor-
dinating mechanisms, on the other 
hand, lead to the syndrome of re-
peated annual coordinating meet-
ings with X, Y, and Z—and more 
frustration at the lack of output.
This underlines the source of one b. 
of the continuing pressures to cre-
ate more central, work-directing or-
gans. There are complaints reported 
in this chapter about “no single 
point of entry”—for the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, for the 
private sector, etc. One answer to 
that is “why should there be?”—or, 
more precisely, “for what exact rea-
son should there be?”, if the Centers 
are entities pursuing different re-
search agendas focused on improv-
ing the situation for poor farmers in 
their area of competence? A point of 
entry that is good at providing a Di-
rectory (who does what, where) will 
not lessen much of the frustration. 
What these entities are talking 
about is a point of entry that can en-
sure that actions take place by desig-
nated Centers. Before effecting this 
degree of central coordination, one 
would have to be awfully sure that 
the golden ring exists—is the Food 
and Agriculture Organization really 
going to create an improved, encom-
passing global food strategy that the 
whole world will agree with, if Cen-
ters coordinate? Are the imaginable 
private sector collaboration gains re-
ally there if there were a coordinating 
point of entry? 
Financing is restricted, directed, and does 5. 
not cover all costs for which project mon-
ies may be made available. The useful 
and candid review of donor comport-
ment does not suggest how these donors’ 
domestically derived strictures are to be 
overcome in the proposed Fund for Agri-
cultural Research. If adopted, this Fund 
could go a good direction in solving the 
financing issues. As most of the current 
discussion is focused in this area, I con-
centrate on the other issues.
Lack of ambitious strategies focused on 6. 
development breakthroughs and suscep-
tible to attracting financial inflows.2 I will 
leave to my very distinguished coreviewer 
the discussion on the needed precedence of 
form vs. function. The Independent Re-
view locates the responsibility for stra-
tegic development in the proposed Con-
sortia, close to the Centers, in dialogue 
with the Fund. This is undoubtedly the 
correct location for this function. A num-
ber of short specific dialogues based on 
short specific papers should be the main 
vehicle for establishing system directions 
and address issues. 
Unrealistic goal language. 7. The language 
of the system goals is not appropriate 
for what the CGIAR Centers can actu-
ally deliver. The emerging issues of food 
and agriculture of developing countries 
must be addressed by policy reform and 
investment within those countries. The 
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CGIAR Centers can advise on both but 
cannot deliver either. The CGIAR Mem-
bers which could deliver more in these 
areas have not to date used the CGIAR 
venue to articulate or negotiate their own 
contributions to investment or policy 
change. The unrealistic goal statements 
lead to frustration. It is probably a pious 
hope to suggest that goal statements 
should be set in terms of yield improve-
ments, rural stabilization and improve-
ment, and environmental preservation, 
but it would lead to systemic goals more 
in line with deliverables.
CGIAR cannot even have large-scale a. 
impact on yields and rural devel-
opment without either substantial 
strengthening of national agricul-
tural research systems in the poor-
est countries, or more acceptance of 
the dissemination and training and 
information-dispersion role of the 
Centers. Good, even great scientific 
breakthroughs and technology do 
not sell themselves or autodistribute. 
Pilot projects rarely foment change 
outside the project areas without in-
tensive ongoing investment. The very 
slow uptake of New Rice for Africa 
rice is only the latest example. The In-
dependent Review speaks to the need 
to find more consensuses on the up-
stream-downstream debate; perhaps 
there needs to be more differentiation 
among Centers or Center activities 
to set out where downsteam work is 
needed and welcomed by the system? 
Partnerships not effective. 8. The effort 
to foster and maintain partnerships is 
highly resource intensive, and these re-
sources come from time and money 
that has alternative uses. Forming part-
nerships because of system pressures or 
political correctness, or trying to forge 
partnerships where the shared interest 
and opportunities are tenuous at best, 
or because these are essential to a perfor-
mance reporting system, can be highly 
distortive. Partnerships are not a virtue 
in themselves. A well running research 
center would want to form relationships 
with those that could contribute to its 
mandate. Elaborate systemwide struc-
tures and processes which are not based 
on constructive opportunism (as most 
successful partnerships are) end up being 
expensive, time-consuming, and not suc-
cessful by anybody’s measurement of 
them. Frustration—and anger with the 
Centers as the operators—results. 
There is also a misleading tendency 
to see a progression where none exists, 
i.e., the suggestion that when national 
agricultural research systems get more 
capable, part of the funding that goes to 
Centers should be allocated instead to na-
tional agricultural research systems. This 
is logical only if the activity is dissemina-
tion/extension or if national agricultural 
research systems are producing interna-
tional public goods and/or organizing 
their work, time, and resources in such a 
way as to share results and resources with 
other countries. At that point this would 
indeed be logical. 
The Independent Review offers a. 
helpful guidance material on part-
nerships—if these criteria are not 
satisfied, there may not be a need for 
partnerships for the case in hand.
The Independent Review has re-b. 
peated the assertion in several Ex-
ternal Program and Management 
Reviews that Centers should be col-
laborating with the private sector—
but once again it is not set out as 
“why, and to do what”? The recom-
mended enquiry is well needed.
Policy role not well developed. 9. In fact, 
policy may not be a principal strength of 
the CGIAR System. It is interesting that 
no part of the Panel Review or the Work-
ing Groups picks up on the World Bank 
meta-evaluation which questions why the 
Centers should be involved in policy (ex-
cept of course where it is natural for them 
to be so). Turning the CGIAR inside out 
so that there is a “policy spokesperson” is 
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odd; IFPRI speaks to the issues on which 
they have studied policy; ILRI has strong 
views on livestock policy, etc. It is not evi-
dent that the Consultative Group has an 
overall policy recommendation role—or 
that the value added to the extraordinary 
effort to create this capacity would lead to 
other than generalities. 
Similarly, the insistence on an “inte-a. 
grated CGIAR policy view on Af-
rica” is problematical, and advocates 
of such an approach have not to date 
outlined what such an integrated pol-
icy might contain given that there are 
40+ countries with different climatic 
zones, levels of development, rainfall, 
etc. Rather, it is suggested that the ab-
sence of this integrated view supports 
the need for structural change. Deci-
sions turn into mechanisms indeed. 
Inconsistencies with Paris Declaration and 10. 
evolving development assistance trends. 
Clearly there is a need for the CGIAR 
system to work in harmony with the 
broad lines of the Paris Declaration to the 
CGIAR system. It is not totally clear how 
the ownership of developing countries 
will devolve from a new arrangement be-
tween donors.
Notes
These comments are made in my personal capacity and 1. 
reflect long involvement in the CG as a donor (President 
of CIDA 1983–89), as a Board member (ICARDA and 
IWMI) and Board Chair (ICARDA). Perhaps most germane, 
I chaired the 2001 Change Management Team. It is also 
of interest that I have sat or Chaired the Boards of two 
non-CG agricultural research organizations, CABI and the 
International Fertilizer Development Center. This offers an 
interesting perspective indeed on pros and cons of CGIAR 
membership. 
This was of course the main rationale behind the Challenge 2. 
Programs which, it was hoped would create small, short 
lived parts of the system working very differently from 
Centers, rather than Center-like creatures tackling complex 
and long standing subjects with full system strictures 
competing for funding , influence, and longevity.
Comments by Uma Lele
As per the terms of reference, these comments 
focus on the analysis, findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations of the Independent 
Review of the CGIAR.1 The review origi-
nated as part of the requirement of the World 
Bank’s Development Grant Facility that such 
an independent review be carried out every 
three to five years. It was expanded into a 
full-fledged external review to consider effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the 
CGIAR, and to “assess whether the CGIAR 
is well positioned to address emerging issues 
of food and agriculture of developing coun-
tries and to make recommendations.”2
General comments on the scope, 
analytical approach, findings, 
conclusions and recommendations
Its overall conclusion seems to be that the 
system is inefficient, has been effective in sev-
eral areas, but as currently managed it limps 
along—however, without being in a position 
to address the emerging issues of food and 
agriculture of developing countries.
The report focuses on improving gover-
nance first, separating financing from manage-
ment of the centers through a firewall, letting 
the Alliance take charge of developing and 
managing programmatic approaches, and let-
ting the appointed new governors address all 
the rest of the issues of the system identified 
in the report. It is a substantial report rich in 
content. There is a great deal to absorb in the 
15 chapters in a very short time, even for those 
deeply knowledgeable about the CGIAR, its 
history and evolution. Whether those in key 
positions to determine the CGIAR’s future 
would have the time to absorb its full con-
tent, and, even more important, to devote the 
time needed to develop thoughtful proposals 
attuned to the future needs of the system is 
a question. The question has acquired added 
importance since nearly 60 actors in the sys-
tem are also concurrently involved in their 
own parallel Change Management exercise, 
with the input of time and financial resources 
of comparable magnitude to that of the exter-
nal evaluation.
Issues relate to the content of this report 
as well as to its ownership in the system. To 
make my comments useful to the External 
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Review in the context of the Change Man-
agement process, and given the time pressures 
under which both are operating during dis-
cussions in IRRI, I provide support below for 
the following propositions: 
The Independent Review’s methodology 1. 
and approach has been similar to that of 
the Operations Evaluation Department’s 
(OED) meta-review completed in 2003, 
with some major differences outlined im-
mediately below.
The Independent Review updates the 2. 
meta-review picture in many areas. But 
its scope is more limited than that of the 
OED meta-review. The meta-review fo-
cused on the implications of the chang-
ing global science. It also explored im-
plications of the greatly differentiated 
national agricultural research systems for 
the CGIAR’s comparative advantage and 
core business.
The Independent Review’s focus on im-3. 
proving governance first is problematic 
for three reasons. First, I show why form 
should follow function, and not the other 
way round, as the Independent Review 
argues. Second, given the deep and long 
standing divide among the CGIAR’s 
key donor Members on the focus on up-
stream vs. downstream research, defini-
tion of the CGIAR’s function has been 
a challenge for quite some time without 
any resolution. No amount of governance 
reform, nor periodic more vision and 
mission statements—as the CGIAR has 
done over the last two decades—alone 
can address that challenge. Third, a form 
already exists or can be created relatively 
easily for the purposes of reforming the 
CGIAR, if there is political will among 
the key donors of the CGIAR to use the 
existing knowledge and to act. Reforms 
based on a partial view of the system, 
whether from this external review or 
from the latest Change Management Ex-
ercise, will continue to be detrimental to 
the system.
While there is general agreement on the 4. 
current state of affairs in the CGIAR, 
well described in the report, there is no 
consensus on how to reform the system 
in a manner that is well positioned for 
the 21st century and yet has the broad 
ownership of the key actors in the sys-
tem (namely, the CGIAR Chair and Sec-
retariat, three or four key donors—the 
World Bank, the United States, and the 
European Union representing its Mem-
bers with a coherent voice—the Centers, 
and the Science Council). Developing 
countries have had a small voice in the 
system ever since it was established, and 
even with increased membership, they 
have either not exercised it effectively or 
have not succeeded in getting their con-
cerns across, except to press for retention 
of Centers in their countries. Regrettably, 
as this report points out yet once again, 
they have not played their part effec-
tively. I concur with the quote from the 
three Gurus of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Yujiro Hayami, Michael 
Lipton, and Harris Mule,who served on 
the Meta Review’s External Advisory 
Panel—namely, that the CGIAR is fac-
ing the challenge of managing a global 
commons.
What I recommend at the end of this 5. 
note builds on, but is different from ei-
ther the Independent Review’s conclu-
sions and recommendations or those of 
the Change Management, seen from my 
own lens on the CGIAR system and from 
the perspectives of developing countries 
by now for nearly 40 years (oops—it has 
been that long!). Prospects for a new vi-
brant CGIAR emerging remain unclear. 
And yet the synthetic view of the Change 
Management and Independent Review 
conclusions and recommendations in-
terspersed with my own thoughts might 
well be worth considering in IRRI.
Notwithstanding the differences in em-
phases noted above, the intended purpose of 
a periodic, independent, systemwide, external 
evaluation which OED recommended to the 
World Bank remains valid. It was to achieve 
transparency and accountability of the system, 
 160 BRINGING toGEthER thE BESt of SCIENCE ANd thE BESt of dEvElopMENt
not just to its immediate stakeholders, but to 
the membership at large. 
The CGIAR has had an impressive evalua-
tion record at the Center level, but it has been 
historically reticent to undertake System-level 
evaluations (a distinction the Independent 
Review does not make) and to learn from 
them. The World Bank’s Independent Evalu-
ation Group is increasingly encouraging such 
System-level evaluations of global programs, 
using common guidelines and standards, 
given an ever larger flow of donor aid going 
through global partnerships. Assessing aid ef-
fectiveness of these partnerships has become 
more important, but more difficult, because 
accountability for performance is diffused—
as the CGIAR well demonstrates. Yet assess-
ing their impacts or achieving reforms in well 
intentioned, but ill conceived programs too 
has become a daunting task.3 An independent 
assessment can potentially provide a useful 
input into reforms. 
I hope therefore that the Independent 
Review will be published and disseminated 
widely, after it has been fully vetted for its 
evidentiary base, factual accuracy, scope, 
and content. I also hope it will contribute 
to the discussion of the future directions of 
the CGIAR which the Change Management 
Process has currently underway.
Detailed comments
Analytical approach, evidentiary base, scope, 
and methodology. The review is based on the 
meta-evaluation of the CGIAR’s own volu-
minous output completed since 2001, the 
CGIAR’s own financial data, the use of the 
CGIAR’s other extensive measurement and 
reporting systems, and interviews and sur-
veys of stakeholders. The method is similar to 
the one deployed by OED’s meta-evaluation 
(which had reviewed nearly 700 reports and 
consulted well over 265 stakeholders). This 
review updates OED’s analysis in useful ways 
and expands it in several areas, e.g., in report-
ing on the poor functioning (according to the 
findings of the Independent Review) of the 
fourfold reforms set in train in 2001, on the 
findings of Science Council’s new evaluations 
of policy and natural resource management 
research, and on the treatment of issues of 
gender and diversity—including particularly 
the decline in the representation of devel-
oping countries in management positions, 
among others.4
There are a few key distinctions between 
the Independent Review and the OED meta-
review in the methodological approach and 
scope. 
The Independent Review has had the •	
benefit of visits to CGIAR centers. 
The OED meta-evaluation did not. 
The OED review commissioned pa-•	
pers from national agricultural re-
search systems in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America to explore the impli-
cations of the changing status of the 
national agricultural research systems 
to the CGIAR reforms—an aspect 
which is currently lacking in this re-
view, as well as in the ongoing Change 
Management exercise. 
A broader view would have led the Inde-
pendent Review to explore the implications 
of its very interesting findings for the reforms 
needed. Several examples follow.
National agricultural research systems and 
CGIAR programs. The reviews of the Sys-
temwide and Ecoregional Programs stress 
the difficulties of scalability and replicabil-
ity, and the importance of—but the absence 
of—a measurement of environmental impacts. 
Without the active participation of national 
agricultural research systems in research and 
application there is limited, if any, prospect of 
Systemwide and Ecoregional Programs having 
large-scale impacts, except when they focus 
tightly only on productivity mainly through 
germ plasm improvement. Moreover, even in 
some of the successful Systemwide and Eco-
regional Programs, such as the Alternatives to 
Slash and Burn and Rice and Wheat Systems, 
with which I happen to be familiar, the impli-
cations for action—in policy and operational 
terms—need the entire gamut of national 
systems.5 There are interesting tidbits in the 
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report on the CGIAR study of its impacts in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in drier 
areas. It suggests that the impact has been 
greater in South Asia than in Africa. I suspect 
that is because of the stronger national agri-
cultural research systems in India, which has 
done more applied and adaptive research on 
the crops in drier areas (a matter of long stand-
ing controversy between India and the Interna-
tional Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics), and is due to a stronger, but by 
no means an ideal, service-delivery system. 
However, neither perhaps the specific impact 
studies of the CGIAR, nor this external eval-
uation explore its full policy or institutional 
implications. The meta-review had noted that 
the role of strong national research and deliv-
ery systems is frequently underrecognized in 
the CGIAR’s impact evaluations, which tend 
to take credit largely to its own activities. This 
also means some national agricultural research 
systems, too, can compete and lead Challenge 
Programs through South-South coopera-
tion. Phil Pardy has made this same point by 
meticulously documenting the importance of 
investment in agricultural research in develop-
ing countries together with the CGIAR.
CGIAR’s poverty impacts. There is no possible 
way that—acting alone, or mimicking in small 
ways the national agricultural research sys-
tems’ functions through adaptive research—
the CGIAR can have large-scale, immediate 
poverty impacts in a manner that the CGIAR 
donors have been increasingly demanding 
of it (a call to which the CGIAR Centers 
have been responding). It calls not only for 
strengthening national agricultural research 
systems (and in the case of small national agri-
cultural research systems, both regional and 
national research systems), but for seamless 
partnerships with developing countries with 
regard to their national policies, institutions 
and delivery systems. This is also illustrated 
by the disappointing spread of New Rice for 
Africa rice noted in the report.6 
CGIAR’s relationship to national agricul-
tural research systems and advanced countries’ 
institutions. Both the Independent Review 
and Change Management are inward looking. 
Neither explores what would be required stra-
tegically and structurally for the CGIAR sys-
tem, and of the donors who fund the CGIAR, 
to mobilize cutting edge science on the one 
hand, and to increase the scientific relevance 
to the clients on the ground on the other. 
The Independent Review’s finding that 
the national agricultural research systems 
find the CGIAR centers competing for re-
sources, rather than complementing their ac-
tivities, is a long standing tension, and it is 
problematic. 
So is the Independent Review’s finding, in 
the context of the Challenge Programs, that 
few advanced-country research institutions 
have found the challenge programs so fair in 
competitiveness as to want to invest their own 
resources to compete. The Independent Re-
view does not delve into how Challenge Pro-
grams have evolved. They have not been cred-
ible enough in terms of the openness of their 
competition, and some in the size of their re-
sources, for either the advanced research insti-
tutes or the more advanced national agricul-
tural research systems to compete as leaders. 
Yet the genuine opening to both national 
agricultural research systems and advanced 
research institutes can be achieved success-
fully where there is demonstrated political 
will to reform the system and full prepared-
ness in the design of competition to achieve 
it. Brazil’s EMBRAPA showed this, an effort 
which the World Bank supported through a 
loan of $50 million to the PRODETAB pro-
gram. That program was in turn derived from 
the GREAN Initiative which had gathered 
considerable momentum in the mid 1990s 
but was never implemented beyond Brazil for 
lack of funding.7 And the original intention 
of the Challenge Programs was similar.
McNamara’s Bank achieved this same ef-
fect of larger impacts brilliantly, albeit in a 
different way, in Asia in the 1970s. The Bank 
had not only designed a clever CGIAR, on 
which I say more later, but made massive com-
plementary investments in Asian countries in 
support of agricultural development strategies 
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technology, and delivery systems that would 
help national agricultural research systems to 
adapt and spread the new technologies on the 
ground.8 
Absence of such a vision for the CGIAR–
national agricultural research systems– 
advanced research institutes partnership may 
turn out to be a particularly important missed 
opportunity in the context of the redesign of 
the CGIAR, given that donors and the World 
Bank are once again focusing on food and 
 agriculture—although their current focus is 
on short term price stabilization and increas-
ing access of the poor to food, a consequence 
of the neglect of agriculture in developing 
countries over two decades.
To summarize:
To achieve larger impacts CGIAR •	
needs to add value by complementing, 
rather than competing investments—
over and above what donors, national 
agricultural research systems, and 
other new suppliers of technologies 
and services already do, can do, or 
should do at the country level. 
The CGIAR not only needs to be a •	
better global player in the arena of 
agricultural policy, as the report sug-
gests, but as its sponsor and lender 
to development countries. The Bank 
and other donors need to make com-
plementary long-term investments. 
The implications of these facts for the 
CGIAR’s own reform process or the 
Bank’s and donors’ complementary 
activity in developing countries are 
not explored either in the Indepen-
dent Review or in the Change Man-
agement process. The result is that 
the CGIAR is expected to perform 
an impossible task by its donors—
namely, to deliver large-scale poverty 
impacts quickly. 
I discuss below the performance-based cri-
teria for resource allocation in the CGIAR, 
rather than the one based on the dual criteria 
of the potential for scientific breakthroughs 
(and/or application of known science) and for 
poverty impacts.
CGIAR, foundations, and the private sector. 
Also from such a broader perspective, how 
should the CGIAR relate to Gates and other 
foundations at the System level? The Inde-
pendent Review documents well the substan-
tially increased role of the Gates Foundation 
in the CGIAR funding through the two best 
Challenge Programs. But it does not explore 
its implications for mobilizing science using 
foundations. Gates is doing this ably in the 
health sector by funding global vaccine pro-
grams. It is dealing with the issues of intellec-
tual property and licensing. It is also investing 
in universities. Foundation Research, and its 
application through the use of the private sec-
tor more generally for the CGIAR reforms, 
are profound—including for a legal persona. 
The proposed funding of the Gates Founda-
tion in agriculture is already far larger than in 
the CGIAR, and the issue of CGIAR reforms 
needs to be considered in that context.
The Strong Review, the OED meta-review, 
the CGIAR itself, and its donor supporters 
have often flagged these two challenges—but 
they acknowledge that they have failed to come 
to grips with them. Even the report by the for-
mer Director and Chair of the CGIAR of the 
reform efforts in the 2001–07 period, which, 
unlike the Independent Review, is generally 
laudable of what has been achieved, acknowl-
edges failure to mobilize new science—one of 
the major stated objectives of converting the 
Technical Advisory Committee into the Sci-
ence Council at the time. By the same token, 
the Independent Review gives insufficient rec-
ognition to the evaluation work carried out 
by the Science Council including of the many 
centers, thematic and inter-Center programs. 
I return to the organizational issues of the 
CGIAR later.
Findings which resonate with the OED meta-
review. Some of the findings of the report 
resonate fully with those of the meta-review, 
the Strong Review, and indeed even the find-
ings of the Change Management working 
groups. These include the CGIAR’s unique-
ness as an instrument, its high rates of returns 
(particularly to the CGIAR’s germ plasm and 
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biological control research), its well estab-
lished contribution to poverty reduction 
(mainly in the areas of germplasm and bio-
logical control), its greater successes in Asia 
than Africa (even in the rained areas growing 
similar crops)—and yet, the increased role of 
restricted funds, stagnation of funds in real 
terms, declining allocation of resources to 
germplasm improvement research, a highly 
complex management structure, rigidities and 
slowness of decision making.
The review also confirms the warning 
of the OED meta-review that the fourfold 
Change Design and Management Team re-
forms—of the Executive Council and a Sys-
tem Office, transforming the Technical Ad-
visory Committee into a Science Council, 
and Challenge Programs as a programmatic 
approach—did not go far enough, and the re-
forms were unrealistic in assuming they could 
transform the system as a whole in a short pe-
riod using Challenge Programs as an instru-
ment.9 With Challenge Programs—such as 
on water, rushed through using massive donor 
fund commitments rather than by the science 
quality—the outcome was predictable, and 
the incentives to centers were clear. All Cen-
ters flocked to Challenge Programs, further 
spreading the system thin rather than leading 
to the wholesale elimination of some of the re-
search programs—or indeed even of the Cen-
ters, as the reform process had hoped. 
The Independent Review’s findings, but 
not its recommendations, confirm the earlier 
assessment of the meta-review, that there is 
need for systemwide allocation of resources 
by an able and qualified Science Council, 
based on system-level priorities. These need 
to be determined by scientific possibilities, 
science quality, and potential for impact on 
poverty reduction. The actual impact of the 
CGIAR technology must, however, come by 
strengthening systems in developing coun-
tries through complementary investments 
by governments and donors alike, and not by 
downstream development activities of Cen-
ters. The latter is a manifestation of the fail-
ure of both governments and donors to invest 
in research and service delivery in developing 
countries. In this regard I found the Indepen-
dent Review perhaps too influenced by the 
Center perspectives. I also found it difficult 
to understand some of the criticism of the Sci-
ence Council. To the extent that the donors 
fund numerous small projects and demand in-
dependent evaluations of their programs, and 
the CGIAR secretariat does its own financial 
monitoring, this has resulted in triplication 
of work. 
The fundamental problem is restricted 
funding by donors to Centers for activities 
of their joint choice, without regard to their 
international public-goods character. The 
World Bank underwriting the overhead costs 
of the Centers compounded the problem of 
Centers by giving them the attributes of con-
sulting firms. It compounded the problems of 
overhead cost collection once the Bank’s role 
as a donor of last resort to produce interna-
tional public goods broke down.
It is true that the Bank’s funding has be-
come more restricted to Challenge Programs. 
Some Challenge Programs are producing 
international public goods, and perhaps the 
Bank has not supported the right Challenge 
Programs. The timebound nature of Chal-
lenge Programs has always puzzled me. The 
two best ones have depended on the work of 
the CGIAR Centers for well over a decade in 
those activities! It is also clear that the Chal-
lenge Programs have doubled the work of the 
Centers by engaging in and providing lead to 
Challenge Programs. This is in part because 
they know the rules of the CGIAR better 
than outsiders, as the Independent Review 
state—but also because the Challenge Pro-
grams failed to open up the system for true 
competition, in a way the GREAN Initiative 
had proposed and EMBRAPA instituted for 
PRODETAB achieved. 
In short governance, management and fi-
nance are intrinsically related to how science 
is conducted in the CGIAR. Simply address-
ing governance, and creating a fund, desirable 
as it is, will not address the problem for rea-
sons discussed below.
The report documents well the lack 
of clarity, overlap and gaps in the roles, 
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responsibilities and accountabilities of the 
key units of the system—namely, the Secre-
tariat, the Science Council, the Systems Of-
fice, and the Centers (Chairs, Directors and 
Managers). While these tensions are inevita-
ble in a CGIAR as an entity, and indeed have 
existed for a long time, the report’s findings 
suggest that they may have worsened in the 
post-2001 reform period, in part due to exces-
sive centralization of functions in the office 
of the CGIAR Director as the Chief Execu-
tive Officer. In that sense the 2001 reforms 
changed the character of the CGIAR funda-
mentally by shifting power from the Chair of 
the Technical Advisory Committee/Science 
Council to the CGIAR Secretariat. From the 
report these tensions seem to have led to the 
Science Council subsequently to (re?)assert-
ing its independence from the System Office, 
the relationship of which the CGIAR Secre-
tariat was ambiguous from the outset. The re-
forms of the 2002 also led the centers to (re?)
asserting their independence from the Secre-
tariat and the Science Council.10 The CGIAR 
Director perhaps no longer acts as the Chief 
Executive Officer of the System as a whole, 
although some post 2001 CGIAR publica-
tions suggest that that is his role. As a result, 
the report indicates that there is diffusion of 
tensions in the last year. However, it does not 
indicate that they have occurred to a point 
where there is mutual trust and a collaborative 
ambiance which once existed in the CGAIR 
system. So how much of the dysfunction is the 
result of structure as distinct from functions 
and personalities? And should structure pre-
cede functional clarity?
Looking ahead
While the Independent Evaluation report 
suggests that the central Change Design and 
Management Team strategy for the conduct 
of science, and to transform the CGIAR sys-
tem from a center based to a program-based 
system, is not working well, the good news 
is that Centers are collaborating more with 
each other. What, then, does this mean for 
proceeding with expanding the Challenge 
Programs as the strategy—and should the 
Challenge Programs simply be turned back 
to the Centers to lead because they do a good 
job under the current rules of the game for the 
Challenge Programs, as the report suggests? 
Should one declare defeat in the transforma-
tion of the system beyond what the centers 
are willing to agree to, in terms of bringing 
new science and actors to the table, as distinct 
from the reality of what the changed external 
environment calls for? 
One of the reason new actors are needed 
is that the cost of investing in the capital 
equipment to conduct modern science in 
the CGIAR compounds is too high, and 
the CGIAR does not have the resources—
nor, seemingly, the political will among its 
traditional official development assistance 
donors—to invest in a situation of declin-
ing resources and increasing costs of mod-
ern research in a highly dynamic biological 
and informational science. Yet there is also a 
considerable underutilization of the physical 
capital invested in biological and physical re-
search, e.g., in US universities, and a hunger 
for collaborations in the context of globaliza-
tion which is better achieved under an inter-
national umbrella.
The way forward
Both the External Report and the Change 
Management process are attempting to come 
to grips with these general findings, but they 
are doing so in very different ways. Whereas 
there may well be a great deal of consensus on 
the findings, there remains little agreement 
on how to address them. This is best illus-
trated by the report “Revolutionizing the Evo-
lution of the CGIAR” by the former Direc-
tor and Chair of the CGIAR. Their diagnosis 
of the CGIAR performance and what needs 
to change, their conclusions, and their rec-
ommendations focus on improving Center 
governance, questioning the Center alliance, 
reducing perhaps the number of Centers, dis-
banding the Science Council and replacing it 
with ad hoc panels, and a strong (CGIAR or 
Science Council?) Secretariat. These are radi-
cally different recommendations from those 
of the Independent Evaluation. It is unclear 
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at this stage if they are more in sync with the 
Change Management proposals.
Role of the current and 
future Science Council
The Independent Review does not make a 
sharp distinction between the roles of the 
Center-level and system-level evaluations and 
those of self- and independent evaluations. 
There is much room for improving the quality 
of both in the CGIAR, e.g, by including par-
ticularly the greater use of controlled experi-
ment methodology in evaluations, and by the 
use of counterfactual and alternative sources 
of supply analysis in evaluating the work of the 
Centers (i.e., the costs and benefits when the 
CGIAR center is engaged in an activity simi-
lar to the ones being conducted by national 
agricultural research systems and even some 
nongovernmental organizations). Yet improv-
ing the quality of Center-level evaluations can 
be achieved with quite different reforms of 
the system’s evaluation function than the ones 
suggested in the panel report of separating the 
evaluation function completely. 
Separating the evaluation function is 
more necessary for the system-level evalu-
ations than the Center-level evaluations of 
Center management and Centers’ scientific 
programs. There is no reason why some of this 
work can not be outsourced without violating 
the principle of independence of evaluators. 
This is where linking evaluation to strategy is 
critical.
To give an example, the report sites that 
stakeholders interviewed consider Natural 
Resource Management and policy research 
to have had much less impact than germ-
plasm research. The two examples of the 
IFPRI policy research with considerable im-
pact cited in the report are the evaluation 
of the Progressa program in Mexico and of 
the school program in Bangladesh. Even 
though IFPRI work in both these cases is of 
high quality and has had impact, there are 
plenty of others who conduct such evalua-
tions of school feeding programs (including 
MIT). Indeed, an impact evaluation indus-
try has recently emerged in US universities 
and think tanks for delivery of health and 
education programs.
What the independent evaluation does 
not point out is that there is dearth of work 
currently on critical agricultural policy is-
sues crying out for guidance: e.g., the fiscal, 
productivity, poverty and environmental im-
pacts of input pricing and subsidies and im-
plications for productivity growth involving 
the poor and natural resource conservation, 
of price stabilization programs on food secu-
rity of the poor, the reality and the scope for 
public-private partnerships in the delivery of 
agricultural services, to name only a few such 
topics. And there are few alternative sources 
of supply in these areas. In the absence of hard 
analysis, donor policy recommendations have 
been driven by ideology and expediency. Gov-
ernment intervention in developing countries, 
even in the face of massive public support of 
OECD agriculture and little prospects for ag-
ricultural policy reforms in developed coun-
tries, has remained controversial in the donor 
community, with little help to advance agri-
culture in developing countries—dual stan-
dards if there ever were any. 
Promoting cash transfers, on the other 
hand, has now become hip. When donor funds 
are tied to what research CGIAR centers can 
do, there is little scope for the CGIAR to play 
up to its true comparative advantage in essen-
tial areas of policy and institutional choices 
for all Member countries, areas in which few 
others are likely to venture. That was the rea-
son why IFPRI was brought into the CGIAR 
system when another such food crisis erupted 
in the 1970s.
In reviewing and commenting on the ex-
ternal evaluation, therefore, one cannot help 
but note that two concurrent exercises are cur-
rently underway. The latter also involves 60 
to 65 people, with concurrent consultations 
with a similar number of CGIAR’s 200 to 
300 stakeholders as held by this review (donor 
and developing country Members, Center di-
rectors and managers, Science Council and 
Executive Council members, among others). 
This experience is similar to when the OED’s 
meta-review was being conducted in 2002 and 
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2003, when also a reform program based on 
the recommendations of the Change Design 
and Management Team was underway. It pro-
posed a more gradualist approach to reforms. 
Besides, there is history of lack of ownership 
of the recommendations of external reviews 
in the CGIAR, well represented in the com-
mentary on the Strong Report by the former 
director and the chairman of the CGIAR, 
one which the meta-review had also encoun-
tered. This leads me to conclude that it would 
be impossible to reform the CGIAR without 
the key actors—particularly the World Bank, 
EU, and US—buying into the reform pro-
cess, particularly in mobilizing completely 
unrestricted funds for the CGIAR, much 
like in the case of the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or the Inter-
national Development Association. However, 
this needs to be done without the Indepen-
dent Review’s analogy of resource allocation 
procedures carried out by either the Global 
Fund or the International Development As-
sociation being applied to the CGIAR, for the 
reasons discussed below.
Recommendations
The Independent Review recommends 
that governance be reformed first, a fire-
wall between financing and management be 
established, the Centers’ alliance should have 
a legal status—and be given the role in the 
development and management of program-
matic approaches with advice from a scien-
tific advisory body—and the new governance 
team should address all other issues, including 
of all allocations with support from another 
set of advisors/experts. 
OED/IEG’s reviews of global programs, 
which are by now substantial in number and 
are on the IEG’s external website, together 
with evidence above, shows that governance, 
finance, and management of global programs 
interact in a complex way, and they need to 
be tackled simultaneously. I do not agree with 
the Independent Review conclusion that the 
form needs to precede function. Function—in 
this case, an agreement among donors on the 
conduct of best science to address problems of 
poverty in a sustainable way complemented by 
long term investments in agricultural research 
and development in developing countries—
needs to precede form. 
This is particularly essential now in the 
case of the CGIAR. Like the external panel, 
I too place a high premium on getting an 
agreement among key donors on unrestricted 
funding to the system as a whole and in larger 
amounts as an integral part of the reform. And 
yet the Change Management reform proposals 
seemed to be built upon a (realistic) assessment 
that increased unrestricted funding as pro-
vided currently is unrealistic. This situation 
can change only if there is a complete make 
over of the CGIAR funding. CGIAR funding 
has evolved as trickles of restricted funding in 
support of small projects contributed to by in-
numerable actors in donor agencies in negotia-
tions with individual centers, in sharp contrast 
to the GEF, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the Interna-
tional Development Association (which itself 
is losing its unrestricted nature). The lack of 
unrestricted funding in larger amounts, as en-
visaged by the Change Management process, 
in my view will fundamentally constrain the 
real reforms which the CGIAR system needs 
urgently. The Change Management proposals 
are influenced by this reality, perhaps apart 
from the reluctance of those scores of donor 
and center staff involved in the system to relin-
quish their own control of the system. 
This logjam on funding can only be bro-
ken at the highest level by the World Bank 
President. And it can only be achieved by the 
CGIAR chair working closely with the World 
Bank President to mobilize his key counter-
parts in the US and EU, the two other key 
actors essential for this reform process to 
achieve real reforms. UN agencies and devel-
oping countries can provide the much needed 
legitimacy to this process in a way that the 
Bank’s Global Food Facility is being blessed 
and legitimized. But they cannot change the 
current state of affairs. The OED meta-review 
had made such a proposal.
In my interviews of Robert McNamara 
during the OED meta-evaluation, he had 
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indicated that when the CGIAR was formed, 
he faced the challenge of replicating the Rock-
efeller model: letting outstanding scientists 
with understanding, both of science and de-
velopment, be put in charge of resource allo-
cation for the CGIAR. Sir John Crawford, a 
savvy agricultural economist with confidence 
of donors and knowledge of Indian agricul-
ture, and a close advisor to McNamara on 
India, was the first Technical Advisory Com-
mittee chair. McNamara said he was afraid, 
that without such a Technical Advisory Com-
mittee chair, the system will be run by bureau-
crats in the World Bank and USAID. They 
would not know how best to allocate resources 
to achieve results in making science work for 
development. I believe strongly he was right. 
He had the vision and the shrewd instinct 
about how bureaucracies work. I do not know 
if this can happen again. The Change Man-
agement Proposals reflect the reality that this 
large and long-term strategic vision may not 
be realizable at this time.
 At the same time I do not think the allo-
cating principles of the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria or the Inter-
national Development Association, which are 
quite different, are applicable to the CGIAR 
by any means. The Global Fund is based on 
competitive proposals with competition being 
open to all developing Member countries, in 
a way that has not happened in the CGIAR, 
and the Independent Review does not propose 
this. Besides, with preponderant resources 
going to Africa, where the need is great but 
the capacity to use resources effectively is 
small, the impacts are likely to be less—the 
Global Fund has yet to be held accountable 
for results. International Development Asso-
ciation allocations are based on demonstrated 
policy and institutional reforms by countries. 
Most still sing the mantra of the free mar-
ket, not a helpful criterion for the allocation 
of CGIAR funds to centers by any stretch of 
imagination. Besides, Centers have demon-
strated their own weaknesses—namely, to 
pursue funding as a way of remaining in busi-
ness, rather than always pursuing their noble 
mission. Finally, the CGIAR was created as a 
global institution. The International Develop-
ment Association and the Global Fund are ex-
clusively country-oriented grant programs. If 
it wishes, the CGIAR can mobilize expertise 
from China, Brazil, and India to help Africa 
in a way the CGIAR Mexican and Japanese 
varieties of maize, wheat and rice helped Asia 
before. That is something the International 
Development Association and the Global 
Fund were not conceived to do. The Rock-
efeller/Ford-funded Centers that led to the 
birth of the CGIAR had that grand vision.
The task of change management should 
be assigned to a small group of thoughtful 
knowledgeable people who know and under-
stand the CGIAR system, have the confidence 
of donors, and have an understanding of the 
developmental process to explore all options 
for an overhaul of the system. It can not be 
incremental and succeed.
Notes
These comments are made in my personal capacity. 1. 
They benefit from my experience in being engaged in 
the issues of the emerging global aid architecture for 
food, agriculture, health and environment and from my 
involvement in and evaluation of global programs and 
partnerships. More information on these evaluations can 
be found at www.umalele.org
TOR sent to the reviewers.2. 
World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group, Source Book 3. 
for Evaluating Global and Regional Programs: Indicative 
Principles and Standards, 2007.
Women were always marginal in management positions 4. 
in the CGIAR. That void has been made up to some 
extent at the top with the Chair of the CGIAR and the 
Science Advisor in the World Bank being women. 
As a development economist borne and raised in a 
developing country, I tend to be more concerned about 
the CGIAR being staffed by qualified individuals than 
with the gender balance given how unequal that balance 
remains throughout the world in all endeavors. The report 
shows that with growing uncertainty about unrestricted 
resources to recruit and retain top quality scientists, 
whether men or women, and whether from developed 
or developing countries, this remains a matter of 
considerable concern in the CGIAR system.
In the case of Alternatives to Slash and Burn, which I 5. 
recently reviewed in the context of the second evaluation 
of the World Bank’s 2002 Forest Strategy and Forest 
Related Global Programs, the implications relate to 
land tenure, community management, global markets 
for tropical timber, agriculture and energy, forest 
concession policies to name only a few. In the case of 
the Rice-Wheat System Initiative in which I was involved 
at the beginning when it was being set up, an important 
concern was the crop rotation of rice and wheat leading 
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to decline in productivity of both, related in part to the 
government’s pricing and subsidy policies towards both 
crops and inputs, and a lack of other attractive options 
for planting. Any payment for environmental services in 
the face of a distorted price regime, which, in any case, 
have not advanced much in India, would certainly call for 
measurement of environmental benefits.
The World Bank for example has consistently questioned 6. 
the economics of rice production in Africa and frequently 
there is no research or extension system to speak of in the 
countries. There is no way that NERICA’s adoption can be 
expanded without such a link to national systems
A joint effort by US Universities, CGIAR centers and 7. 
developing country scientists, co-chaired by Cornell 
University and University of Florida, The Global Research 
on the Environmental and Agricultural Nexus (GREAN), 
was endorsed by the then chairman of the CGIAR, Ismail 
Serageldin.
See Uma Lele, India’s Food Crisis and the World Bank’s 8. 
Role in Fifty Years is enough.
“The Challenge Programs were being established without 9. 
first addressing the issues of system level funding, priority 
setting, science quality and governance treated in the 
previous evaluations of the CGIAR. OED recommended 
that the CGIAR postpone the approval of new Challenge 
Programs (beyond the first two already approved) pending 
an assessment of System-level priorities, and a thorough 
review of the design and approval process of the first 
two programs to learn lessons for the selection, design, 
sequencing and phasing of future Challenge Programs in 
the context of System-level priorities and strategies.
The OED Meta review had noted that “the CGIAR is less 10. 
focused on enhancing agricultural productivity than it 
used to be. Its current mix of activities reflects neither 
its comparative advantage nor its core competence. 
The six founding principles that were adopted when 
the CGIAR consisted of fewer centers and less diverse 
constituents are no longer suited to today’s politically 
driven authorizing environment, wider research agenda 
and expanding membership”, Précis of the CGIAR Meta 
Review, OED, 2004.
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containing the Independent Review Panel’s 
full Technical Report.
The Technical Report begins with an 
Overview of Findings and Recommendations. 
The body of the Technical Report is presented 
in 15 chapters that address the Review’s Terms 
of Reference and cover four overarching top-
ics as outlined in the Inception Report: the 
global context in which the CGIAR operates, 
governance of the CGIAR and its Centers, fi-
nancing, and partnerships. 
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss challenges to 
global agriculture and provide an assessment 
of the CGIAR’s scientific achievements. 
Chapter 4 describes the multiple components 
of the CGIAR System and their operation. 
It also discusses the character of the CGIAR 
“System” and the CGIAR’s capacity for stra-
tegic planning. Chapter 5 then provides an 
analysis of the international architecture for 
agricultural research for poverty reduction.
Chapter 6 evaluates the work of the Sci-
ence Council, and Chapter 7 assesses the roles 
of the CGIAR’s Members and cosponsors. In 
Chapter 8 the Panel reviews the Challenge 
Programs and the extent to which they have 
met the objectives set out in the 2001 Change 
Design and Management process. The chap-
ter also discusses Ecoregional and Other Sys-
temwide Programs and whether they and the 
Challenge Programs are effective mechanisms 
to optimize CGIAR science and synergies 
among Centers and between Centers and 
partners. Chapter 9 evaluates System- and 
Center-level gender and diversity issues. 
Chapter 10 assesses the CGIAR’s and 
Centers’ management of intellectual prop-
erty. This leads into Chapter 11, in which 
the Panel reviews the CGIAR’s and Centers’ 
partnerships, both internally and with outside 
organizations. In Chapter 12 the Panel ana-
lyzes how the CGIAR conducts evaluation 
and performance measurement and describes 
how the CGIAR System can better incorpo-
rate results-based management into its opera-
tions to improve its relevance and efficacy, as 
well as its ability to articulate outcomes and 
impacts of its work.
Chapter 13 reviews the Executive Coun-
cil, the System Office, and the CGIAR’s re-
form efforts over the past five years. It then 
puts forth a governance model based on a re-
balanced partnership between the Consulta-
tive Group and the Centers it supports. This 
is complemented by Chapter 14, which de-
scribes current and proposed resource mobi-
lization and allocation practices. Chapter 15 
gives an in-depth analysis of financing trends 
and financial management.
Appendix 1 of the Technical Report is 
a detailed summary of the results of the In-
dependent Review Panel survey of informed 
stakeholders.
